By

Professor Julius O. Ihonvbere, OON
National Chairman, Board of Trustees
Institute of Corporate and Business Affairs Management
Lagos, Nigeria

Text of a Lecture Delivered at the Church of God Mission, October 1, 2009.
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Protocol
I thank God for this day and thank the leadership of the Church of God Mission for this invitation.  I congratulate our mother Bishop Margaret Idahosa for continuing the great legacies of our departed Papa Archbishop Benson Idahosa.  May his good soul rest in very perfect peace.
It is indeed a pleasure to be amongst you today.  Under normal circumstances, the tone and content of this lecture would be different.  But I have a lot of respect for the house of God. A man that cannot differentiate between his father’s house and the market place is a fool.
Let me not waste your time with intellectual gymnastics, definitions and unnecessary grammar. The issue before us is economic bliss and good governance.  I have changed it to good governance and economic bliss because it is good governance that makes economic bliss possible.    Contrary to the thinking of many intellectuals and policy makers, just as we all know the difference between good health and illness, ordinary people know the difference between development and underdevelopment.  Today, some nations like to make themselves feel good by saying they are developing nations: we shall not argue with that.
Saying that our country Nigeria is blessed in every respect is saying the obvious.  What is it that we do not have in this country?  Well, we do not have terrorists, earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, Tsunamis, and other devastating natural disasters that make other nations around the world feel jinxed or cursed.  Maybe this is also why we have tended to take things for granted.  We just believe that things will be alright if we keep quiet, and don’t rock the boat.  It is best to be patient; your time to chop will come.  Others have gone as far as drawing up a philosophical road map to what they call “you chop I chop.”  Yet, others go to the extent of leaving everything in the hands of God; they bother God with everything, while they sit down and do very little or nothing.  They do not reflect, organise, think, mobilise, or act on anything.  They forget that heaven only helps those that help themselves.  But you and I know that no country has ever made progress without discipline, focus, responsible and creative leadership, planning, investment, savings, productivity, stability, and good governance.
Today, we are all shouting Obama! Obama!! Obama!!  We even claim that a black man has taken over the most powerful country in the world.  Someone on TV said that visas would now be available to all Nigerians to go to America: what a silly dream.  They fail to look at who Obama is, his antecedents, networks, investment in the people and community, fund raising strategy, organisational strategy, courage, vision and the environment in which he operated.  If Obama were a Nigerian would he win a Councillorship seat?  How many God fathers did you notice?  How many Ghana must go bags full of dollars did you see? How many thugs did you see?  How many political clashes did you see? How many policemen did you see going about with Obama during the campaign?  Did you see electoral officers announcing results?  Can you tell me the equivalent of their INEC in America? Was there a broadcast by the Police Chief warning people on how to behave?  The questions are endless… but let us leave that matter for now.  America was not always like this and Nigeria is not America.  But, can we draw lessons? We do not need to reinvent the wheel!

It is true: We were Colonized, how Long Ago?

There are those that blame our national predicament on our colonial experience.  They claim that because of that experience we can never make progress.  Well, they are right, and very wrong.  True, the Nigerian state is still one in formation.  The State is still non-hegemonic and remains unsteady, unstable, ineffective, inefficient and a tool for primitive accumulation in the hands of the powerful.  It is quite easy to worry about the rather unfortunate state of the nation today.  But a proper historical understanding of the Nigerian reality can enable any analyst to place our conditions and predicaments in proper context.  Our experience with informal empire, colonialism and neo-colonialism has been responsible for the contemporary recycling of inherited distortions and disarticulations.  Yet, we must admit that while the global divisions of labour, power and opportunities have been hostile to Nigeria, we have failed to initiate structures, institutions and processes to contain or respond adequately to our extant challenges.  We have also failed, like most African states, to take advantage of openings in the global economy to restructure, reform, recompose and redirect the character of state, class and production in Nigeria.  Even well-intended policies and programmes, have been easily undermined by prevailing contradictions, limitations, and conflicts in the system.
Is it not amazing that virtually all the problems and challenges discussed in the 1960s, ranging from agriculture, infrastructure and economy, through unemployment, corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, to rural backwardness and industrialisation, are still being discussed today.  In many instances, the problems have more than quadrupled in complexity even if we have made some progress in such as area as telecommunications.  This is rather unfortunate in spite of socio-economic and political experimentations.  From indigenization through commercialization to privatization; parliamentary through military to presidential forms of governments; and state and local government creation; various joint venture and public-private-partnership agreements; Nigeria is yet to find an answer to any of its numerous challenges.  I recognise the debilitating constraints of the colonial experience but I doubt that we can use this excuse for ever.

Oh Yes, We Have Made Progress, can’t you see?

It is true that we can point at new local governments, new states, new infrastructure, a new national anthem, new federal capital, wider, but not necessarily stronger economy, deeper involvement in the global market due mainly to oil exports, and new discourses on politics and economy.  But they have, in large measure, and in spite of the civil war, several military juntas, and transitions, been no more than motion in a barber’s chair: a lot of motion but very little movement or progress.  Countless opportunities to move forward, give our people hope, restructure and reposition the political economy and improve the living conditions of the people have been carelessly squandered without apologies by the governing elite.  Can we truly say that Nigerians are happier? Inflation is lower? Poverty and unemployment are lower?  In the Niger Delta, the Creeks remain as they were in 1958 when the Willinks Commission warned that they could become bastions of protest and resistance.  Where are we today?
The Nigerian state on the other hand remains non-hegemonic.  Yet, a degree of hegemony is required to maintain the sovereignty of a country, keep the bourgeois classes under control, maintain an environment that promotes accumulation and define a nation’s location and role in the global divisions of labour and power.  To be sure, part of the reasons for this, aside from the limited hegemony of the state is the lack of cohesion amongst the ruling or power elite, the distortions in the economy, the vulnerability of the political economy to external interests, and the general condition of poverty in which the majority of Nigerians live.  The way the Nigerian elite breaks into factions and fractions, ethnic and religious enclaves, and engage in very dangerous and irrational fights is simply amazing.

To read the entire speech, you may download the PDF

Prof. Julius O. Ihonvbere, OGI, OON

Text of Lecture delivered to mark the Inauguration of the Edo State Chapter of the Yar’Adua/Jonathan Solidarity Forum, at the Oba Akenzua Cultural Centre,

Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria, June 27, 2009.

PROTOCOL

I thank the organizers for inviting me to deliver this lecture. I heartily congratulate all those being inaugurated today.  I do pray and hope that they will lead by example and lay credible foundations for the future.   Because it is an inauguration ceremony, this lecture will be brief and direct.  In any case, the PDP in Edo state is at a stage today where it cannot afford to engage in trivialities, double-talk and grandstanding.  We have been bruised, battered, humiliated, and almost caged. But thank God, we remain fully on ground, with able and capable leaders, so there is absolutely no shaking.  However, the way out of the present challenges facing the party is to sit down, reflect, be honest with ourselves, reorganize, re-strategize, refocus, reposition, and work collectively for the emergence of a true and even more powerful party in Edo State.  We must abandon our old habits if we are to succeed as a party.

We all know the problems or challenges of leadership in Nigeria and Africa.  Let me state clearly that it is the failure of leadership that has landed us in the wahala (trouble) we all face today.  If the LEADERS have been in charge just before and since political independence, then can we say that they have succeeded or done well?  Some Nigerians even believe that life was better under colonialism.  This is unfortunate because life can never be better under slavery, discrimination, domination, and colonization.  However, such statements are simply a measure of the general frustration and disillusionment with our contemporary leaders.  Let us look at the problems of Nigeria in the last twenty years: poverty, unemployment, insecurity, lack of water, lack of adequate housing, crime, corruption, rural underdevelopment, low industrialization, technological backwardness, nepotism, ethnic distrust, religious violence, deteriorating infrastructure, illiteracy, poor pay for workers, lack of social security, unreliable power supply, poor public transportation system, malnutrition, high maternal and child mortality, inadequate health services, political instability and rascality, I can go on and on.

Now tell me, are these problems not still with us today?  Are they almost solved?  Are they 50% solved? Are Nigerians happier today?  That is the crux of leadership and democracy.  Bad leadership cannot enhance democracy.  Bad leadership cannot promote accountability, discipline, social justice and good governance.  Bad leadership cannot encourage discipline, productivity, creativity, unity, and patriotism.  Bad leadership and bad governance are directly related.  But what exactly is good governance

By good governance we refer to the existence of an environment that promotes accountability, social justice, fiscal discipline and responsibility, transparency, service delivery and accessible leadership.  Good governance requires that the people remain primary in the deployment of governmental powers, the allocation of programmes and policies as well as resources.  Good governance demands a leadership that emanates from the people and functions within the context of dialogue, consultation, and constitutionalism.  In an environment of good governance, the public will and public good dominates and the people, their communities and constituencies are consulted before governmental actions are taken.  Good governance is about the people, their hopes, dreams, relationships, cultures, values, and general socio-cultural environment.  Can we say that we have been experiencing and enjoying good governance in Nigeria and Edo State in particular?  I leave that to your judgment for now.

The truth is that our leaders have, in large measure, failed us.  Not only have they failed to promote economic development to improve the living conditions of the people in general but they have also done everything to undermine all laid down rules and regulations that guide socio-economic and political development.  The evidence is around us in dilapidated infrastructure, massive unemployment and underemployment, breakdown of public institutions, general inefficiency, unbelievable corruption and waste, and the contamination of the souls of our people.

In government, political parties, educational institutions, businesses and at home, bad leadership spells disaster for all.  A business under bad leadership accumulates debts, declining profits, structural fragility and eventual collapse.  A home without leadership also culminates in crisis, violence, indiscipline, and collapse. A state or government with bad leadership lacks focus, discipline, credibility, capacity to deliver, and ends up inflicting pain and punishment on the people.  Democracy is about the people, their security, prosperity, progress and living conditions.  Any leadership or government that can not ensure and assure these conditions, or at the very least, be seen as capable of meeting these conditions,  can be described as useless.

As a young African leader put it not too long ago, “

Good leadership brings hope and energy to the people.  It attracts the best minds as well as local and external support.  Good leadership brings about quality and good governance, progressive policies, happiness in the people, and general dynamism.  Good leadership brings out the most purposeful, creative and innovative qualities of citizens and expands the capacity to share the pains of reform and to establish strong platforms of tolerance, mutual support, cooperation, innovation, and social justice.  In fact, no matter the level, there is no alternative to purposeful, honest, focused, dedicated, and patriotic leadership.  A good leader encourages the emergence of other leaders, encourages people to take charge and to want to make a difference (President Faure Eyadema, 50^th Birthday Lecture for Prof. Julius Ihonvbere, Benin City, 2006).

Download and read the rest of this paper here: Sustainability_of_democracy_in_Nigeria

• To collate, review and distill the various reports, suggestions and recommendations on the Niger Delta from the Willinks Commission Report (1958) to the present, and give a summary of the recommendations  necessary  for government action.

• To appraise the summary recommendations and present a detailed short, medium and long term suggestion to the challenges in the Niger Delta.

• To make and present to Government any other recommendations that will help the Federal Government achieve sustainable development, peace, human and environmental security in the Niger Delta region.

The committee was inaugurated by the Vice President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan on September 8th, 2008 with the following speech:

Let me begin by thanking all of you for accepting to serve in this very important national assignment. On behalf of the President and the Federal Government of Nigeria, I welcome you to our nation’s capital, Abuja.

At the inception of this administration in May 2007 we identified the crisis in the Niger Delta as a major issue that we must urgently resolve so as to bring about the much needed development and advancement to our dear fatherland. Our determination in this regard became manifest in Government’s early policy pronouncements and engagements, including the inaugural address of Mr. President, and also the articulated 7 -Point Agenda.

It is true that the crisis in the Niger Delta was not a creation of this administration. We have, however, taken upon ourselves the patriotic task of bringing to a close this rather sad and embarrassing chapter in our nation’s quest for stability, prosperity and good neighborliness. We believe that a fair, thorough and holistic resolution of the crisis in the Region will have a tremendous impact on our democratic aspirations and yearnings for good governance.

In the last fifteen months, we have immersed ourselves in encouraging the erection of very vital pillars that we are today very confident will help our collective efforts in bringing about sustainable solutions to the over five decade-old crises. We began by an assessment of the current state of the crisis in the Region and have since followed it with broad consultations with individuals, communities, constituencies, corporations and ethnic nationalities.

Although we have made some significant gains in the journey to resolving the crisis in the region, we cannot claim that we are satisfied. We are convinced that a declaration of satisfaction cannot come till a majority of Nigerians, especially the affected and impacted, say so.

We are in a democracy where the will of the people must prevail over the arbitrariness of a few. The resolution of the crisis in the Niger Delta cannot be done outside the Niger Delta and its people.The Federal Government will support the people of the Niger Delta and all men and women of goodwill in its efforts to bring smiles on the faces of all citizens that are dependent on the fortunes of the Region. It is in pursuance of this that we have gathered here to inaugurate the Technical Committee on the resolution of the crisis in the Niger Delta.

Ladies and Gentlemen, this is a very important assignment and time is of vital essence. I don’t believe, however, that the task will attract new research, field trips or lengthy debates.A majority of the information you may need are to be found in existing commission reports, suggestions, recommendations and position papers that may be forwarded to you by Nigerians. As you may be aware, this initiative of a Technical Committee on the Resolution of the Niger Delta Crisis is a suggestion from the people of the Niger Delta. The Committee, is, therefore, expected to collate, review and distill the various reports, suggestions and recommendations on the Niger Delta from Sir Henry Willinks Commission Report on the Fears of the Minorities (1958) to General Alexander Ogomudia’s Special Security Committee Report on Oil Producing Areas (2001) and on to the Report of the National Political Reform Conference (2005).

Wherever a report on the Niger Delta exists, and you can reach it, I urge you to have them ferreted out; examined as thoroughly as you can and make suggestions for Government’s necessary and urgent action. On behalf of the Government, I want to assure you that your recommendations will not be treated with levity.

A quick glance at the list of men and women who have been called to serve our country in this Technical Committee indicates that a majority of you are individuals who have made the resolution of the Niger Delta crisis a major plank of your daily existence. Some of you have done this through intellectual advocacy while others through peace building and development.

Let me use this opportunity, therefore, to remind you that you are not assembled here as representatives of ethnic, youth or union groups. The task before us concerns us all and transcends individual and special interest associations. You were nominated to this Technical Committee by the various State Governments and other civil platforms by virtue of the experience you have amassed these many years on the matter of the Niger Delta. I urge you, therefore, to work in harmony with one another and come out with suggestions that will make the people in the Niger Delta and a majority of Nigerians happy.

The Federal Government, through my Office, will provide secretarial services and other logistics. You are to appoint your own chairperson and secretary and also evolve the mechanisms through which you can bring about the necessary collation, findings and suggestions. Government will not interfere with the workings of the Technical Committee and expects that you will submit your report to it within ten days of your first sitting.

This is the season of dialogue. Upon the receipt of the Technical Committee’s report, the Federal Government will without undue delay put in place an all-embracing stakeholders’ framework to dialogue on the distilled recommendations raised by this Committee.

Great events are heralded by lights! I am confident that the dark patches in the Niger Delta will give way to light and we shall rejoice in due course. On this note, on behalf of the Federal Government of Nigeria, I hereby inaugurate the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta to the Glory of God and the urgent resolution of the crisis in the Region.

I thank you and may the Almighty God bless us all.

Read the full report in PDF format here: Niger_Delta_Technical_Committee_report

Text of a Lecture Delivered at the Founders Day Celebration, Lead University, Ibadan, Oyo State, Nigeria, March 12, 2009
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Allow me to begin by thanking the Management and students of this great citadel of learning for inviting me to deliver this lecture.  I have followed the activities of this institution fairly closely since its inception.  I am convinced that it is steadily emerging as an intellectual crucible that will not just fill a strategic place in our nation’s quest for growth, development and progress, but would also sufficiently empower its products to effectively meet the challenges of globalisation.
Our topic for discussion today is very direct and clear.  We are interested in interrogating the place of leadership in the future of Nigeria.  This does not mean that we are not interested in followership.  In fact, it is the combination of leadership and followership that often determines the future of a nation.  However, since leaders control and dominate the commanding heights of the economy, exercise legal monopoly over the means of coercion, dominate the structures and institutions of politics and economy, and shape the ideological or philosophical direction of society, we shall focus on leaders and the future.
I would not go into a debate as to whether leaders are born or made.  Suffice to note that we are all leaders in different ways.  Emergency or challenging situations can produce leaders. But the nature of society, existing contradictions and opportunities, power balances and societal values can determine whether the imbued leadership qualities can be nurtured, subverted or simply negated or ignored.  Leadership can be individual or collective.  Either way, the purpose of leadership at home, work or anywhere for that matter is to exercise power, provide direction, encourage and inspire others, show the right direction, build appropriate legacies for the future generation, and work for the common or public good.

If we undertake an opportunistic analyses of the Nigerian predicament today, we can lay the causes of our problems at the colonial and post-colonial dimensions of our history.  We can emphasise the distortions and disarticulations of that experience and claim that the leaders that have failed to do much for us are products of an undemocratic, non-accountable, exploitative, repressive and discriminatory colonial order.  Hence, the imperialists systematically produced leaders that would continue in their own ways and left behind structures, institutions and ideologies that would ensure that departure from the neo-colonial consciousness would be almost impossible without a revolution.  Though fanciful, this would be an incomplete argument.  Unless we wish to lay claim to inferiority and incapacity to move in terms of our own creativity, innovation, and productive energies.

I believe that we must search elsewhere for the causes or origins of our national wahala.  While acknowledging the systemic limitations and contradictions, I want to believe that the managers of that system must be carefully examined to know their level of culpability.  The failures and failings of the past have squandered the legacy of independence, undermined the present and mortgaged the future.  What is perhaps more frightening is the way in which current balances of power and policies, especially in the last two decades, have tended to marginalise and discourage genuine leaders while promoting opportunists, charlatans and mediocres.  Actually, can we say that the majority of our people are better off today than at independence?  Have we made much progress since 1960.

It is possible to contend that there is very little structural distinction between Nigeria’s yesterday and today.  This is because the legacies of colonialism and peripheralisation in the global divisions of labour, power and exchange have continued to shape the character of production, exchange and consumption, and they remain essentially unaltered even after almost half a century of political independence.  From the distortions in the economy and the fragility of the state to the largely unproductive disposition of the power elite and the marginalization of the political economy in the global political economy not much has changed in Nigeria.  We have had reforms, restructurings, minor adjustments here and there and political epochs but no revolution, effective reformation, or structural transformation.
It is true that we can point at new local governments, new states, new infrastructure, new national anthem, new federal capital, new political parties, a new constitution, a wider but not necessarily stronger economy, deeper involvement in the global market due mainly to oil exports, and new discourses on politics and economy.  But they have, in large measure, and in spite of the civil war, several military juntas, and transitions, been no more than motion in a barber’s chair: a lot of motion but very little movement or progress.  Countless opportunities to move forward, give our people hope, restructure and reposition the political economy and improve the living conditions of the people have been carelessly squandered without apologies by the governing elite.
True, the Nigeria state is still one in formation.  It is quite easy to worry about the rather unfortunate state of the nation today.  But a proper historical understanding of the Nigerian reality can enable any analyst to place our conditions and predicaments in proper context.  It is true that the global political economy has been hostile to Nigeria in several ways, but we have failed to initiate structures, institutions and processes to contain or respond adequately to our extant challenges.  We have also failed, like most African states, to take advantage of openings in the global economy to restructure, reform, recompose and redirect the character of state and class in Nigeria.  Even well-intended policies and programmes, have been easily undermined by prevailing contradictions, limitations, and conflicts in the system.  Our political, social and economic power blocs have adjusted to the distorted and unproductive system that recycles underdevelopment and crisis. They have persistently shied away from a serious-minded, consistent and focused structural transformation and repositioning of the political economy.  It is therefore not amazing that in spite of Nigerianisation, Africanisation, indigenisation, war against poverty, operation feed the nation, the Reform Agenda, Development plans, local government and state creation, the oil boom, Rolling Plans, stabilisation, structural adjustment and other publicly celebrated strategies, Nigeria is yet to find an answer to any of its numerous challenges.  Even good leaders with vision, the few islands of integrity, easily get contaminated, compromised and corrupted. Their ideas and achievements are often easily swallowed by a strong and diabolical contraption of indiscipline, political rascality, elite insensitivity and irresponsibility.  No nation on earth has ever made progress in that way.

The Nigeria state on the other hand remains non-hegemonic.  Yet, a degree of hegemony is required to maintain the sovereignty of a country, keep the dominant classes under control, maintain an environment that promotes accumulation and define a nation’s location and role in the global system.  To be sure, part of the reasons for this, aside from the limited hegemony of the state is the lack of cohesion amongst the ruling or power elite, the distortions in the economy, the vulnerability of the political economy to external interests, and the general condition of poverty in which the majority of Nigerians live.  Yet, our elites appear to be disinterested in purposeful and progressive visioning, building state and class hegemony, and establishing viable foundations for holistic progress.  In spite of changes in the world, the Nigerian state and its custodians remain rigid in its ideas and politics.  It finds it difficult to move from government to governance, respect gender equality, structurally transform the foundations of society, distinguish between rulers and leaders, and refocus the nation for sustained progress.

The basis of Nigeria’s leadership failure can be found, in its concentration in largely unproductive ventures.  We have a lot of people with cash capital, but with very little capitalist drive or initiative.  They are traders, commercialists.  Such a class has never built a sustainable economy or polity.   In addition, the state is the primary means of accumulation.  Until the accumulative base shits from the state or public treasury and speculation to investment in technology, research, ideas, and production, the leaders can only be superficial and opportunistic.

The power elite appears to have a pathological fixation on subverting the foundations of the state, collaborating with undemocratic forces to abridge democratic rights, and designing dubious and diabolical strategies to close political spaces, suffocate civil society, enthrone a culture of anti-intellectualism, and rusticate opportunities and possibilities for progress and development. Until recently, the culture and obsession of the power elite was on building a parallel or alternate state at the expense of the public good.  In its failure, it has created private alternatives in the following areas:
o Water – private boreholes as against public water systems
o Health services – private and foreign hospitals as against general or public hospitals.
o Schools for children – expensive private schools in and outside the country at the expense of public schools
o Security – private bodyguards and security systems as against collective or community and public security.
o Electricity – private generators as against public electricity supply.
o Foreign travel – use of foreign as against national airlines, vacations abroad rather than local alternatives
o Banking Stolen funds – stealing is bad, even then they patronize foreign banks.  Their counterparts do not even consider Nigerian banks for this purpose.
o Houses as prisons – high walls, complex security gadgets, electrified fences, huge dogs, close circuit televisions etc- more defended than local prisons!

How can a country move forward when the elite, the leaders, the very custodians of state power, those that ought to set the example, give hope and inspiration, act as if they had lost faith in the present and future of their own nations?  How can the nation have a future when the elite appear to be turning its back on the nation?  Now they are buying houses in Brazil and Dubai and take pride in their foreign assets.  Where they can help it, they die in foreign hospitals then we are told that they died with one white doctor by their bedsides!!

What is more painful is that these same elite presided over the squandering of trillions of naira, ran down our basic institutions- Eleme petrochemicals, Nigeria airways, Oku Iboku paper mill, Nigeria shipping lines, Nigeria coal corporation, all Government catering rest houses, all government printing presses, Ajaokuta Steel, Delta steel, NIOMCO, the various ports, Nicon Hilton Hotel, and so on.  The list is endless.  How do we build a future on such gargantuan display of fiscal recklessness, administrative rascality and incompetence, and managerial mediocrity?

To hide the extent to which they have compromised our future, they try to legitimate corruption, manipulate primordial differences and exaggerate socio-cultural differences in order to hide their failures or divert attention to non-issues.  So, they create all sorts of ethnic and counter-ethic associations and pretend to be using them to defend the interests of the people.  They exhibit a criminal fixation on the capture of raw power by all means necessary including violence, thuggery, lies, bribery, stuffing of ballot boxes, exclusion of candidates from the ballot, manipulation of security forces, even the use of juju!  The power they spend so much to grab is not for the promotion or advancement of peace, stability, basic human needs or progress, but for the enhancement of primitive accumulation, reproduction of underdevelopment and the recycling of undemocratic conducts.

I believe that we must wake up as a people to put a stop to this unacceptable control of our present and future by so-called leaders that have not read a book in ten years.  Even reading newspapers is a lot of work for them. We must begin to ask new questions, insist on merit, fair-play, accountability, social justice, and sensitivity to the plight of the ordinary person. We must reject those that we know to have been tainted in the past that are now running around as leaders, decision-makers, democrats, and godfathers. We must set new standards for identifying and supporting those with leadership qualities that will serve individual, national and collective interests. And we must develop the courage to stand against election rigging, abuse of power, subversion of the constitution, manipulation of public policies, and the enthronement of mediocrity in our national life.

We must of course, change our ways within the family, work place, community, professional organizations, and in the public sphere by showing good leadership and sensitivity at all times.  Even in the simple things such as treating subordinates as human beings count a lot in building appropriate leadership for peace, progress and democracy.
What is the Leadership Challenge in Nigeria?
For President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, the Nigerian predicament can be put squarely on the challenge of leadership.  As he put it recently, the “concept of leadership has been bastardised in Nigeria, and people use leadership positions to show arrogance, oppress others and misappropriate resources meant for the generality of Nigerians instead of serving them as directed by God” (Leadership August 1, 2008, p. 3).  While the President is absolutely correct, the fact remains that these leaders operate within a system that encourages impunity, the abuse of office, rascality and indiscipline.  These same people work at very high and prestigious positions internationally and they never abuse their offices or misbehave.  However, once they are given opportunities within Nigeria, they begin to do all that the President has outlined and worse.  This means that we must look again at the structures and institutions of the state, the constitution, character of policy making, enforcement of laid down rules and regulations, political will, and the involvement of the people in politics and policy to fully appreciate why leadership is what it is or has turned out to be.  Will you believe that all the numerous reports on the Niger Delta since 1956 have virtually recommended the same solutions and not one has been implemented?  Is this just insensitivity, political rascality or plain wickedness: to leave communities and constituencies, fellow Nigerians whose land produce so much wealth in grinding poverty and environments that resemble worse than the Fourth World!  How do we explain the existence of thousands of abandoned projects all over the country today?  What is the explanation for thousands of dilapidated schools, hospitals and public institutions around Nigeria?  Why do our so-called leaders measure their wealth, success and importance with the degree of poverty around them?  How do we account for children hawking in dangerous traffic when they should be in school?  Why has the looting of public funds almost become institutionalised and we cant find any of the hundreds of arrested or prosecuted looters in any prison?
Because leadership is largely pedestrian, opportunistic, unpatriotic and insensitive to the plight of the people, it is still possible to see regionalized or ethnic based agendas whether it is Afenifere, Ohaneze, Arewa, Northern Union, South-South Peoples Assembly or the like.  It is the failure of elite and state hegemony that encourages primordialism.  In fact, where the state is seen as largely irrelevant to the survival of the ordinary citizen, coping or survival mechanisms are invested or routinised.  This eats away at the capacity and capability of the state to perform the basic function of government much less that of a state.  On the other hand, coping mechanisms congeal divisive political and cultural enclaves- ethnicity, region, gender, religion, professional or atavistic.  Loyalty is transferred from a state that is seen as repressive and ‘irrelevant’ to other non-repressive organisations and outlets for social expression.  This is why we have prominent ethnic or regional rather than truly national leaders today.

These trends and tendencies of distrust and covert and/or overt opposition are expressed in the numerous coalitions, contradictions, conflicts and confusions in the society.  There is hardly a consensus on any issue in Nigeria, including the continued survival and unity of the country.  This in itself is a sad and unfortunate development after the Nigerian civil war and the high price that was paid by our fellow citizens. Indeed, between and within economic, cultural, political and social communities and constituencies, the degree of distrust remains very heavy and deep.  University graduates and HND holders are at war; NECO versus WAEC certificate holders are treated differently; so-called career and non-career officers are at war; north and south, Niger-delta versus the rest of the nation, and security and non-security personnel are not communicating.  Within Christendom, the competition and commercialisation has gone beyond rational understanding.  Within universities, cultists and non-cultists are at war.  Libraries are either empty or behind by over a decade in relevant literature and journals, and many academics are involved in general business and consulting as against serious research and teaching.  In addition, rural and urban dwellers, the poor and the rich, landlords and tenants, employed and unemployed, and segments or sectors of the private sector strive to outdo and undo each other as opportunity permits.  Nothing seems to go in an orderly or predictable manner. Recruitment into paramilitary forces results in the death of several applicants.  Satellites get lost in space within a few years of purchase and launching while airplanes disappear for months only to be found by farmers, despite the billions invested in emergency rescue and satellites!  In the midst of all these, we have leaders, mostly self-imposed leaders that have simply refused or failed to lead us anywhere.

Any wonder therefore that Legislators that are asked to probe corruption end up being probed!  Trust, accommodation and cooperation hardly exist in any aspect of national life.  As public institutions crumble or give the façade of a beautiful existence based on their architectural outlays, within the institutions exist an ocean of conflict, waste, manipulation, oppression, indiscipline, arrogance of power, ethnic jingoism and downright terrorization of the powerless and those with no godfathers or political connections.  In the judiciary, while it has remained the longest undisturbed arm of government and in spite of numerous assaults especially the military juntas over the years, has also not escaped the rot in the system.  Some judicial judgments leave many lawyers wondering if so-called non-learned persons have invaded the sector not to talk of countless allegations of bribery made against judges at all levels.  Of course, these are all manifestations of the structural deformities in the system and the rather unsteady constitution of the non-hegemonic State under the control of a badly factionalised and fractionalised leadership.   In this context, the followers take strategic but reactionary positions on the political landscape and use their own hands to destroy their environment and foul up the system.  The entire nation suffers while the so-called leaders subsidise and lubricate their survival with looted public funds and monies in foreign banks.

Ladies and Gentlemen, why do we find it so difficult to move in one direction so that our people can conserve and deploy energy for productive purposes?  How are we going to move forward in the midst of plan indiscipline, policy inconsistency, competitive as against complementary programs, duplication of services and functions, the re-awarding of the same contract over and over again even by the same government?  How can we move forward with empty libraries, poor research culture, limited concern for futurology and visioning, and inability to identify and use the best brains and hands in the larger society?  We must begin to think out of the box, break out of the barber’s chair of motion without progress.  If the leaders, after almost 50 years, refuse to lead, the people and their organisations must bypass them.

Let us look briefly at leadership at the political level.  You are all living witnesses to the political abracadabra going on in our dear country.  In spite of the existence of a constitution, political parties and party rules and regulations, politics is war in Nigeria.  You can now understand why many Nigerians wept and celebrated the victory of Obama in far away America.  In fact, a former president of the country once described politics, elections in particular, as a “do or die” affair.  It is costly, diabolical, unsteady, uncertain, and announced results hardly ever reflect what took place on election-day.  It is not unusual for political leaders to ambush and undermine the best candidates before or during the primaries.  Only in few cases are the best candidates presented for political office and aspirants are almost bankrupted before they get elected.  This in itself lays the foundation for the arrogance of power, executive recklessness and unbridled corruption.  Until our political parties become truly and fully reformed, Nigeria cannot move forward.  Until the parties begin to respect their own rules, Nigeria cannot produce credible, capable, courageous and visionary leaders that will build the political economy and consolidate democratic institutions and practices.  The parties must begin to perform some of the basic functions of political parties- identify and train leaders, develop policy platforms, present the best aspirants and candidates for office, regulate office holders, conduct research on party and political development, encourage public discourses, and commit openly to the sustenance of democracy in every regards.

Office holders that emerge from a dubious and diabolical process cannot be expected to respect the constitution of liberties.  They cannot be expected to distinguish between the public and private treasury.  That is why we must never tire of the struggle for democratic practice and social justice.  Political parties in Nigeria must be bastions of fair-play, justice and freedom.  Unless this happens they would be contributing directly to the consolidation and reproduction of poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment in Nigeria.

This is exactly why electoral reforms more than urgent in Nigeria to correct the defects of our present system.  This will ensure efficient and speedy adjudication of critical petitions, careful monitoring of electoral processes by civil society groups, and severe sanctions for all electoral offences. It is one of the strategic ways to get our politics rights, and when this happens, we can get our economic directions right.  We require focused and capable leaders to ensure that politics is no longer seen as a business, an opportunity to loot the treasury and mortgage the future of our dear country.

So, Once again, we are into the business of constitution review.  The very last effort was contaminated and destroyed by the narrow interests of a few at the expense of the common good.  So, we threw the baby, the bathwater and the bath-basin out and we lost everything.  Billions of naira went down the drain, no questions asked.  Today, we are starting all over.  This is not one man’s show and it must not be an ego trip.  It is not senators versus the representatives.  It is not the National Assembly versus the rest of the nation.  Rather, it is one more golden chance to give ourselves a living document, a true peoples covenant, a road map to show us how to organise and deploy power in the collective interests of our people.  It is an opportunity to correct historical injustices against women, the youth, the poor, micro-minorities and minorities.  It is an opportunity to stop oil theft, kidnapping, illegal-bunkering, arson, assassinations, money laundering, hostage taking and other forms of violence in the much neglected and exploited Niger Delta.  It is an opportunity to produce the document that will engender peace, stability, dialogue, tolerance, diversity, unity, democracy and progress in Nigeria.

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, I doubt if this will happen if the process is opportunistic, elitist and complicated.  We must draw lessons from Uganda, South Africa, Eritrea, Ghana and other parts of the world by adopting a truly open, consultative, transparent, accountable, process-driven and people-led approach to constitution-making.  This is the only way to produce a constitution that we can all understand and all own and defend with our lives.  This is the way to build the architecture to deepen, widen, promote, sustain and reproduce democracy and democratization.  The process of refederalisation will be possible and much more viable with a true constitutional consultation and process that brings our people together and restructures our political compact.  It is also the only way to build a culture of constitutionalism, the process publicises it, mobilises the people, and wins buy-in from the people.  If we do not get the politics right, we can never get our development right.  Political uncertainty, contradictions, distrust, violence and instability will continue to challenge well-intentioned programmes and policies and thus reproduce underdevelopment.  Given the challenges of growth and development in Nigeria today, this is not the time to fight over chairmanship versus deputy or vice-chairmanship or even the right to amendment the constitution.  Just involve the people, provide leadership and let the open process flow.

The failure of leaders, especially at the formal sphere has increased the relevance of ethnic leaders, militants and primordial warlords.  Of course, the masses themselves live as if under a spell.  Disappointed by regime after regime, government after government and leader after leader, they give obedience on the surface, more to avoid oppression and death than out of loyalty, love and patriotism.  Their souls have been so mangled and corrupted that they have nothing but cynicism and disregard for the state, the custodians of power and state policies.  They have adopted coping and survival mechanisms to make it through the confusion and uncertainty in which they find themselves. To get any service from government agencies, they first prepare the bribe, then the required fee.  They know that if they do not do so, there is no chance on earth that they would get any service: job applications, national passport, driver’s licence, import licence, building permit, vehicle licence, tax clearance, national ID card, you name it.  Many have retreated into community, ethnic, religious and other demonic and occultic enclaves as they hope endlessly for political rationality, sensitive leadership, and adequate democratic spaces in which to survive.  In other instances, Nigerians abuse the name of God as the Almighty is invoked at the slightest opportunity even while perpetrating evil against individuals, community and the entire nation.  A few have designed ways to use religion, especially Christianity to get rich and further impoverish the already poor.  It is no wonder that one can find twenty branches of the same church or denomination worshipping the same God on a single street in most of our major cities!  Only recently have some church leaders come to declare that fasting and prayers can not change Nigeria.  In large measure, where is the leadership from the religious leaders?  It is not enough to speak after every religious clash.  Prevention is better than lamentation!

The “elasticity of hope” in Nigeria is just incredible.  In spite of the rascality, corruption, arrogance, insensitivity and socio-economic violence unleashed on the majority by the minority power-elite, a revolution has not taken place even if anger and disillusionment often result to pockets of open resistance.  Hope is almost becoming the opium of the Nigerian: e go beta, God dey, “tomorrow will be better”, “when my child grows up I will eat my share of the cake” are used to rationalise tolerance for bad leadership, corruption and bad governance!

So, in conclusion, what brand of leaders do we need in Nigeria?  No one can deny the positive value of good leadership to a family, business, community, or nation. Even religious bodies and NGOs cannot thrive without good leadership. This is because good, accountable, efficient, effective, sensitive and God-fearing leadership brings hope, courage, peace, and encourages productivity, creativity and innovation.

Good leadership builds bridges and bonds of tolerance, inclusion, pluralism, love, friendship and partnership.  Good leadership helps people to bear the pains of setbacks while inspiring the generality to reach the highest points of their productive and creative abilities.  Good leadership is pro-people especially the youth, women and physically challenged.  It is pro-community, pro-environmental protection, pro-social justice, pro-accountability, and pro-democratic in disposition. We have lived through all brands of leadership in Nigeria and we all know the opposite of good leadership.  The consequences, pains, frustrations and embarrassment of bad leadership, at times quite demonic in manifestation, are there for all to see.  This means that we cannot afford to continue to test the waters, give another chance to known crooks, accommodate incompetence, experiment with perpetual underachievers, tolerate persons that have no respect for the people and communities, consider persons with no democratic credentials, and give room, by acts of omission or commission to toy with our present and future again.  We must remember, as one young African leader put it recently, that “one year of bad leadership can take us back ten to twenty years. In other words, one year of bad leadership can contaminate and destroy ten solid years of progress.”

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, the leaders that we choose at all levels and sectors must not be those that will undermine democracy, terrorise society, loot the treasury, build their own mansions and keep their own children abroad while making life hell on earth for the majority.  We must pick leaders that value education, industrialization, infrastructural development, capacity building, and information and communication technology. We must pick leaders that understand globalization and glocalization; leaders that know the value of environmental protection, and understand that health is wealth. We must, set the local, sub-structural and internal facilities, policies and programmes in place appropriately and investors will come on their own rather than daily runs around the globe at huge public cost in search of investors that we never see.  Once we restructure our society, strengthen structures of accountability and service delivery, have the right leaders in place, feed and employ our people, we would have fully re-branded our country.  Tourists and investors would come on their own or with little motivation.

Our leaders, with all due respect, must have education, exposure, experience, competence, vision, integrity, dignity, commitment, and moral depth. They must have compassion, sensitivity, track record of service and identification with the people, and capable of privileging accountability, transparency, due process and service delivery. Our leaders of the future must be God-fearing, morally sound, spiritually confident, credible, honest, reliable, progressive, and with a sense of mission and sense of nation.  Their loyalty must be to the State and not to a godfather, some shrine or to a hidden bank account. Their commitment to uplifting the conditions of the people, rehabilitating our dilapidated infrastructure and institutions, empowering communities and constituencies and building lasting bonds of friendship and partnership across ethnic, religious, regional and gender lines must be absolute.
The leaders we identify and pick to manage our lives, resources and future must have courage to admit mistakes, correct errors, alter our decadent past, build new opportunities, support radical ideas, attract investments, and bring our nation at par with the rest of the world in every way.  Nigeria’s future leaders must know Nigeria and the world.

In this era of globalization and instant information, we cannot afford to manage ignoramuses, people who hate reading, and those that will rather die than think.  Our leaders must understand and appreciate good governance as the foundation of social justice, rule of law, equity, popular participation, mobilisation, and sustainable development.  Good governance enhances patriotism, honesty, new leadership and unity because it puts the people as the core of politics, policies and social actions.  Ladies and Gentlemen, our new leaders must be humble but tough, caring without being careless, and loving without being stupid.

Finally, our new leaders must be persons that can appreciate the beauty of our communities and country, the sacrifices of our past heroes and heroines, the central place of women in our national development, the boundless energy of our youth, the productivity and energy of our workers, the indomitable spirit of our armed forces, the creativity of our traders, the strength of character of our traditional and religious leaders, and the innocence, purity and smiles of our babies, who invariably represent our boundless future.

For those of us in this room today, I have the following prescriptions for you:
“ If you cannot be a leader, be an informed, active and alert follower;
“ Set goals in life and identify the methods or mechanisms for achieving them;
“ Prioritize goals and strategies;
“ Rediscover yourself, learn to strategise, identify partners and always have a plan B;
“ Re-examine your approach to work, life, neighbours, associates, community and the nation;
“ Learn to share responsibilities, learn to give and not always expect back on the spot;
“ Build good will: it is much more durable and rewarding that kickbacks or instant bribe;
“ Re-dedicate yourself to family, community and nation;
“ Develop a guiding philosophy for relating to colleagues, community and nation;
“ Have a world-view and try to understand the world from a patriotic;
“  perspective and be sure to do some reading to expand your horizon;
“ Learn to listen to those around you, irrespective of class, gender or identity;
“ Be willing to tap into the pool of knowledge, experience, and ideas around you;
“ Respect yourself, respect those around you, avoid negative cliques, and petty attitudes e.g. backbiting and lies;
“ Learn to be a team player; do not underrate or ignore anyone or ideas that you are not familiar with;
“ Put the people and the nation first.

I thank you for your patience and may god continue to remain with you all.
Ibadan, March 12, 2009

Professor Julius O. Ihonvbere, OON

Text of Lecture Delivered at the Workshop on Political Obligations/Social Contract for Local Government Political Officers in Cross River State, Calabar, April 21^st, 2008

It is indeed a pleasure to be amongst you here today. Let me congratulate you all on your election as chairmen of your respective local governments. I know what it means to win the ticket, go into elections, win and retain the victory in our dear nation. My prayer is that you will all keep your covenant with your people so that your names would be written in gold in the history books and minds of our people.

My brief remarks will be focused on “Political Obligation and Democratization.” Our goal will be to highlight the linkage between political obligation and the deepening, widening and sustenance of democratic practice, thus making democratization part of our political discourse and practice. First, what is political obligation?

Obligation simply means a bond. This could be legal or moral. Legal obligation is “the responsibility bestowed or vested in someone or a bond between two legal persons which ‘enforces’ duties and rights.” It is the “legal liability imposed on someone to act in a certain manner towards others.” Moral obligation on the other hand “accrues from … personal grounds- the idea of being bound to do something.” Moral obligation may not be legally enforceable but may be “morally desired” and may make one feel uncomfortable for not doing what ought to have been done. Moral obligation also can be reinforced by societal sanction or public condemnation and may seriously compromise or mediate someone’s social, political or professional career. It is a universal norm that moral obligations are binding on all rational beings since they carry the idea, knowledge and consciousness of what is good or bad. This is what differentiates human beings from animals. Human beings that behave like animals usually end up in psychiatric hospitals, mental asylums or in prison cells. We can therefore assume that we are all rational human beings, that chairmen are special breeds of rational human beings and that we all know what is right or wrong.

Political obligations are those expectations or obligations arising from responsibilities attached to particular political positions through the constitution or other regulations, from the constitution of political parties, or from commitments and promises made in the political process such as those made during political campaigns. The people, their organizations and the media are usually the custodians of such promises and commitments and they may end up advancing, mediating or terminating the career of politicians if not adequately handled.

It is clear therefore, that you all, as LGA Chairmen, have obligations at three levels: First, obligations arising from the Constitution that clearly defines your functions as Chairmen and your functions and responsibilities to the people you govern. Second are obligations arising from the Constitution of the political party that you belong to, its code of conduct, party platform or programme and expectations defined from the screening processes. Third, are obligations arising from your campaigns through the promises that you made to the elders, women, community organizations, party leaders, youth groups, students, contractors, and I hope not, herbalists and diviners!

But do Politicians in Nigeria care about Obligations?

The evidence on ground is that politicians generally do not care about obligations. They see politics as a game that has no rules or principles. They do not believe that they are bound by rules or regulations. They assume that the people are more objects of politics than subjects of politics. They assume that the people cannot think, they are not exposed or educated or are too rural to remember commitments made on the campaign trail. Once they give money to the so-called leaders and the police, they think it is all over. After all, it was not the vote of the people that got them into office so, why should they bother about the people. The campaign was just to fulfill the political righteousness of going round and making some noise. And because, politicians and militricians have gotten away with doing so much injustice to the people since political independence, modern politicians believe that it is business as usual. Why worry? Wetin dem fit do? Wetin dem sabi?

This has been the case because we have managed to put a sick horse before the cart in our politics and planning processes. The power elite, including most of us here, have managed to do so much to the people and so little for the people. Look around our country today and show me the evidence of careful, well-thought-out, consistent, holistic, integrated planning that is pro-people, pro-community, pro-environment, and pro-stability? We have actually used power, opportunity and resources available to all to undermine, compromise, contaminate and confuse the process of nation-building and development. We have created suspicion, anger, disharmony, disunity, discord and jealousy between the poor and rich, rural and urban, literate and illiterate, employed and unemployed with very few but weak meeting points.

Normally, if the power elite realizes this and begins to recognize its obligations to the people, to community, and nation, even its obligations to God, then we can say there is hope. If the power elite recognizes the value of history, the importance of a good family name, and the need to ensure or assure prayers from the people rather than curses, then we can say that there is hope. But this is not the case in Nigeria.

What has the Nigerian elite done about its failure to keep its political and moral obligations? What has it done about reproducing the pain, misery, and poverty of our people? What has it done about strengthening or whitewashing the structures of domination, exploitation and underdevelopment? What has it done about destroying public institutions- airways, railways, electricity, schools, hospitals, water supply, paper mills, steel mills, shipping lines, you name it? What has the Nigerian elite done about increasing hopelessness, disillusionment, anger and violence in the larger society? How does the Nigerian elite account for all the violence, poverty, crime, insecurity, and despondency in the nation?

Out great elites have simply created a parallel state, an alternative to the public sphere. An alternative that allows them to dodge their responsibility to the people and allows them to undermine their legal and political obligations and commitments. Of course, they still retain and patch up the formal or public sphere. They are experts at this, especially since the end of the civil war. But they retain and manage the public sphere in order to enhance private and primitive accumulation. I do not need to educate you on the numerous scams and unbelievable stories of looting of the public treasury. But because they have little confidence in the state and political structures that they control, they construct private alternatives and rely on the private sector for almost all their needs: private hospitals, private schools, private clinic, private water bore holes, private generators, private security, private airlines, private jets, even very private commentaries. They build their personal prisons with thick walls, high fences with spikes, barbed wires, electrified fences and closed circuit TVs and dogs, even snakes roaming their compounds. In this way, they are able to stay away from the people, ignore the people and even terrorize the people with their policemen, thugs and siren-led convoys of bullet-proof jeeps as the case may be. This is the reality in the country and you all know what I am taking about. Such an environment does not privilege obligations or social contracts based on the commonwealth or common good.

Let me take one more example from our politics and political style. We have learnt to be smart. Politics is seen as a business. You invest in it and reap doubly if you succeed. It is not a business of investing in the people so that we can collectively build a solid foundation for peace, unity, love, growth and development. Rather, we hook up with the gatekeepers, the lords of power, those that dominate the party and make friends with the security forces. Then we proceed to generate resources by all means necessary. If we prepare manifestoes at all, it is a matter of routine. We do not sell issues, mobilize people, engage the opponents in debate, and present alternatives positive futures for our people. At rallies we insult opponents and demonize other parties. We believe that all opposition should be wiped out of existence. In all of these, we convert political rallies to arenas for singing, dancing, eating and gossiping. At the end of the day, we believe we have paid our dues, we have satisfied the people, and we do not owe them anything else: No obligation and no commitment. Is this really the case?

Obligation and Democratization

When politicians fail to acknowledge their obligations to the state, the constitution and the people, they become politically careless and reckless. Political rascality becomes the order of the day and the rules of politics and principles of governance are compromised and contaminated. They undermine the foundations of democracy and encourage a culture of indiscipline and impunity. In fact, politics becomes normless as political forces engage each other in a do or die duel all to the detriment of the collective good. Rules are rewritten and people take positions on the political canvass to articulate the best war strategy. In all of the meetings that political forces hold day and night but mostly at night, development is hardly discussed. Unemployment, deteriorating health services and dilapidated infrastructure are not discussed. Democracy takes a back seat and dies slowly.

Democracy- multi- parties, multi-candidates, elections, free voting and periodic change of office holders- is just the beginning of a democratic political construct. Democratization is the grounding, routinisation, and popularization of political practice and processes. Democratization ensures and assures efficiency and effectiveness at the level of service delivery; the involvement of the people, equal opportunities for all and emphasis on social justice. The rights of all are respected and access to the state and its structures is liberalized. The people are given the centre-seat in the political process and the constitution is respected. The political parties are democratized and it functions are true political parties, identifying and presenting the best candidates for elections. Politicians recognize their limitations and strive to prepare and present the best programmes to the people in order to ensure a good record and win elections. Elections are not seen as war and there is constant and sustained effort at ensuring platform superiority among political parties. Party leaders are not seen gods whose pronouncements cannot be questioned. The rules are open, public, known to all, obeyed and defaulters are sanctioned under laid down rules and regulations.

The conditions just described can only take place when obligation has meaning and politicians care for both moral and legal obligations. Indeed, when political leaders begin to adopt shortcuts, disregard laid down rules, disrespect the constitution, and abandon political programmes and promises, the people begin to adopt extra-legal and other innovative mechanisms of survival. This often compels otherwise ordinary and good people to become political crooks. The final impact is the weakening of democracy, democratic values, and democratic practice. The larger society remains stuck with superficial or ephemeral democracy and democratization is kept at bay.

Local Government and Democratic Practice

I know that as Chairmen of local governments, you all have serious challenges. These include receiving your allocation in full; getting the support of your governor; sustaining the support of party leaders; meeting the pressure to recruit every eligible and non-eligible person in the local government; careful deployment of scarce resources in the face of growing demands; generating internal revenue without promoting mass revolt; developing new programmes to retain the enthusiasm and support of the people; and promoting democracy at the grassroots.

How, then, do you live up to your obligations to your family, the people, the community, the local government, the state, the party, to history, and to God? Allow me to raise some issues and questions:

1. You have to decided that you want to be a good politician that people will remember with joy and that history will be kind to;

2. You have to decide to carry out a democratic restructuring of the local government, be truthful, open, accountable, sensitive, responsive, disciplined, honest, God-fearing and people-focused administration;

3. Are you, as Chairman going to commit to balancing existing inequities and inequalities especially against the youth and women;

4. Do you plan to document and make public your commitments to the people during your campaign;

5. Have you prioritized your commitments and promises into immediate, medium term and longer-term projects;

6. Will you highlight and make public your legal commitments to enable the people know realities and thus effectively manage their expectations;

7. Do you currently live with your people. It is strange that local government chairmen tend to live in state capitals, at times outside their states. Please, live with your people, know them better, feel their pain, share their joys and give them positive leadership;

8. Will you use resources wisely and not just to use resources meant for the people to satisfy the needs of so-called political leaders and party officials;

9. Will you always explain to the people why there may be setbacks in your efforts and work, do not lie to them, play on their intelligence, manipulate them or set them against each other through distractions;

10. Will you be committed to making your LGA the show-piece of the State. Make your achievements a point of reference- rehabilitate schools, roads, clinics, markets, dispensaries, public utilities and encourage sporting and social activities;

11. Will you open a register and link up with indigenes of your local government that are in Diaspora…. Within and beyond the country and get commitments from individuals and associations to specific projects in the local government and be sure to give them regular and proper accounting;

12. Do not award contracts that you know you cannot pay for. It does not help your image and only makes you appear unreliable, dishonest and crooked;

13. Do you have a budget and was this budget discussed with your executive and stakeholders?

14. Do you have a budget monitoring committee to guide you in the identification of priorities, the deployment of resources, and the monitoring of on-going and completed projects?

15. Do you hold weekly, monthly and quarterly meetings with stakeholders in your local government to exchange ideas, hear of problems, provide explanations, and receive suggestions on salient matters;

16. Do you have linkages with neighboring local governments to exchange ideas, share best practices, and widen the frontiers of local and grassroots democracy?

17. Do you have any programme for attracting local and global investors to your domain so as to expand productivity, strengthen the market, and create jobs?

18. Do you have a strategy for attracting skills, training, technology, and resources from international doors and NGOs such as the UNDP, UNESCO, DFID, etc etc?

19. Do you have two or three show-piece projects that you plan to bequeath to your people through which you will be remembered in history;

20. Do you plan to stand for re-election or to move to a higher-level political position? If yes, how do you plan to win the attention of the leaders of the party, the governor, and win the undiluted support of the community and electorate?

It is very pertinent that any leader must at all times demonstrate high qualities of leadership. If you do not have these qualities then, there would be serious problems and challenges. What are these qualities? A true, accountable, sensitive, responsible, efficient, effective, focused, credible, capable, reliable, dependable and progressive leader must be democratic, believe in the people, believe in the constitution, and be transparent, passionate and able to learn from mistakes. He or she must be a good listener, accommodating, tolerant, and not suffer from the arrogance of power. A true leader must fully embrace the politics of participation, accommodation, and accountability. Social justice, equality and fairness must serve as the hallmark of political conduct and activity.

Conclusion

I want to, once again, express my gratitude for the opportunity to address this audience. My only appeal is that you should all believe in yourselves and in your ability to provide leadership for your people. If you do much harm to your people, believe me, history will not be kind to you. I do not need to preach about what you will need to settle with our creator for not trying to improve the lives of your people. It is not an easy task but it is not impossible. Just commit to doing your best, use the opportunities and resources at your disposal, try to improve yourself, expand your horizon and knowledge, and take good care of your health.

Finally, remember that political and moral obligation require that you remain true to yourself, your family, your supporters, leaders, community, party, government, associates and God.

I wish you well. May God remain with you.

Thank you.

by

Professor Julius O. Ihonvbere, OON

Paper delivered at the Policy and Programme Retreat 2007, Organised by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Delta State Chapter, Grand Hotel, Asaba, Delta State, February 2007.

I thank the Delta State Chapter of our great Party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) for inviting me to deliver this paper on “Ethnic Reconciliation” at this very important retreat. Ethnic issues and ethnic politics have become critical variables in our political and other calculations in the last five decades or more. All over the world, unbelievable actions are being taken within and amongst ethnic constituencies. In some cases, genocides and unprecedented massacres have taken place in the name of ethnic conflict and ethnic politics. The mismanagement of culture, identity and difference has become an excuse for promoting criminal politics, intolerance, disregard for constitutional provisions and the rights and liberties of others, especially minorities.

What is most unfortunate is that at times governments and political elites tend to overlook the signs of deterioration in ethnic relations until it is too late. In other cases, ethnic issues are taken for granted, especially by majority groups. In this instance, they underrate or overlook the process of mobilisation, strategisation, and preparedness for confrontation until it occurs. The issue, therefore, is how a government, political party, and political elite effectively responds to ethnic issues, ethnic politics, and ethnic positioning to ensure inclusion, harmony, peace, tolerance, social justice, and the full participation of all in society. This is not an impossible task if elites and decision-makers are committed, and if democratic constitutions, values and practices are strong.

There is nothing wrong with belonging to an ethnic group. It is an identity that we all carry and which, in some instances, shape our lives as we engage the factors and forces of production and struggle to survive in an increasingly complex and competitive society. In many instances, ethnic groups have been found more relevant that governments. This is because ethnic/cultural associations provide those social and welfare services that meet the needs of the individual better than government structures. An Ijaw man that lands at Ojota Motor Park in Lagos will find that issues of accommodation, employment, social security, social networking, and integration will be better met by his ethnic association than the State or Local Government. Ethnic associations do not rely on violence, bribery or intimidation to recruit and sustain members. When someone passes on in a ‘foreign’ location, it is the ethnic group, more than any government that I know, that caters for the corpse, moving it to the village, burial rites, catering for the family and property. This shows that ethnic groups are not necessarily negative. In Nigeria, we have not done a very good job at managing ethnic relations and much less at addressing reconciliation. It is only now that certain realities are starring us in the face that we are beginning to take these matters seriously. As the saying goes, “it is better to be late than never.”

There are those who prefer to see everything, including whether it rains or not, in ethnic terms. They make it sound as if some ethnic groups are made up of devils. They demonise others in order to justify certain dubious and diabolical arguments which, in reality, are designed to advance their personal interests. These ethnic magnates or commercial ethnicists will stop at nothing to fuel the fire of ethnic violence. Their negative public ethnic campaigns are usually different from what they do privately. They pay lip service or remain mute over issues of reconciliation and harmony.

If I may ask: when the Urhobos, Itsekiris, Ibos, and Ijaws in Delta state see each other, do they attack each other always? Do they do business together? Do they buy food items from each other in the market place? Do they ever belong to the same political party? Do they ever share office space or work for the same organizations? Do their children ever attend the same schools or do they attend ethnic schools? Even Urhobo College…are there only Urhobo teachers, administrators and students there? When they need medical attention, do they insist on ethnic medicine brands, ethnic hospitals and doctors? When they travel do they enter buses or vehicles owned and operated only by their ethnic folks? When they are hungry is there a special ethnic hunger? Or are there ethnic roads in Delta state that cannot and must not be used by others? Are there special forms of unemployment reserved for particular ethnic groups? When they leave this world to the great beyond is there a special ethnic death by which you can separate them? This list can go on and on and I am sure that you can all relate to them. I am also sure that no one can answer a “yes” to any of the questions above. This means that ethnic conflicts are not natural, no matter the historical explanations. It means that by and large they are invented, they are the products of ignorance, arrogance, opportunism, deliberate mis-education, tools for rationalizing inequity and corruption, and tools used, mostly by elites in their struggles for power, property and opportunities. It means that ethnic groups have always lived together, do live together and will continue to live together.

If this is the case, is it not best to seek ways to encourage all in society to reach the uppermost level of their creative and productive abilities to the benefit of all than to allow violence, suspicion and socio-economic decay and dislocation to guide our lives? In all societies you will find sanctimonious and even supernaturally-based explanations, justifications, rationalizations, and postulations on ethnic superiority/inferiority and so on. In reality, those who perpetrate these differences and reasons for intolerance are not democrats but political opportunists, mis-educated persons, and those that seek to cover their weaknesses and opportunism with ethnic blankets.

In addition, ethnic entrepreneurs, unfortunately, never proffer concrete or viable solutions to the situations of conflict. The real question therefore is: what causes ethnic frictions, contradictions, and conflicts? Ethnic conflicts and violence do not just happen, they are planned, organized, executed, reproduced, deepened and quite often, resolved by people.

The truth that we must all accept is that there will never be a time when one ethnic group will succeed in wiping out the members, culture, values, and institutions of another ethnic group, no matter how small or weak. In multiethnic communities, it is even dangerous to attempt such a mission. As ethnic group A attacks and tries to eliminate or severely weaken or contain ethnic group B, ethnic group C is preparing to do exactly same or worse to ethnic group A. This because a natural assumption is that when ethnic group A finishes with B, C may be the next. In this context the attack on A could be unprovoked or some excuse will be found to justify the attack. The spiral continues culminating in destruction of life and property, instability, corruption, waste, and the containment of opportunities for growth and development.

More importantly, no one, no matter how influential or wealthy can claim to be safe from ethnic conflicts or violence. Once the devil is let out of its cage, you never know where and when it would strike and who would be its next victim. This is why even those that plan such acts of violence often get consumed by it.

Ethnic conflicts or ethnic relations are generally conditioned by:

1. History and historical experience including the interpretations of history;

2. The composition of social classes and the struggles within and between classes;

3. The direct struggle for power;

4. Demographical balances, the struggle for space and the politics of location;

5. Economic self-interest based on individual interest, collective or sub-group interest;

6. Culture- its organization, expression, and politicization;

7. Myths generated, circulated, and often almost legitimated over time;

8. Poverty in all its ramifications;

9. Bad leadership, bad governance and corruption that breeds envy, anger, frustration, and ethnic interpretations and perceptions of reality;

10. Political manipulation by powerful elites usually to advance self-interest;

11. Bad government policies that wittingly or otherwise punishes, marginalizes, under-develops and weakens a section of society and the politicization of such occurrences- recruitment, retrenchment, promotion, revenue allocation, location of industries or facilities, composition of cabinets, beneficiaries from scholarships;

12. Careless and irresponsible pronouncements by politicians and government officials against particular ethnic groups that inflame the passion for retaliation;

13. Breakdown or weakening of religious, traditional, and other community-based mediation and control mechanisms that culminate in the privileging of intolerance, violence and destruction in place of dialogue and negotiation;

14. The reproduction of neo-colonial educational structures and programmes that do not provide education for service, mobilization, and unity but directly and indirectly seek to legitimate values, tastes, postures, misrepresented history that deepen suspicion, hatred and conflict;

15. Constitutional miscalculations…where, in a multiethnic society with some majority groups, minority groups are ignored and the majorities are favoured;

16. The existence of ethnically based political parties which is alright in a democracy but could be dangerous if such parties constantly whip up ethnic sentiments in order to survive or remain relevant;

17. General insensitivity to the plight, pains and cries of marginal ethnic groups where governments and elites tend to embrace a unicultural view of power and governance.

The possibilities above show that it is very important for leaders, political parties and governments at all levels to pay special attention to ethnic relations and to design pragmatic and realistic short, medium and longer term programmes to ensure reconciliation, harmony and understanding. No matter how minuscule an ethnic group may be, they can cause grave damage to the image and peace of a society. The militants in the Niger Delta are not millions but you all know what they have so far cost this country internally and externally.

Managing Ethnic Relations: Towards Ethnic Reconciliation

The challenge of managing ethnic relations is not as complicated as we are often made to believe. It takes commitment, focus, and a democratic disposition to respond appropriately. More importantly, response policies must be anticipatory and not always responsive, after the fact. Around the world, below are some measures that have been used to manage ethnic, including racial, relations:

1. Good governance- transparent, accountable, and pro-people

2. Good leadership- effective, honest, fair, accountable and sensitive

3. True democratic practice- anchored on dialogue and social justice

4. Constitutional protection and guarantees for all interest groups

5. Federalism or special political arrangements to protect minorities and vulnerable groups, including autonomy arrangements;

6. Affirmative action to allow weaker or smaller groups an opportunity to be part of the system;

7. Zoning or power rotation arrangements to give hope and meaning to the place and role of all ethnic groups;

8. Multiculturalism, a deliberate programme designed to ensure autonomy of cultures and cultural interaction as state policy;

9. Economic empowerment programmes, special loans, grants and other assistance;

10. Political appointments and balancing to ensure equal opportunity;

11. Education- use of the school system to teach, if you like, preach tolerance, understanding, inclusion and democracy;

12. Campaigns by political elites who, in virtually all statements must speak to the issues of oneness, unity, peace, love, and tolerance;

13. Political and administrative decentralization, mostly away from the major urban centres. This reduces pressures on the centre, disperses responsibility, and builds a sense of belonging;

14. Support for civil society groups and encouragement to use their location and relationships with the grassroot to promote webs and bridges of understanding and inclusion;

15. Legal provisions against discrimination, hate crimes and statements, and all forms of cultural discrimination;

16. Open statements by ethnic warlords, politicians, and leaders to the new perspective of harmony, tolerance, unity, and collective commitment to democracy and progress- special meetings, community for a, press conferences, lectures, and other opportunities.

The prescriptions above and more are dependent on the individuals, and how serous and honest they are to the cause of reconciliation. Constitutions, legal provisions, special policies, and other options would have to be implemented by persons. That is why it is critical that we get the right people into power. This is what the PDP is trying to do now. The process may not be as tidy as it ought to be but no one can deny that it is sanitizing the system and sending the right signals everywhere.

Reconciliation requires:

1. Honesty, leadership, truth, remorse, courage, dedication, and commitment to justice, equity, and peace;

2. Meeting the basic needs of all in society. The solution to hunger in all ethnic groups is the same: food. The solution to ill-health in all ethnic groups is the same- medical services. The solution to illiteracy in all ethnic groups is the same- education. The solution to ignorance in all ethnic groups is the same- information and communication. The solution to alienation, political frustration and anger in all ethnic groups is the same: good leadership, good governance, honesty, truth and social justice..

3. Special structures or institutions dedicated to promoting true reconciliation;

4. Special policies and programmes that are knows to all that are designed to correct past errors and initiate new ones;

5. Special campaigns, sustained over time and flexible to accommodate changes, all reflecting the new commitment, new vision, and new reality.

6. A new spirit of forgiveness and preparedness to break with the past.

You all, as leaders, must search your hearts, look at the faces of the elders and children, the faces of the women and decide what is best. You all know that the interactions and engagements between the various ethnic groups in Delta state can only be to the benefit of all if truly well managed. If Delta is truly the BIG HEART of Nigeria, then it must behave as such. It is the people that make it a State and how we relate to one another determines a lot. It is not be best thing to be the subject of vile and embarrassing jokes by all comedians in the country. We want to hear comedians and musicians constantly saying good things about Delta State- a State that has given and continues to give so much to our dear country. It is not the best for a local government to be referred to as ‘I go die local government.” We all laugh when we hear these things, but it is a thing of shame.

With the quality of people, leaders, and resources available in Delta State, the living conditions ought to be better. But ethnic violence, rivalry, destruction, and other underhand strategies aimed at undermining each other have complicated, contaminated and compromised leadership options and public policies. So, no matter the size of investments, federal allocation and internally generated revenues, Delta state may not develop if the ethnic rivalry, suspicions, conflicts, and destruction continue. This is just the plain truth.

Now, we have a new opportunity to put the past behind us. A new opportunity to rebuild and refocus on an inclusive, tolerant and democratic society. This is the time to support our leaders to encourage them to deliver on all their promises. This is the time to really touch-base with our people, give them hope and give meaning to their lives. We cannot hide from the society that we build with our hands and building our “personal prisons”—with high barbed-wire fences, bullet proof doors, personal boreholes, generators, security services and so on, will not protect us from the anger of the larger society. Even where the crime is perpetrated by a few, we, the elite take collective responsibility and will be collectively judged and punished by history. There is time to do better for the people and our society. Let Delta, like Kerala Province in India, where all classes, ethnic groups, sects and castes live together in peace and harmony, set the pace and example for others to follow. I know the people of this State very well, and I know you can do it. May God guide you along the way.

Thank you very much.

Asaba, Delta State,

February 2007

Julius O. Ihonvbere

The number one political contradiction or challenge in Africa today is how to deal with the national question.  The continent’s history and the contradictions and engagements of the post-colonial era have precipitated deep political fault lines and congealed interests on both side of the political divide.  Put simply: on the one hand are those that are benefiting from the current status quo and see no reason for change.  To this group, the “problems” of politics, economy and society would resolve themselves or be resolved with time.  On the other hand are those that feel that the African past had been squandered, the present mortgaged and the future so uncertain that politics could no longer be taken for granted.  Consequently, they have demanded a re-negotiation and recompacting of relations between the power elite and the people.  This time, they are demanding to be fully involved in the process of remaking the constitution in order to ensure that those issues that affect them and their communities are not trivialized or relegated to the dustbin of political decision making.
This article advances one argument: in order to address the national question in Nigeria, the political elite can no longer be trusted to do the right thing.  To safeguard even its own narrow interests, the power elite must concede to an open and popular recompacting of the constitution.  Only a truly consultative and participatory process can put the national question up for democratic debate and negotiation without resort to violence.  Such a consultative process could be utilized to mobilize and educate the people politically, establish new rules of politics, reconstruct institutions, and redefine the foundations of governance.

The National Question and the New Politics in Africa.

Given the historical suffocation of civil society, the privatization of the state, and the arrogance of privatized power, the contemporary challenge for all Africans is how to take apart the state and subject the national question to popular debate.  At all spheres of society, Africa is being rocked by new discourses, new alignment and realignment of social forces, the emergence of new institutions and leaders, and the construction of alternative political platforms.  Given the extent of socio-economic deprivation of the last three or more decades as well as the levels of political repression and marginalization of popular communities, these developments represent a breath of fresh air. The culture of corruption, mismanagement, insensitivity to the plight of the poor, elite privatization of the state, and the subversion of traditional values and institutions culminated in new challenges to the state and its custodians.  These challenges witnessed a new enthusiasm for democracy and human rights among women, students, professionals, workers, religious leaders, and other non-bourgeois constituencies.  The result, as is now clearly evident, has been the gradual restructuring of political spaces to enhance pluralistic politics and re-establish new political values and the construction of new institutions.  The issue today is that no matter the level of resource endowment, the size of the population, the size of foreign aid, or how well-intentioned some leaders might be, until the political question is resolved, peace and progress, much less growth, development and democracy cannot thrive.  The inherited state and class forces and structures can no longer move the cause of growth, development and democracy forward in Africa.
Today, irrespective of justified reservations, we can claim that here is an increasing feeling of euphoria in Africa.  For a continent that was awash with brutal dictators, corrupt regimes, misplaced priorities, institutional decay, and social dislocation and violence, the recent political openings and renewed commitments to democratic values is a welcome relief.  True, there is much to worry about in the illiberal democratic realities of the continent.i  In fact, most of the newly elected politicians still act and sound very much like the dictators of the past.  In Nigeria, elected politicians and appointed officials appear impatient with democracy and continue to see politics as an opportunity for very rapid primitive accumulation.  Hence Claude Ake is convinced that:  “The triumph of democracy may be more apparent than real.

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Constitutionalism and the National Question in Nigeria

“Under a true federal constitution, each group, however small, is entitled to the same treatment as any other group, however large.  Opportunity must be afforded to each to evolve its own peculiar political institution.  The present structure reinforces indigenous colonialism- a crude, harsh, unscientific and illogical system”. – Obafemi Awolowo.

“If we continue to operate a very defective system, this country would face very serious danger of survival because this constitution cannot sustain this country”. -Lateef Adegbite.

Most of the recent discussions on political restructuring in Nigeria have been isolated from a serious and holistic attention to the character of the Nigerian state.  This compartmentalized approach has culminated in rather limited, even ahistorical interpretations, analysis, conclusions, and projections.  In this chapter, we seek to argue that the nature, character and politics of the Nigerian state as presently constituted mediates possibilities for democracy and the required political engineering for true federalism.  The continuing crisis of power and governance, the inability to construct hegemony or a national project, and deepening socio-economic crisis are all precipitates of state failure even state exhaustion in certain spheres. While there have been critical tendencies, coalitions and counter-coalitions within the state and the constituencies of the political elite, the fundamental and structural character of the state as a violent, privatized, insensitive, unstable, vulnerable, and non-hegemonic force remains intact.i  In the following discussion, we examine the historical origins of the state to set the context; isolate the tendencies within the country’s distinctive political economy; examine the process of defederalization and the role of the military; critique the 1999 constitution; and finally, we propose an alternative constitutional approach to political restructuring and refederalization.

History, Class and State in Nigerian Politics

Nigerian politics continues to reflect and carry the stamp its colonial and neo-colonial experiences as well as then elite that lacks hegemony and a sense of nation.  This elite, lacking a strong and viable base in production, turns to the state as its primary instrument of primitive accumulation.  In this process, the state is mangled and rendered impotent in the quest for nationhood, growth, and development, much less democracy.  Interestingly, the state that the political elite hope to utilize as the weapon for nation building and for facilitating accumulation has remained unstable, inefficient, ineffective, and incapable of building hegemony.  Consequently, the state, privatized by the corrupt elite to substitute for its tenuous relation to productive activities, relies on violence, repression, and other forms of manipulation to reproduce itself and maintain a form of political domination.  It is therefore important to understand the dynamics of Nigeria’s distinctive political economy and social balances as well as the lasting impact of the social formation’s historical experiences in order to fully appreciate the crisis of politics and power.ii
In several ways, Nigeria is a victim of its history.  The social forces, institutions, external relations, and domestic patterns of accumulation and exchange bequeathed by western imperialism have continued to mediate opportunities for growth, development, and democracy.  Over four decades of independence has witnessed several creative and not-so-creative efforts at engaging the contradictions and crises unleashed by this historical inheritance.  Such engagements have themselves been mediated by the character of an elite that had bee structured to reproduce rather than restructure the status quo.
It is well established in the literature that Nigeria’s contact with the forces of western imperialism had far-reaching impacts on state and class formation, on political and social values, the patterns of accumulation, and the country’s location and role in the global divisions of labor and power.  The programmed transition to neo-colonial relations continued to mediate the ability of the state and its custodians to find democratic avenues for managing the crisis of politics.  In fact, the Nigerian elite appears to have sacrificed opportunities for initiating a national project on the alter of short-term interests even if it meant the subversion of the very institutions it required for maintaining its own longer-term interests.  Consequently, in spite of the creation of several states and local governments, a new national anthem, new constitutions and forms of government, and changing leaderships especially between the military and so-called civilians, the Nigerian state remains plagued with all sorts of negative coalitions, contradictions, conflicts and instability.  At the core of the contradictions is the national question.  Essentially, Nigerians have never had the opportunity to discuss and reach some consensus on how the nation should be structured, power defined, contestations for power organized, resources generated and allocated, rights protected, and the larger democratic project articulated and compacted in a truly democratic constitution.  It is embarrassing that in almost four decades after political independence, Nigerians still find data, political arrangements, and institutions designed by the brutal and totally undemocratic and illegitimate colonial state as the point of reference or comparison with their contemporary realities and predicaments.
The character of the Nigerian state continues to be directly responsible for reproducing the country’s deepening socio-economic and political contradictions.  In fact, the state seems to worsen the country’s predicaments with every policy action or inaction it initiates or fails to initiate in the process of trying to consolidate the interests of its custodians.  The state has never been able to build an appreciable degree of confidence among Nigerians, ensure some discipline within the ranks of the elite, manage the economy in the interest of the people, or construct the much needed platforms of inclusion, tolerance, and participation.  As well, the state has been captured and privatized by a tiny fraction of the elite that use public institutions and resources to terrorize non-bourgeois communities, abuse human rights, loot public funds, and mortgage the future of the citizenry.  Perceived as a wicked, aloof, insensitive, corrupt, and distant force, Nigerians relate to the state as enemy.  It is seen as an enemy that must, as opportunity permits, be subverted, avoided, cheated, dismantled, and destroyed if the interests of the majority of the citizenry are to be protected.  For all intents and purposes, the repressive and “captured” postcolonial Nigerian state seems to do everything to provoke non-bourgeois forces.
The nature and composition of the state is important and central to the nature of political arrangements adopted in any social formation.  If it is an unstable, non-hegemonic, and illegitimate state, there is often the tendency to adopt desperate programs to shore up its institutions.  Thus the state could be federal in name but in reality under the domination of a single dictator, a military junta, or cabal of autocrats with a visible distaste for democracy.  Once a state is militarized, it loses the capacity to mediate contradictions within and between political communities, becomes intolerant of opposition, and becomes extra-sensitive to criticism.  It diverts scarce resources to defense and security and punishes minority and vulnerable communities.  The overall political values quite often, reflect a centralizing tendency that culminates in the suffocation of civil society and the closure of democratic platforms to popular interests.  The net consequence of such developments is not just the erosion of democratic values but also the subversion of the national project and the intensification of conflicts.  The custodians of state power in Nigeria have done such a terrible job at building those elements that pull a people together to cultivate a national identity and culture.  The evidence can be seen in the fact that on the eve of the twenty-first century, Nigeria has no national (s)hero, hardly enjoys stability, no national identity, and the rate at which the youth abandon the country for foreign lands remains alarming.  At all levels, economic, political, social, and ideological, even spiritual, the state and its custodians have failed woefully.    This has been Nigeria’s experience since political independence in October 1960.  The plight of marginalized and minority communities and nationalities all over the country arise from the situation and patterns that we have summarized above.

Tendencies in Contemporary Nigerian Politics

The consequences of the contradictions of Nigeria’s history and post-colonial politics have generated certain broad and specific tendencies that continue to shape the country’s political economy.  It is important to take a look at these tendencies because Nigerians are wont to forget or ignore them in the face of pressures from dictatorships and illiberal democratic arrangements.  The military has been unable to engage, mediate, or contain these tendencies and contradiction largely due to its commandist structure and character.  The contradictions arising from the tendencies have survived various forms of military arrangements since 1966.  Civilian governments have hardly done better.  Many, like the Obasanjo government behave like military juntas.  Others simply were too steeped in disorganization and corruption, and too impatient with democracy that the contradictions of underdevelopment were simply multiplied.  While post-colonial political alignments and realignments have been critical to the nature of Nigerian politics and society, the fundamental basis of the society has not changed even if new issues, institutions, contradictions, and coalitions have been introduced and in some ways power relations have been marginally reconfigured.
The structure of the Nigerian federation reflects the vacillations between civilian and military dictatorships.  Years of military rule have turned the weak federation inherited at political independence into a unitary system.  Most of the current politicians, bureaucrats, and other political actors have become used, even addicted to the commandist and authoritarian ways of the military.  This development has had far reaching implications for stability and democracy.  Perceived or real inequities arising from a wobbled federal arrangement or non-arrangement for that matter, have congealed loyalties to alternative sites of power.  The net result is the further erosion of an already tenuous legitimacy.  Opportunistic military officers have frequently capitalized on this situation to grab power and initiate another gyration in the complex waters of Nigerian politics.
The deepening economic crisis has had very deep implications for politics, specially the building of democratic institutions.  There is a tendency to ignore the economics of transition politics.  In the Nigerian situation, deindustrialization, mass poverty, economic dislocation, environmental abuse, rising foreign debt and debt-servicing obligations, and the neglect of rural areas and producers continue to significantly affect the nature of Nigerian politics.  The failed structural adjustment program and in particular, the unequal distribution of the pains and costs of adjustment have generated new political coalitions and interests that cannot be ignored in any serious discussion of the politics of the country.  How can poor people tolerate the political shortcomings of the elites?  How much participation can be expected from a poverty-stricken and alienated populace?  Will the neo-colonial state have the resources to fully operationalize the requirements of a full democratic system?  These issues have created a wide gulf between the leaders and the people thus making the cultivation of democratic values almost impossible.
The shifting or changing character of the Nigeria military is a central feature of contemporary Nigerian life.  What to do with the military remains part of the critical political discourse in Nigeria.  Yet, containing the military remains a very prominent political and vexing question.  The proposals have been as diverse as there are interest groups: demobilization, re-education, constitutional control, reorganization, retraining, regionalized commands, total disbanding, and the democratization of recruitment into the military.  Many of these prescriptions that are being insisted upon by some nationality groups and aggrieved communities are reflective of total dissatisfaction with the nature of the Nigerian federation, the character of leadership, and the injustices that pervade the country.  Without doubt the Nigerian military has disgraced itself beyond redemption and aside from deliberately distorting national political structures, institutions, and relations within and between communities, it also remains a serious challenge to the survival of post-military democratic arrangements.  In more recent times, the retired fraction of the military elite has begun to make a direct bid for power while retaining the capacity to significantly influence party formation, funding, selection of candidates, ministerial appointments and political alliances.  The capacity to execute these critical political initiatives has been directly related to the extent of corruption perpetrated while in office.  These have clear implications for the nature of power politics in Nigeria.
The threat of authoritarianism continues to stare Nigerians in the face.  This is a tendency that has steadily built up since political independence but was given a specific for or character by the rapacious military juntas, especially the Badangida and Abacha juntas.  The clear evidence is in the ease with which the late General Abacha almost succeeded in civilianizing himself and his brutal dictatorship.  Though he died unsung and to the relief of several national and international constituencies, Abacha continues to enjoy the loyalty of elements across society that were part of his diabolical political agenda.  Such a dictatorship would have made only superficial pretensions to democracy with the existence of five so-called political parties and a national assembly while continuing the suffocation of civil society.  Nigerians would for a long time have problems with how to wear down the authoritarian values and attitudes bequeathed by the military.  This would not be easy because many of those that have been elected as legislators and into executive positions had been ardent supporters of the past dictatorships.  While the only hope for effectively addressing this problem lies in strengthening civil society, it will require a lot of understanding and concessions from the custodians of state power to get on this path.  This is currently not on the political screen in Nigeria.  If anything, authoritarian tendencies continue to shape the character of politics especially under Obasanjo’s limited regard for the constitution and the illiberal dispositions of the political elite.
The management of primordial identities and politics remain critical to determining the context of Nigerian politics, indeed, the future of the Nigerian nation-state.  This has developed over the years into one of the top five national contradictions that has led to the loss of thousands of lives and would continue until adequately addressed.  There are several dimensions to this.  Not only in terms of suspicions and contradictions between ethnic, religious, and regional interests but also within each primordial constituency.  The tendency has been to focus so much on the contestations between the majority Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa ethnic groups that the minorities have been more or less ignored.  As well, within each of the majority groups are significant coalitions and divisions that mediate the ability of groups to act as absolute mobilizational weapons.  In other words, while ethnicity and religion remain very critical issues in the formulation of political interests and postures, they are also being mediated by issues of class and the relative consciousness of the Nigerian people as they confront the challenges of survival.  To be sure, the ethnic and minority issue is directly tied to the questions of political restructuring, refederalization, revenue allocation, and democratic consolidation.  If the political elite remains insensitive to popular demands on these issues, ethnic postures would get consolidated and become ever more violent.  Already, invented identities are complicating the ability of ethnic groups to articulate clear political agendas.  This has led to an internalization of violence as sub-ethnic groups engage each other in a struggle for supremacy and identity, as well as spurious claims to territory.  On the other hand, the unsteady state responds with more violence to this internalization thus further complicating opportunities for political negotiation.
Resource generation and distribution often called “revenue allocation” in Nigeria remains one of the most critical aspects of power politics in Nigeria that is hidden behind the veil of ethnic identity.  In some way, this is related to the structure of Nigerian federalism and the dominant role of the center.  It is also tied to the question of minority rights, center-periphery relations, and the traditional contestation for hegemony between the dominant groups.  Of course, given the neglect of non-oil wealth, the focus today is on oil, which generates well over half of national revenues and about 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings.  The Nigerian rentier state has not just become the source of accumulation but it has also become the focus of elite competition and thus a stabilizing force: no one wants to hurt or kill the golden goose that lays the eggs!  But minorities, oil producing communities, oil producing states, and bourgeois elements from oil producing areas are not pleased at the deprivations their communities suffer and the perceived ways in which oil wealth is used to promote development in non-oil producing areas.  Until demands for a just and equitable formula for revenue allocation is found, these increasingly restless communities would continue to challenge the legitimacy of the state and reject existing policies.  If the central government does not want to grant the demands from the oil producing states and communities for the use of the derivation principle as the basis of revenue allocation, then it has to find an alternative formula that would satisfy the communities.
The character, organization, discipline, world-view and politics of the Nigerian political elite negates possibilities for democracy and federalism.  Though it has always collaborated with military juntas, it has not fared well under the military.  It has been abused, manipulated, intimidated, and rendered almost useless by a rather arrogant military structure.  Though it is only just beginning to reorganize itself, it would continue to pay for its experience under the military in the next three to four decades.  It does not help an elite to be perceived by the populace as corrupt, irresponsible, unprincipled, unreliable, and useless.  As indicated earlier, the tenuous relation of the Nigerian elite to productive activities is directly responsible for its subservience to foreign capital and its reliance on the state for accumulation.  Its fixation on primitive accumulation has prevented it from developing powerful constituencies, forging a vision for the country, and developing an ideological context for growth and development.  This bourgeois class is highly factionalized and fractionalized and has been unable to significantly operate beyond the narrow confines of its ethnic and regional as well as ethnic enclaves.  Unless this bourgeois class begins to seriously construct its politics across primordial lines, it would remain incapable of constructing the type of national constituencies needed to build a new politics for democracy and development.  The elite has already begun to pay for its allegiance with the past dictators as civil society groups are steadily capitalizing on the newfound democratic environment to question the credentials and credibility of the political elite, in particular, those holding political and elective positions.  Developments over Sharia law, contestations in the Niger Delta and Lagos, and permanent rumors of military coups are indicators of an unsteady and uncertain elite in charge of an unstable and non-hegemonic state.  This is hardly a recipe for democracy or federalism because political uncertainly encourages absolutism and the privatization and concentration of power.  The shallowness of its efforts at a national character and platform is evident in the ease with which such efforts dissolve into ethnic and other forms of engagement in the face of crisis.
A tendency that does not appear to have improved is the largely conservative political agenda and world-view of the Nigerian elite. Nigerian politicians do not discuss gender and the environment.  Largely a reflection of their conservative and opportunistic disposition, gender and environmental issues are beginning to emerge as critical issues influencing constituency building and democratic politics.  Without doubt, the emergence of several NGOs and the experiences of the minority communities especially the Ogonis and the Ijaws have contributed significantly to introducing the critical themes of minorities, resource control, the environment, and gender into political discourses in Nigeria. Environmental questions are now directly tied to contradictions and conflicts over questions of revenue generation and allocation and refederalization.  As well, the corrupt and insensitive political styles of the custodians of state power is beginning to galvanize women all over the country to develop clear political programs.  If, in the context of current global debates, Nigerian politicians still fail to take these issues seriously, we can understand why they remain insensitive to the demands of non-bourgeois constituencies for a new democratic compact.
The rise of critical and militant opposition politics in Nigeria evaporated to a large extent with political independence.  It was only resuscitated in a national sense following the 1993 annulment of the presidential election result won by Chief M.K.O. Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP).  Since then, the country has moved along very significantly on the political front.  Yet, all has not been well in spite of the emergence of scores of civil liberties organizations, new leaders, and opposition movements on the political terrain.  The opposition has been vulnerable to penetration, domestication, corruption, and incorporation by the state and its agents.  Many opposition movements have been characterized in several ways by undemocratic conduct, ideological bankruptcy, marginalization of women, ethnic and regional chauvinism, opportunism, limited vision, weak political programs, and a failure to effectively network for effectiveness.  Many are simply urban based, depend excessively on foreign sources of funding, do not strive to build new dialogues or cultivate new constituencies, and continue to have a very narrow definition of politics and power.  How the opposition works out its own politics and interacts with civil society organizations will be critical to how Nigerian politics will be constructed and reproduced in the future.  The withdrawal of the military from politics in May 1999 has now opened up new challenges and paths to engaging the state and its agents.  The trend towards the clarification of objectives, identifying and training new leaders, building new networks, and working out more effective strategies to ensure maximum impact would continue to be critical to the depth and direction of democratic politics in Nigeria.  This would equally determine, to some extent, how the military would react to the politics of power struggles in the future.
Finally, the tendencies that have prevented the strengthening of civil society, the construction of state hegemony, or the cultivation of democratic values have combined with other contradictions to reify power, prevent political engineering, and have led to authoritarian tendencies even under the so-called democratic regime of Olusegun Obasanjo.  This is where we must locate the problems of political restructuring and the challenges of refederalization after decades of irresponsible and vicious military dictatorships.

Reifying Political Power and the Rise of Bigman Rule

It is important to understand the root of our current predicament.  While it is true that the Nigerian state is not constituted to build democracy, its custodians are much worse.  It is the character and hollowness of the world-view of this elite that has precipitated Nigeria’s contemporary predicament and the difficulty of refederalization.  This is the more amazing given the obvious relevance of refederalization to the resolution of deepening political crisis and violence in the country.  One of the consequences of colonialism in developing societies is the legacy of the reification of power.  Because the colonial state was absolutist in every sense, it combined the power of life and death and dispensed power without consultation or accountability.  The colonial governor or district officer was the executive, judiciary, and legislature all rolled into one.  The indigenous elites that had been structurally incorporated into the power and economic networks of colonialism following World War II were nurtured in the context of these undemocratic values.  Indeed, many actively participated in the brutalization of their peoples and were rewarded with all sorts of decorations.  Given the tenuous relation of the African elite to productive activities, political independence witnessed the capture of political power without economic power.  Consequently, accumulation, survival, and domination could only be guaranteed through the unmediated control of state power.  The new elite was thus forced to devise strategies of ideological containment, depoliticization, diversion, violence, and human rights abuses to ward off opposition.  This situation in itself raised the premium on power to new and frightening proportions.  To capture, control and effectively deploy political power therefore, villages were raided, taxes were imposed, communities were punished for not voting rightly, and suspects or enemies of the state were found in all nooks and corners of the society.  The military formations were strengthened as private security outfits were set up and armed to the teeth.  External scapegoats were found abroad and promptly blamed for the failures of misguided policies.  In short, the postcolonial African elite squandered all opportunities to mobilize the people and deploy their unbounded energies to the task of decolonization, development, and democracy.  It is no wonder that one after the other, the postcolonial regimes were sacked or consumed by the very contradictions they had created.  The battle between factions and fractions of the power elite revolved around how to capture and monopolize the state at the expense of popular groups and other marginalized constituencies.  The last concern for such beleaguered elite was sharing the power that they had managed to grab through all sorts of underhand and clearly extra-legal methods.  Yet, the entire theory and practice of federalism, especially in plural societies, is anchored on power sharing.
What has become power sharing in the context of Nigerian federalism would normally be a good political agenda designed to open up opportunities to disadvantaged communities and give all nationality, religious, and cultural groups an almost equal opportunity to manage the affairs of the nation.  But in the Nigerian context, we need to be very cautious if we are to understand the driving forces behind the strident calls for power sharing that has become a national obsession.  The truth is that Nigerian politicians have been calling for new patterns of power sharing not because they are genuinely interested in gaining a share of power in the interest of their respective nationality, religious, or interest groups, but because they see such arrangements as an easy route to grab power and deploy it for private primitive accumulation.
There is no evidence of any correlation between the access that Nigerian elites have enjoyed under the guise of power sharing and an improvement in the conditions of living of the Nigerian people.  It is actually possible to contend that the politics of power sharing has not in any way been of benefit to the generality of Nigerians.  In fact, members of the political elite have grabbed power directly and though the working of various power sharing arrangements and have turned around to use that power to dominate, abuse, marginalize, terrorize, exploit and intimidate non-bourgeois communities and constituencies.  The criminal looting of public funds, the mismanagement of the public services, the gross inefficiency of the bureaucracy, and the absence of basic facilities needed to make life comfortable for the majority are indicators of the failure of the Nigerian elite and its use of political power.  Nigerians, in spite of the production and exportation of oil and the collection of well over $250billion since 1958 from oil sales, have grown poorer and poorer.  As a federal state, power-sharing arrangements have revolved around the following:  a). Rotation of party/political positions among geo-ethnic zones; b). Federal character arrangements in political appointments guaranteed in the constitution; and c). Zoning arrangements designed by political parties to ensure the distribution of party/political positions;
However, in spite of all the arguments, quarrels, and conflicts over power sharing since 1960, the results have failed to reassure minorities and marginalized communities just as it has failed woefully in generating a sense of inclusion, patriotism, or belief in the national project.  It has not bridged the distrust between Christians and Muslims; between north and south or east and west; between oil producing and non-oil producing communities; between the military and civilians; or between the state and civil society.  As well, it has not resolved the perpetual distrust and conflicts between majority and minority ethnic groups in the country.  With the pathological fixation of the Nigerian elite on power grabbing by any means to facilitate private accumulation, it is in no position to address these contradictions.  Power sharing requires some degree of discipline and an ability to rely less on the direct deployment of state control in the interest of private accumulation.  Power sharing requires that the political elite respect the rules of political competition and learn to accept defeat.  Rather, the Nigerian elite does not accept defeat.  The state is seen as a private domain.  Those that control power make no distinction between their personal bank accounts and the public purse.  As well, the power elite does not believe in the give-and-take that informs and strengthens democratic politics.  Many have been known to fund military coups against legitimately elected governments.  The irrationality of the Nigerian power elite, often rationalized in the name of speaking for or representing particular ethnic and regional or religious communities, has worked directly to encourage the excessive concentration of power at the center and the near total erosion of federalism.  As indicated earlier, military rule, in which the elite robustly participated at all levels, did not help the situation.  Now that the military has temporarily disengaged from formal politics, its proteges appear incapable of carrying out the necessary political restructuring needed to support the consolidation of democracy.  Why has this been the case in Nigeria?
Among other explanations, the answer can be found in the premium placed on power in the postcolonial era.  The state has become the quickest instrument of capital accumulation.  The challenge is to penetrate it by any means necessary and preside over its resources.  The reality is that the resources are not generated from tax collection by the so-called federal government.  Rather, especially since the end of the civil war in 1970, the resources have come from the production and exportation of oil found mostly in the new ravaged Niger Delta.  Since the elite is rabidly corrupt and largely unproductive, it required undemocratic mechanisms to control the communities so that it could cheat them out of its resources.  This is exactly what is behind the numerous dubious and diabolical revenue sharing arrangements, the undemocratic power arrangements, and the robust alliance between the military and the Nigerian power elite.  For those that have come to locate their visibility, accumulation, opportunities, and power at the center and the ability of that center to control oil resources, the devolution of power or refederalization is hardly on the political agenda.  As is the case with Olusegun Obasanjo since May 1999, it is easier to harass the governors, threaten martial law or state of emergency, issue shoot-on-sight orders to the police, set up commissions that are designed to keep the status quo, and refuse to open up the constitution review process to the people of Nigeria.
As was to be expected, the combination of the contradictions above have generated more agitations and conflicts for and over power sharing as restless minority communities, especially in the Middle Belt and Niger Delta continued to make strident demands for the right to be involved in decision making and in the governance of the country.

Militarization and Defederalization

It will not be wrong to conclude that the military has practically ruined the political future of Nigeria.  Of course, it is still possible to correct the terrible legacies of military brutality, mismanagement, corruption, and negative politicking.  With the first intervention in politics in 1966, the military not only set the basis for eroding all structures and features of federalism but also began to build new authoritarian structures and attitudes derived from its grossly undemocratic, intolerant, and commandist nature and structure.  Though the military once again retired to the barracks in May 1999, today, Nigeria is certainly less united and peaceful.  Yet, if the military created several states and local governments, introduced a new anthem and pledge, created a new capital, constructed some highways (without feeder roads), and created more multimillionaires, it failed woefully to reassure minorities and other disadvantaged communities that there was a future for them in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  More Nigerians have been killed in peacetime under the military than ever.  Religious, ethnic, and class-based riots have become part of everyday life only because the military was insensitive to the demands of nationality groups.  More often than not, it treated such demands as irritants and relied on repression, co-optation, violence, and temporary measures to deal with agitations for increased minority participation in power structures and the return to true federalism.
By “defederalization” we refer to the process of making unitary what was once federal.  In other words, defederalization is a deliberate process of eroding or dismantling a federal system and replacing it with a unitary arrangement.  The military not only concentrated power in itself and the center, but also ensured that the states were reduced to mere administrative units taking orders from the center.  The excessive centralization of power, resources, and opportunities also encouraged the rise of authoritarianism and other forms of despotic rule, and the negation of democratic values.  As well, the personalization of power and politics under the military was made possible by the centralization of power and resources at the center.  Hence, under the Generals Babangida and Abacha juntas for example, Nigeria was perceived or discussed in terms of their personal whims and caprices.   Relying on violence and intimidation, the military arrangement introduced all sorts of undemocratic values, reified existing contradictions, generated new conflicts, and negated the fledgling democratic platforms that were emerging in the first republic.  The reliance on decrees that oust the jurisdiction of the law courts and by disrespecting existing social and cultural institutions, the Nigerian military destroyed possibilities for inter-ethnic harmony; nation-building opportunities, and platforms of pluralism and tolerance within and between nationality groups.  It was not unusual, especially under the Abacha junta that the top ten senior positions in the country were all occupied by persons from the same ethnic and/or religious group.  As Pini Jason has aptly noted, the Abacha junta

…in a space of five years removed every remaining semblance of Federalism from the governance of the nation.  Being no respecter of any rules, he reduced the affairs of the state to a conspiracy, an affair between himself and few trusted locals.  If you were not from Kano or of Kanuri or Lebanese extraction, you didn’t qualify for any worthy post.  Those who were allowed at the outer peripheries of power were either those who did him favours or those who did his dirty jobs.  In such a situation, it was very easy not to see the problems of Nigeria beyond the needs of Abacha and his acolytes and courtiers.iii

Furthermore, according to Jason, the military, in total disregard for the principles of federalism and as evidence of insensitivity to the need for equal representation in the country’s power structures, went all out to concentrate power in the hands of a particular ethnic group.  The situation under the Abacha junta serves as a typical example:

Let’s take a typical situation for example.  Were Abacha to desire an advice on the legal situation of Chief Abiola’s pending case in the Supreme Court, he would have had in attendance, his Special Adviser on Legal matters Professor Anwalu Yadudu, Attorney-General, Alhaji Abdulahi Ibrahim, the Chief Justice, Muhammed Uwais, National Security Adviser, Alhaji Ismaila Gwarzo, his Chief Security Officer, Major Hamza el-Mustapha, the Director-General of Military Intelligence, Brigadier Sabo Mohammed and perhaps, the Secretary to the Federal Government, Alhaji Gidado Idris… But tell me, where can you locate anything “federal” in this assemblage?  If you say that this group, most probably conducting their strategy meeting in vernacular, would not be tempted to see the matter as an us versus them, you are probably lying.  If it concerned labour unions, you would add the Minister of Labour, Alhaji Ahmed Gasua and you would end up with the same unfederal assembly!  If he summoned the Inspector-General of Police, the Deputy IG, AIGs and Commissioners of Police, you would still have the same sectional assembly and sectional solutions to a federal problem.  There is nothing equally federal in a situation where people from one section of the country are solely in control of all the border posts of the immigration, and almost all the area administrators of the customs.  That simply amounts to deliberately holding the rest under siege.iv

The situation described above, reflecting a situation of near absolute defederalization, is not imaginary.  All protests against this “unfederal” development were met with unmediated repression.  This tactic drove opposition elements abroad or forced them to generate more militant and political programs for engaging the neocolonial state.  The fact that the non-hegemonic military-dominated state was incapable of instituting a truly inclusive and democratic system has become rather obvious to minorities in the country.  This realization is what has increased the militant agitations for autonomy and local control over local resources.  The national gyrations of state creation led to the emergence of states that were not viable and only ended up in strengthening the central government on which they were all totally dependent for revenues.  In any case, each new state generated its own minority question and thus compounded the sites of contradictions and conflicts all over the country.  To the extent that the control of power was still coterminous with accumulation and the definition of self-worth, those that dominated the state continued to monopolize it at the expense of power sharing options.
Under the military, Nigeria became a federal state in name only.  All power came from Lagos or later, Abuja.  All opportunities came from Abuja.  All major contracts came from Abuja or from the offices of the representatives of the Commander-in-Chief in the various states.  All Decrees came from Abuja and yet, the “lord” in Abuja was not elected by any one and was not accountable to anyone.  The almighty federal government paid the salaries of primary school teachers in the states.  It constructed and repaired roads in the states and supplied drugs to state owned hospitals.  In the days of General Abacha, a super federal government agency, the Petroleum Trust Fund (PTF) was even established to perform the task of several federal and state ministries.  Those that were shut out of power had no choice than to either toe the established line or exist on the fringes of power.  Central planning became the ideological basis for growth and accumulation though it was hardly accompanied by any clear-cut ideological frameworks for combating dependence, underdevelopment, and instability.  The so-called mixed economy became an excuse for using public funds to subsidize the confused accumulative strategies of an equally confused political elite.  The state was turned into the accumulative machine of the bourgeois class.  As they looted the state, largely aware that they could not be probed under a junta that was accountable to no one, they tightened their control over the state, its institutions and resources and did everything possible to keep others out.  This generated deeper contradictions not only within and between nationality groups, but more specifically between elites that felt shut out of power and those that dominated power.  This was also acted out within the military as coups and counter-coups became avenues for expressing the misguided ambitions of some military officers as well as a strategy for contesting the power space.  The Majors Saliba Mukoro and Gideon Orka coup of April 1990 that was ostensibly executed on behalf of the Christians and southern states of the country was a typical example of this trend.
The advent of military rule, therefore, represented a major assault on Nigerian federalism.  In fact, federalism was summarily abolished as powers hitherto guaranteed to the regions were abolished or gradually taken over by the federal government.  The very first misguided assault on Nigerian federalism by the military, in a direct sense, was when General Aguyi Ironsi promulgated Decrees No. 33 and 34 of May 24, 1966 abolishing federalism and replacing it with a unitary form of government.  Thus “National Government” was to replace “Federal Government” in this new political adventure of trying to force unity on Nigerians without the adequate political arrangements even as Ironsi was seen as favoring the Ibo ethnic group in his appointments and policies.  Of course, this only gave further impetus to the contradictions that eventually culminated in a civil war that led to the death of millions of Nigerians.  Given that the constitution had been suspended, regional parliaments abolished as were political parties, all powers were now concentrated in the so-called “supreme headquarters” in the person of the “Commander-in-Chief “ and head of the Supreme Military Council (SMC).    Regional police forces were abolished, the military commands were centralized, education became a federal affair, and all-important appointments at the state levels by state military governors reflected a set pattern of politics dictated by the military head of state.
Finally, on the military, it has completely destroyed the fabric of Nigerian federalism thus making it an almost insurmountable challenge for post-military democratic governments to reclaim lost ground.  This is so because in the last three decades and more, most of the civilian elements that now occupy the seat of power in the new Obasanjo dispensation were virtually made by and under the military.  The world-view and attitudes that they carry, more frequently than not, reflect the culture of military authoritarianism.  To be sure, part of the explanation can be found in the historical origins of the Nigerian military: a force created by the undemocratic colonial state to visit violence on the peoples of Nigeria.  On seizing power it saw the Nigerian social formation as a huge barrack under the command of the Commander-in-Chief with “obey before complain” as its philosophy of governance, and thus incapable of grappling with Nigeria’s robust and vibrant, even quarrelsome civil society.  Believing in legitimation (or compliance) by repression, the commandist, repressive, insensitive, and undemocratic character of Nigeria’s military juntas have precipitated an almost firm condition where power is dominated directly by the military retired and/or active, or by surrogates of the military.

Constitutions without Constitutionalism: Recompacting the Political Space.

Nigeria has never has a truly democratic constitution.  To be sure, the country has had legal constitutions, but they have hardly been legitimate.  The country has never adopted a participatory or process-led approach involving the various nationality groups and the various communities, constituencies and interests that make up the country in compacting its constitutions.  It has consistently been elite-driven with the state playing a critical role in determining the content of the final document.  It is no wonder that the constitutions have hardly served as coherent compacts for determining the relationship between the ruled and the rulers and none has been able to ensure the rule of law and popular participation much less transparency, accountability, and social justice.  Nigerian constitutions have been opportunistic documents designed to perpetrate what could be regarded as a political fraud on the nationalities of Nigeria in particular minority groups and non-bourgeois constituencies.  Finally, Nigerian constitutions have never been instruments for ensuring the survival of the democratic project neither have they prevented nor discouraged the subversion of the democratic enterprise by the military.  More so, the constitutions have not empowered the Nigerian people to have access to the structures of power or to the constitution so they can claim ownership of the document and deploy such ownership in the defense of their individual and collective rights.
As indicated above, military rule destroyed the basis of Nigerian federalism.  The concentration of power in the federal government and the commandist nature of military rule turned Nigeria into a pseudo-federal state.  This has turned out to be the basis of agitations for autonomy and political restructuring demanded by the various minority groups, opposition and human rights movements, and ethno-cultural organizations.v  The 1999 constitution hardly demonstrates any sensitivity to these issues.  It hardly pays attention to questions of autonomy or reorganization of political power and though it pays so much attention to power and the definition of power, it is still lopsided in favor of the center.  The states of the federation do not have control over their own resources.  This is still the exclusive preserve of the federal government that has guaranteed only 13% of generated revenues to the states where the resources are generated (see below).  This is no different from the situation under the military where the federal government illegally appropriated the resources of units of the federation and doled out meager portions to them under dubious fiscal arrangements.vi  The debate in the oil-bearing and producing communities of Nigeria has long gone beyond percentages to one of control.  The 1999 constitution could not have been more unrealistic and out of touch.
Under the 1999 constitution, the states cannot set up their own police forces.  The State Police Force (SPF) is only a branch of the federal police force under a federally appointed inspector general of police.  Section 214 (1) is clear on the fact that “There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.”  According to Section 214 (c), it is the National Assembly that is empowered to “make provisions for branches of the Nigeria Police Force forming part of the armed forces of the Federation….”  And the Commissioner of police for each state “shall be appointed by the Police Service Commission.”   Even more ridiculous in a federal system, is that in the event of a need to maintain or secure public safety and public order within the state, a governor may direct the commissioner of police to take necessary action.  However, according to section 215 (4), “before carrying out any such directions…the Commissioner of Police may request that the matter be referred to the President or such Minister of the Government of the Federation as may be authorized in that behalf by the President for his direction.”  After Nigeria’s experience in the first republic, and given the bitter partisan quarrels that accompanied the 1998-99 elections, the federal government can hardly be regarded as not being partisan much less interested in objectively responding to crises in states if such crises might weaken the opposing parties.  The federal ministry of education does not just play a supervisory role; it also dictates policy to the state departments of education.vii  In fact, one of the first acts of General Obasanjo as the democratic president of Nigeria was to pay the salaries of striking teachers in the states.  As it turned out, General Obasanjo had illegally appropriated monies belonging to the state governments to perform this magnanimous act for which he took a lot of credit!
Citizens in a state cannot form political parties that are registered in the state and interested in canvassing for support and contesting for office only in the state.  In fact, all parties are to comply with federally dictated requirements and are to be registered with the federal government’s Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).  This goes directly against the autonomy of the nationalities of the federating units and erodes the ability of states to organize their political interests and processes independently.  In fact, the entire idea of parties being registered by the federal government means that the same federal government could deny registration on the grounds that its requirements have not been met.  Given the experiences of the past, what the 1999 constitution has done is to restrict the formation and operation of political parties to the wealthy.  It is only this wealthy class that can afford the cost of such an exercise.  It also hardly recognizes the fact that not all parties in the world are necessarily set up to win national elections.  This would continue to anger the minorities, the opposition groups, and locally based politicians.  As Balarabe Musa has already argued, “…the idea of party registration is undemocratic.  For instance, during the last election, we saw a situation whereby only people who had money and who could afford to buy votes, were able to contest and win elections.”viii  In other words, the cumbersome, expensive, and intrusive federal government requirements for party formation and registration is a direct way of encouraging corruption, elite-dominated politics, and the continuing marginalization of persons without connections with the wealthy in the political process.  The 1999 constitution negates a cardinal pillar of federalism by denying Nigerians the right to form political parties at any level they wish and by doing so, it subverts creativity at the local level by forcing it into the complex, corrupt and often compromised vortex of national politics.
Because the state wishes to continue the concentration of power at the center, it has avoided a direct engagement of the nationality issue.  Thus it tries to forge a non-existent sense of nationhood by forcing political parties to adopt superficial national symbols in their logos, names, and presence in geographical spaces.  The reality is that these can (and have) been done without a true commitment to unity and the integration of political interests and objectives.  Most political parties that have described themselves as “national” in Nigeria’s history have been dominated by power elites from the North, East or West.  Denying the nationality question is tantamount to postponing the evil day for Nigeria because the degree of political alienation in the country that gave rise to ethnic and regionalist groups like Afenifere and Oodua Peoples Congress (OPC), Ijaw Peoples Union, Ahaeze, Middle Belt Forum, Midwest Initiative, Eastern Mandate Union (EMU), Northern Peoples’ Forum, and so on, cannot be wished away through superficial institution building.  Rather, Sections 221-229 stipulate regulations that are federally determined and controlled.  In fact, according to Section 223 (b), “the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political party must reflect the federal character.”   Section 222 (f) requires political parties to have their headquarters in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.  This is a clear negation of the rights of nationalities to form their own parties, restrict their activities to their states or local governments, and dedicate themselves to the improvement of their particular communities.  In fact, the federal stipulation means that only those that can afford the high cost of party formation at the national level can pursue such an agenda.
In a country with well over 250 distinct ethnic groups with a plethora of distinct languages, the 1999 constitution declares in Section 55 that the language of the national assembly shall be English, Igbo, Hausa, and Yoruba.  This ridiculous and provocative prescription is evidence of the arrogance of power that informs the politics of the custodians of state power in Nigeria: the majority ethnic groups and retired/active military interests.  In their arrogance, they completely ignored the growing militancy, awareness, organization, and demands of the other nationality groups in the country.  Thus, rather than accord all languages equality before isolating those to be used in the National Assembly, the constitution and its civilian and military framers simply ignored non-majority spoken languages in Nigeria.  This attitude reflects the power configuration of the country and exhibits the direct implication for resource control and redistributive politics.
The 1999 constitution retained the vexing issue of the Land Use Act in Section 315 (d).  This Act, passed in 1978 as the Land Use Decree under the previous General Obasanjo regime, has angered minority communities, those that feel margialized from the center of power, and the entire groups and communities in the Niger Delta.  It was the greed to control the oil wealth of the Niger Delta by an unsteady state and an unproductive elite that led to the promulgation of the Land Use Decree.  The decree allowed top military officers, transnational corporations and members of the ruling class to grab large parcels of land at minimal cost in the name of farming.  In fact, following the election of General Obasanjo in 1999, the leading groups in the Niger Delta, including the Ijaw Youth Council, The Chicoco Movement, and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) met and announced their rejection of his election as president because he was singularly responsible for promulgating the decree that took away their land and vested all oil wealth in the federal government from which they are marginalized.  When President Obasanjo visited the Niger Delta in June 1999 to meet the warring factions, Ijaw activists told him to his face that they still rejected the Land Use Act and the constitution into which it has now been incorporated as it represented a grave injustice and a negation of true federalism.
The various Niger Delta communities and groups have clearly articulated their position, demands, and perspectives on the national question in various documents including the Ogoni Bill of Rights; the Kaiama Declaration, the Ogbia Declaration, and the Ikwerre Rescue Charter.  The positions in these declarations have been endorsed by other democratic groups such as Solidarity Movement of the Southern Minorities of Nigeria, National Conscience Party, Oodua Peoples Congress, Movement for the Survival of Easterners and Niger Deltans, Eastern Nigeria/Delta Unity Association, Women of Nigeria International, and Igbo National Movement to mention a few.  The 1999 constitution not only ignores these documents and demands but actually goes as far as declaring that the provision on the land use act (and those on the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), the public complaints commission, and the national securities agencies) “shall continue to apply and have full effect in accordance with their tenor and to the like extent as any other provisions forming part of this Constitution and shall not be altered or repealed except in accordance with the provisions of section 9 (2) of this Constitution.”  The Land Use Act has been included in the Exclusive Legislative List and would continue to “have effect as Federal Enactment (…)…” This is not only insensitive to the demands of the various groups that have demanded increased control over their lands and other resources, but a clear demonstration of continuing federal domination of the states as had been the case under military regimes.  Without doubt, this would continue to generate pressures, contradictions, and conflicts as alienated groups have made it clear that the repeal of the land use act remains one of their primary objectives.
The 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria is anything but federal.ix  One could make the argument that in spite of existing political structures at local, state, and federal levels, the constitution assumes that the military was still in power!  It simply consolidates existing relations of power in favor of the central government.  Section 4, Second Schedule outlines a very long list of Legislative powers.  The “Exclusive Legislative List” is a long shopping list that includes everything with no attempt to bring in the states, much less the local governments.  Part II of the Schedule contains the “Concurrent Legislative List” where both the Federal and the State governments have powers to make laws.  Even here, the central government has the final say on all issues as the National Assembly is declared as the superior power whose laws shall prevail in the case of conflicts.  The Third Schedule lists “Federal Executive Bodies” such as the Code of Conduct Bureau, Council of State, Federal Character Commission, Federal Civil Service Commission, Federal Judicial Service Commission, Independent National Electoral Commission, National Defence Council, National Economic Council, National Judicial Council, National Population Commission, National Security Council, Nigeria Police Council, Police Service Commission, Revenue Mobilisation Allocation and Fiscal Commission.  These are simply national or federal commissions designed to facilitate federal regulation and control of the states up to the minutest details.  In this context, it has hardly altered existing relations that had reduced the states to mere appendages of the federal government under the various military juntas.  Interestingly, Part II of the Third Schedule lists only four “States’ Executive Bodies”- the State Civil Service Commission, State Independent Electoral Commission, and the State Judicial Service Commission.  The national equivalents, save for the civil service commission, continue to have significant influence in the performance of duties within the states.  Thus, in terms of addressing the demands of prodemocracy groups, human rights organizations, minority communities, the various ethnic associations, women’s movements, the Niger Delta communities, and the widespread calls for political restructuring to return the country to true federalism with regional control over local resources, politics, and economic activities, the 1999 constitution has completely failed to address these issues.  It is strong and long on power, but very weak and short on strengthening civil society, and serving as the basis for mobilizing Nigerians for the construction of a tolerant, inclusive, and democratic project in the next millennium.  The constitution dos not pretend to be the basis for operating a federal system of government.
To drive home its insensitivity to nationality agitations in the country, the constitution has provided very stringent and clearly unattainable conditions for amendments, state and local government creation, and boundary adjustments.  What it wants to do is preserve the current structures that favor the majority nationality groups and silence the yearnings of the minorities.  This also translats directly to majority control over national resources within the excessively centralized power structures.  For instance, to create a new state, Section 8(1) of Chapter 1 provides that an Act of the National Assembly shall be passed only if a request is supported by at last two-thirds majority of members representing the area demanding the new state in the Senate and House of Representatives, the house of assembly in the state concerned, local government councils in the area concerned, a referendum approved by at least two-thirds majority of the people in the area where the demand originated, the result of the referendum is approved by simple majority of all states of the federation through a simply majority of members of the houses of assembly, and finally the referendum result is approved by a resolution  passed by two-thirds majority of members of each house of the national assembly.   Aside from the scary financial implications involved in this circuitous process, the framers of the 1999 constitution knew very well that intra-party conflicts and competition, personality cashes, ethnic and religious as well as regional suspicious would make this process useless to the task of state creation.  Clearly, the requirements already work in favor of the majority groups that already dominate or control power and resources in the current structures that the framers of the constitution appear determined to preserve.

Conclusion: Towards true Federalism and Constitutionalism

The character of a dominant elite is critical to the restructuring of political spaces and relations.  A dominant elite with a holistic world-view would always appreciate the value of dialogue, negotiation, and compromise in the interest of the larger national project.  As well, it would recognize that in politics, concessions do not necessarily mean defeat.  As well, the ability to build new networks and platforms of politics in the interest of advancing the cause of democracy and expanding the foundations of pluralism is directly related to the structure of class relations and the patterns of capital accumulation.  Unfortunately, for Nigeria, it fails at all points of interrogation.  The elite is still factionalized and fractionalized.  Its national project is still heavily mediated by primordial considerations, loose alliances, political irresponsibility, and a seemingly pathological fixation on primitive accumulation.  Its regard for civil society is opportunistic and tendentious.  Its commitment to a national project is shallow.  Its relationship to the state is opportunistic as it uses it to enhance accumulation even at the cost of destabilizing it.  Finally, the Nigerian bourgeoisie remains impatient with democracy, sees politics as a business in which you invest and reap quadruple rewards, and sees the ordinary Nigerian as an object of manipulation in the political process.
Clearly, such an elite is incapable to constructing the necessary political structures to support a truly democratic project.  This is unfortunate for Nigeria where the experiences of the past, especially the civil war (1967-70) created opportunities for redefining and recompacting political relations.  Furthermore, consistent and articulate agitations by popular groups since 1960 have produced some of the most creative political prescriptions for inclusion, tolerance, accountability, and political restructuring in Africa.  The power elite, especially its fraction that dominates the state, has simply opted to ignore these prescriptions.  More than anything, this elite has preferred superficial tinkering with political reforms.  This situation has not been helped by the advent of the military that introduced an arrogance of power and gave the political elite a feeling of invisibility.  Even then, contestations within and between political constituencies since political independence have also exposed the fragility of the state and its limited ability to consolidate the occasional engagements with democracy.  The corruption and breakdown of governance that accompanied military rule, especially under the Generals Babangida and Abacha juntas easily reified corruption and curtailed the ability of the elite to effectively or seriously negotiate the contours of the country’s complex political terrain.  The net result of these and other features of Nigeria’s distinctive political economy is that political restructuring has become part of national contestations and discourses.  Yet, the character of the state and its custodians remain an obstacle to very much needed national dialogues, much less negotiations for reform.
The option open to the Nigerian state today is to go very far beyond the so-called “Presidential Technical Committee to Review the 1999 Constitution” that has adopted an opportunistic, short term, and non-consultative approach to reviewing the constitution.  The process of constitution making must, in some sense, be seen as an effort at reconstructing or remolding the soul of the nation, and an effort at compacting a peace treaty between and within the various nationalities.  It must be a truly open, transparent, accountable, inclusive, and participatory process with the capacity to engage all communities and constituencies.  Such a process must bring in all groups and give them an opportunity, to become part of constructing such a national project.  The depth of existing contradictions has taken this initiative beyond what the political parties or national assembly can handle.    Nigeria would do well to learn from recent experiences and processes in Uganda, South Africa, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe where the emphasis is on the process as well as on ways to not just use constitution making to address the questions of ethnicity, political structure, identity, leadership and so on, but also as a way of generating a document that would be owned by the people and used to defend the democratic enterprise.
Given the present levels of contradictions, negative coalitions, suspicions, violence, and direct challenges to the already tenuous legitimacy of the state, the Olusegun Obasanjo government would be swept off the political scene if it fails to adopt an open, inclusive and participatory approach to recompact the foundations of governance.  This would be the only way to build democratic legitimacy, strengthen political institutions, reopen closed political spaces, and enhance the struggle to consolidate democracy.  The current strategy of piece-meal, aloof, elite-driven, and superficial efforts at consulting the people wold culminate once again in sidetracking the issues and a missed opportunity to establish minimum political platforms of agreement and mobilizing the Nigerian people in a true federal political system.

Endnotes
* A version of this paper focusing on federalism, power and revenue sharing was presented at a conference on consolidating Nigerian democracy in Lisbon, Portugal, September 20-25, 1999.

i Chief Obafemi Awolowo quoted in Ken Saro-Wiwa, A Month and a Day- A Detention Diary (London: Penguin Books, 10995), p. 63.

It is rather interesting to note the way in which debates on the current democratization projects in Africa have been domesticated, encapsulated, and redirected by Western scholarship, media, and institutions. It is no wonder that the initial enthusiasm which accompanied the so-called “opening up” processes has ebbed as the pro-democracy movements, the much maligned and beleaguered African state, scholars and activists struggle to meet the interpretations and demands of imperialism, lenders, donors, and western governments. On the one hand, such processes of ideological containment and depolitcization of grassroots movements have generated new conflicts, diversions, and weakened the people, their communities and constituencies.

This has obviously set the democratic projects back substantially and strengthened the hands of the local agents of imperialism and the neo-colonial military establishments. It is no wonder that it was so easy for the military under the reactionary leadership of General Sani Abacha to seize power in Nigeria and has succeeded in actually consolidating his grip on power.

On the other level, the encapsulation of political change in Africa has strengthened the hands of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the US and other Western governments in determining the context and content of political alignment and realignment, debates, and patterns of social mobilization and accumulation. Thus in a certain way, a steady recolonization of Africa is taking place under the guise of a so-called new world order and the push for democratization.

In this brief study, we examine some of the ways in which this process is being presented, rationalized and legitimized. We also look at the implications of this process for the liberation of Africa from the structurally determined constraints imposed during the contact between African pre-capitalist social formations and the forces of western imperialism.

Laying the Foundations for Backwardness and Vulnerability.

It is striking that in many of the literature published on Africa in the last decade, very few contain sections or chapters dealing with colonialism and imperialism in Africa. There is a conscious effort by western scholarship to obliterate this period in Africa’s history and to delink it from explanations of contemporary coalitions, crises, contradictions, and conflicts. Even within academic institutions, African politics is taught with scanty or no reference to slavery, the period of informal empire, colonialism, and the programmed transition to neo-colonial dependence and underdevelopment. It is therefore not unusual to see a discussion of the African predicament beginning with the so-called economic crisis and moving on to structural adjustment with an unabashed prescription of commercialization, devaluation, desubsidization, and other misplaced monetarist prescriptions which are supposed to lead Africa onto the path of economic growth and development.

Such ahistorical explanations of the African reality have only succeeded in confusing issues and moving attention away from how difficult it is to change and restructure the imposed structures which currently benefits imperialism and its local agents. What follows is that such modes of analysis enable the donors, lenders and some western scholars to blame the victims of centuries of domination, brutalization, and exploitation. The African state is thus an easy target and the realities of the West are touted as models which Africans and their governments should learn to copy. It is presented as if the West was always developed, the market is super efficient, every westerner subscribes to the market, the West was always democratic, the West always respected human rights, and communism failed because it was an inferior ideology to capitalism. People like Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama have even celebrated the demise of communism and the end of history and argued that nothing could stand in the way of a universalization of Western liberal democracy and market relations. Such ahistorical and narrow interpretation of the dynamics of ideological discourses and development confuse structure with process, and remove the ability to make history from the people (Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 1993; Kaplan 1994).

We would like to contend that any discussion of the current African predicament which overlooks or downplays the place of history and historical experience in any way is not only fraudulent but completely dishonest. Such an approach will not only be ahistorical but completely incapable of understanding and effectively explaining the struggles of African peoples for liberation and the sort of fundamental alignment and realignment which goes on daily below the surface of visible politics. This is why the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have never succeeded much in Africa because their prescriptions, often designed by the 80,000 consultants who work on Africa alone (Ayittey 1992), are ahistorical and only address the symptoms and manifestations rather than the causes of the African reality. Very few were amazed when in 1989 the almighty World Bank (1989: 27) confessed that “A 1987 evaluation revealed that half of the completed rural development projects financed by the World Bank in Africa had failed.”

To understand the African reality therefore, scholarship must move away from the westernization of African political thought and praxis to consider the nature of pre-colonial formations; the period of informal empire of relatively interdependent exchange; the period of slavery and its devastation of African societies; the impact of colonization; and the transition to neo-colonial dependence, and underdevelopment. The point is that the suffocation of civil society, dependent accumulation, political instability, corruption, mismanagement, declining productivity, non-accountability of leaders are not natural to Africa. They are direct precipitates of the colonial and neo-colonial experiences of Africa which terminated endogenous and natural processes of state and class formation and imposed alien and exploitative structures, modes and relations of politics, power, production and exchange.

It is in the context above that we can understand the rent-seeking, fractionalized, and repressive character of the African military. This was largely a structure set up by the exploitative and non-accountable colonial state and bourgeoisie to exploit the colony. It employed violence without restraint or moral censure. It designed patterns of exploitation in the primary interest of the metropole. African officers like Idi Amin Dada and Jeane Bedel Bokassa were rewarded for deposing traditional rulers, wiping out villages, subverting African institutions and traditions, and containing popular pressures. That post-colonial armies continued in these traditions manifested in coups and counter-coups and have little regard for constitutions and civil society should then be clearly understood. As well, colonial armies were largely recruited from minority and marginalized communities; people who had some scores to settle. Thus ethnic, regional, class, religious and other primordial differences were clearly part of the colonial politics of divide-and-rule. That African armies today exhibit these traits and coups and counter-coups have been executed in support of narrow clannish interests can then be understood as no transformation of the nature, role, and structure of the armies took place following political independence.

To accuse the African state of being interventionist, bloated, over-extended, overdeveloped, and so on tells us very little. In fact, to try and link the backwardness of African economies to the institutions and policies of the state without considering its custodians, structures, and type is ahistorical and superficial. The postcolonial state is a merely repackaged colonial state. The colonial state was undemocratic, violent, non-accountable, exploitative, dishonest, and relied on the manipulation of primordial loyalties to facilitate the interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Political independence did not witness a transformation or reconstruction of the structures, policies, and institutions of the colonial state. The new African elite simply inherited the state and embarked on using it to depoliticize the people and promote private accumulation given its own marginalization in the local economy and its underdevelopment in relation to foreign capital. Thus, without some reasonable excursion into the historical origins and inheritances of the neo-colonial state, prescriptions which address is contemporary visible behavior cannot seriously affect or change the African condition. Though post-colonial alignment and realignment of political forces have redefined state interests and led to the creation of new institutions, social relations, legal forms, and structures of violence and control, the state remains non-hegemonic, inefficient, ineffective, and incapable of promoting discipline within the ranks of the dominant classes.

Finally, it is easy, as evident in the literature to complain bitterly about the unproductive nature of the African elite, the inefficiency of the bureaucracy, and the vulnerability of the economy. The real question is whether African nations have ever had the opportunity to build viable, productive, self-reliant and autonomous economies since the advent of political independence three or more decades ago. It is well known and generally agreed in the literature that political independence was not accompanied by economic, social and cultural independence. The colonial state had ensured the marginalization of Africans in their own economies and consolidated the position of foreign capital. The new elite had no choice but to use the state for accumulation. At independence, all that the African elite had to rely on was the state and its institutions. They had no choice but to use it to exploit the people, forge unequal exchange relations with imperialism, and defend themselves in power. The state became the greatest employer, contractor, importer, and exporter. Ironically, in as long as this satisfied the needs of the West, no one complained about the so-called over-extended or bloated state in Africa. It exploited the peasants and workers and made it easy for foreign investors to accumulate capital without restraint. The state was then okay. Suddenly, it was no longer useful to the West. The Cold War ended and the state which had so very well served the super and great powers was now seen as enemy and ideological positions were generated to confine it to the dust bin of history: restructure the state, roll back the state, the state is useless, it is corrupt, it is inefficient, it is incapable of promoting accumulation, the state cannot move Africa out of its predicaments.

At the same time the state in the capitalist economies continued to expand. In America the state funds universities, public transportation, research and development, and subsidizes health care. It provides food stamps and several entitlement projects. It provides thousands of scholarships to its citizens. It regulates the economy and through frequent intervention, tries to control inflation and prices. It subsidizes agriculture and even pays farmers not to grow crops. It uses the military to provide jobs and bails out ailing banks and big corporations that have been looted by corrupt businessmen or poorly managed. The list is endless. The state in the advanced capitalist society is actually more interventionist than the state in Africa. Yet, it is this attack against the state, in an environment where the bourgeoisie is weak and dependent that is often overlooked or underplayed in prescribing the monetarist policies which have not been directed at the greatest debtor-nation in the world, America.

The state has always been part of the processes of change, accumulation, domination, exploitation, and progress. The new Western agenda does not differentiate between the state as an institution and the state type. As well, the state is not conceived in its totality or in its social context, in this context it is easy to reduce it to government and blame it for all the ills of the continent: “African economies were dominated by large, inefficient public enterprises. Private sector activity was heavily regulated…Excessive controls and regulations encouraged corruption. Economic activity became distorted. The biggest profits were earned not from production, but from gaining access to favours from the bureaucracy….Many of the activities undertaken by African governments are still harmful to economic growth” (Chalker 1993: 24). This sort of position is impressionistic. First, how come foreign companies operating in and employing Africans manage to reap huge profits annually? Second, I am not aware of any major parastatal in Africa without a major foreign partner which supplies the high level skills, information, technology, management, and at times capital. How come only Africans take the blame when these foreign operated or foreign managed parastatals go bankrupt and fail to make profits? Third, the explanation of corruption by Lynda Chalker does not explain how come there is so much corruption in Western economies in spite of the efficiency and so on. After all, the savings and loans scandal in America makes the likes of Mobutu, Babangida, Nguema, and Moi look at amateurs when it comes to corruption. Finally, fourth, Chalker does not explain why a real bourgeoisie should rely on the state or bureaucracy for accumulation, why it should be inherently committed to accumulation through unproductive (though lucrative) alliances with imperialism. On the one hand the African bourgeoisie is blamed for being corrupt and unproductive, and on the other he or she is encouraged to maintain the unequal and exploitative relations with foreign capital which makes it easy to penetrate, dominate and exploit African economies. Let us briefly turn to a few elements in this new western agenda for Africa.

Structures of Domestication and Encapsulation

There is a tendency in the literature to attribute the on-going political changes in Africa to developments in Eastern Europe. It is almost as if the monumental political developments in Africa cannot be discussed without reference to the developments in Eastern Europe. The argument is often that with the dismantling of the Soviet Empire and the adoption of the market alternative by the republics in Eastern Europe, Africa was forced to follow suit. In fact, Africa had no choice but to once again copy from the and East and West how to go about its political reconstruction. Nothing could be farther from the truth or more misleading.

The struggle for democracy, accountability, human rights, social justice and popular participation clearly predates the developments in Eastern Europe. These struggles date back to the 1960s when the nationalists engaged largely in struggles of limited objectives against colonial imperialism. Except in countries where independence came through the defeat of western imperialism on the battle fields, political independence was negotiated between imperialist agents and African elites who had been created and nurtured under colonialism. Thus political independence was used to consolidate the powers, privileges, and institutions of colonialism like the marketing boards. In Nigeria, even after political independence, many innocent citizens were still arrested for being in possession of locally produced gin (the so-called illicit gin). This was a policy the colonial state had adopted to destroy local production and consumption of gin to create a market for imported substitutes. The ideology of development was a convenient way to engage in propaganda and diversions. The people had to be depoliticized, to remove from them the momentum and enthusiasm for liberation. In more ways than otherwise, the new African elite were as corrupt, non-accountable, irresponsible, decadent, exploitative, and aloof like the colonial elite. Even where some political changes took place at the superficial levels, no such changes took place at the economic levels. The struggle to challenge, confront, defeat and cheat this elite took off at this time.

African history is full of thousands of instances of such confrontations between the state, its institutions, and agents on the one hand, and the people, their communities and organizations on the other: peasant revolts, students’ demonstrations, strikes by workers, army civilian clashes, the rejection of “political heavyweights,” withdrawal from the formal economy, the expansion of the underground market, refusal to pay taxes, refusal to sell crops to government institutions, attacks on politicians, and countless covert modes of resistance against the state are clear indicators of this struggle for freedom and a better Africa. To now attribute the renewed struggles for democracy and democratization in Africa to developments in Eastern Europe is to do great injustice to the struggles of African peoples against oppression and brutalization since the 1960s. We argue that the recent struggles have come to the fore more because the state has been badly delegitimized, resources have dried up, the long-drawn out struggles of the people are beginning to take effect, and the elites now have no where to turn in their culture of waste, misplaced priorities, decadence, opportunism, and repression. To be sure, a more favorable international climate has made this internally driven agenda more feasible. Or, has it?

This grassroots struggle to dismantle inherited institutions and structures of exploitation in Africa, took more of the route of democratization- the steady and systematic empowerment of the people, their communities, and constituencies in a direction which enables them to dictate and determine the content and context of politics. This would place emphasis on giving power to the people, emphasizing accountability, the protection of the environment, productivity, self-reliance, gender equality, social justice, and a humane society. But the western agenda has changed all this. Rather, the western agenda for democracy has reduced this struggle to a struggle for procedural democracy and to issues of constitutionalism. The entire endogenous project has been dismantled and atomized to a level where it looses its historical content and context and now strives to fit into a western model of democracy. First, democracy now means the market. In fact, both terms are now used interchangeable and it is assumed that only western liberal democracy can lead to capitalist development. Yet, we all know that save for a handful of countries, the entire African continent has always been pro-capitalist and pro-west. From Zaire through Kenya to Nigeria and Egypt, there have hardly been periods where non-capitalist ideological models were taken seriously. Yet, none of the nations can be regarded as being on the path to capitalist development today. The truth is that no one can prove that capitalism, especially under conditions of underdevelopment, necessarily leads to democracy or vice-versa. This position has now been appropriated by the ideologues of western capitalism and African politicians and pro-democracy activists now struggle to count the number of parties, place emphasis on periodic elections, and insist on rights which the repressive elites have not found too difficult to meet. This has led to political changes at the superficial levels as in Ghana where a military dictator aided by the World Bank easily civilianized himself and won the elections; Kenya where donors withheld foreign aid and forced liberal democracy on Moi; or Zambia where the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) heavily funded from abroad defeated Kenneth Kaunda but has been unable to restructure the state and economy away from the traditions of Kaunda.

This is not to underplay the importance of liberal democracy in opening up political spaces, expanding civil society, creating opportunities for challenging the status quo, and providing openings and opportunities for nurturing new leaders. However, as Representative Harry Johnston (1994: 19) has warned, “the movement towards genuine democratic change in many African countries has stalled in the face of growing political anarchy. Africans must closely examine the current political trend if Africa is to succeed in its attempt to democratize. Recent experiences suggests that multi-party elections do not necessarily lead to open and tolerant societies.” This is largely because the Western conception and ideology of democracy hardly gives “sufficient thought to dismantling repressive state structures in the rural countryside and the creation of conditions for community empowerment,” (Mutua 1994: 14). Thus, the entire project is reduced to demands for a free press, independent judiciary, the right to organize and other attributes of liberal democracy. The real question is whether these rights can be guaranteed when the social formation is dominated and exploited by imperialism; managed by an unstable, inefficient, and non-hegemonic state; which is itself presided over by a subservient, factionalized, fractionalized, and corrupt dominant class.

The Western agenda cannot ask these questions or raise issues of empowerment, democratization, and the dismantling the neo-colonial state. This is largely because it would be raising issues which procedural liberal democracy cannot address: will marginalized, brutalized and exploited constituencies empower themselves to accept or change the status quo? Will communities and persons brutalized for so long and subjected to all possible indignities by local and foreign exploiters democratize in a way that will not lead to a major confrontation between the rich and the poor; the exploiter and the exploited? Do people empower themselves to accept domination and a continuation of the decadent tradition? Finally, will oppressed peoples accept to participate in politics under the guidance of the same state that has squandered scarce resources, suffocated civil society, looted the treasury, and severely underdeveloped their communities for decades? Such issues challenge the role of the West in Africa’s development: its racism, its double standards, its discrimination, and its lack of interest in helping Africa (Clough 1992). One can ask a rhetorical question: Which African country has ever received very serious foreign assistance like, say, Mexico, South Korea or Taiwan from the West? The simple answer is none. During the Cold War, the West funded ruthless dictators like Samuel Doe, Said Bare, Gaffer Nimeiri, Ibrahim Babangida, Marcias Nguema, Mobutu Sese Seko, Jeane Bedel Bokassa, and Arap Moi. We can see the legacies of these leaders and their foreign supporters in Africa today. America poured millions of dollars into the maniacal campaigns of Jonas Savimbi in Angola because the Angolans did not declare for capitalism. Today, Russia has received more foreign aid, loans, and pledges from the West and Japan as well as from international lenders and donors than all the countries in sub-Saharan Africa put together. As Salim A Salim (1994: 3, 5) noted recently, “Everywhere I go I am told that the continent of Africa is not being marginalized, that there is sufficient interest in Africa, there is concern about Africa. But it is not true: the reality is different. Because of global changes, there is less flow of resources to the continent now….Africa is no longer considered to be of Cold War geo-political importance, its problems will not be taken seriously.”

In spite of the dismantling of economic restrictions in virtually every African state to please the IMF, World Bank and donors, “the foreign direct investment response has been at best, hesitant and weak in Africa,” (Sirleaf 1994: 9). Many African ambassadors in Washington D.C. go about with long lists of companies, previously owned or subsidized by the government which are up for privatization. How many buyers have shown up, even when they are made available at give away prices? Yet, compare with the rush of companies from fast food to construction to Eastern Europe (which is actually more unstable and more unpredictable than Africa), the establishment of countless scholarships, fellowships, and academic and research programs on Eastern Europe within a few years. The truth and reality is that the West is NOT interested in the development of Africa and it is not interested in genuine democracy in Africa. In terms of direct foreign investment, Sirleaf (1994: 9) shows that “In Africa, where the need is perhaps greatest, the trend has been dismal. According to (the) UN…, the annual average flow of foreign direct investment to Africa over the 1985-89 period was $2.6 billion. The corresponding figures are $6.0 billion for Latin America and the Caribbean; $13.6 billion for East, South and South East Asia; $55.8 billion for North America and $60.8 billion for Western Europe.” Of the 93 third world nations listed in the World Bank’s World Development Report with populations over 2 million, “only 18 attracted direct foreign investment of eight dollars per capita or more during the 1986-90 period, all of them outside Africa,” (Sirleaf 1994: 9). Worse still, of the 23 nations in sub-Saharan Africa with populations above two million, ten had no direct foreign investments inflow whatsoever and “only six had inflows of more than two dollars per capita,” (Sirleaf 1994: 19).

With such minuscule support for growth, development and stability in Africa, the region’s devastated and marginalized economies are expected to perform miracles: to grow economically, increase productivity and trade, and to democratize. Procedural democracy in Africa has not solved any economic problems. The conditions of living in Zambia have actually worsened since the MMD government came to power in 1991. In Kenya where donors forced the government to liberalize the political landscape through direct pressures, “political paralysis, high rates of inflation, and insecurity have become the order of the day since the Moi government stole an election in December 1992,” (Mutua 1994: 16). Yet as Obasanjo (1994: 22) has warned, “Democracy and poverty are strange bed-fellows.” The point we wish to emphasize here is that the Western agenda does not contain any program to help new regimes consolidate and sustain democracy and to deepen it to levels where is can be self-sustaining. When it fails, it becomes very easy to point accusing fingers at African elites as incapable of doing anything right; and of being incapable of undertaking a “simple” project like democratization!

The Western agenda for political liberalization in Africa is creating big business in the West and confusion in Africa. By succeeding in reducing democracy to elections, it has generated its own market in election monitoring in Africa. To be sure, foreign monitoring of elections enable domestic opposition forces to compete openly. As well, it gives the election some global legitimacy, protects the opposition from the violence of the state, creates room for political education and training, and allows for the creation of independent local election monitoring bodies. However, as the experiences of Zambia, Ghana, and Nigeria clearly show, foreign election monitoring make little or no difference. But that is by the way. Who decreed that African elections can only be legitimate when it is monitored by westerners many of whom have little idea of the real stuff of politics in Africa? It is not simplistic to note that in spite of corruption (eg, the use of so-called “street money” in America) Africans do not come to monitor elections in the West. Many of the monitoring agencies disappear as soon as the elections are over thus puncturing the inflated confidence of local monitoring bodies. As well, because international legitimacy, foreign aid and investments are now directly and/or indirectly linked to the nature and conduct of elections as determined by foreign monitors, African pro-democracy movements and politicians now strive to listen to the monitors, take their advice, and strive to fit their politics into the model acceptable to the foreigners. This has been one of the major problems of the pro-democracy movements, many of which now see themselves as branches of USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, the Carter Center or some other foreign observer group. As Obasanjo (1994: 23) has noted: “The presence of international observers does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of the legitimacy of the results, if all parties do not play according to the rules, and especially if the international community is not ready to enforce observance of the agreed terms of settlement and negotiations.” What was the purpose of monitoring the Nigerian elections in June 1993 if the monitors and their home governments would not defend the results of the monitored elections on a permanent basis? What have the monitors and their governments done since the ruthless General Abacha dismantled all the democratic institutions and has since November 1993 not only jailed the winner of that election but has embarked on a large scale abuse of human rights and criminal looting of the national treasury? How could the monitors pronounce the Ghanaian elections of 1992 as free and fair when it was clear that Rawlings not only manipulated the power of incumbency but also intimidated the opposition, divided them and hardly opened up the political space to genuine political competition. More importantly, the opposition (save for two minor fringe parties which teamed up with Rawlings’ party) boycotted the parliamentary elections and Rawlings went ahead with it any way thus producing a typical one party state in Ghana today.

Election monitoring might be big business in the West for consultants, researchers, travel agents and so on, in Africa is creating diversions, confusions, false hopes, and a wrong emphasis on the superficial and easily containable aspects of political change. Procedural democracy and the politics of election monitoring has made it easy for dictators with legendary reputations for waste, corruption, and a total disregard for civil liberties to “use multi-party elections to relegitimate (themselves) in international terms,” (Ellis 1993: 138). And the West expects the people- students, workers, women, human rights activists, social critics, farmers, and scholars who had been brutalized for so long to accept these leaders and reach accommodation with them just because they organized multi-party elections and have been accepted by the West. In fact, the West naively believes that such elections have changed these corrupt dictators. Hence, though General Ibrahim Babangida was presiding over one of the most directionless, corrupt, and repressive regimes in modern history, Western scholars continued to believe that he was actually organizing a transition to democracy (Sandbrook 1993: 89, 106). As well, given that the West had to find a new agenda or basis for its relations with the wretched of the global capitalist system, democracy fitted the bill adequately. It enabled the West, with its past reputation of being on the side of the most ruthless dictators in Africa (Mobutu, Babangida, Nguema, Banda, Amin, Moi, Nimeiri, Bare, Bokassa) to come out in new clothes: democracy rather than dictatorship.

The end of the Cold War required a new basis for consolidating the gains of capitalism and for entrenching American hegemony. But doing this required a new commitment to a political agenda which would be acceptable to all, or to at least the majority of nations in the global system. The manipulation of the United Nations e.g. reporting to the Security Council after bombing Iraq; unilateral actions; refusing to put U.S troops under international or UN command; the ruthless destruction of Iraq in the name of liberating Kuwait (no one ever considered this, not even comprehensive sanctions in the case of South Africa) and a misguided intervention in Somalia were just elements in this new program. In declaring a new global order following the defeat of Iraq, the world has not been presented with a global economic agenda for reconstruction, growth and development. In Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim what have been developed are exclusionary trade blocs designed to consolidate regional markets. Of course, the Western media has been conveniently silent on the fact that African initiatives had been concluded in Lagos in 1991 long before Europe ‘92 and NAFTA and that more than earlier initiatives, it include a provision for the election of an African parliament in AD 2025. The development of such trade blocs provides legitimacy to discriminatory international programs and foreign assistance and enables Western governments to discriminate against debt-ridden, poverty-stricken, and marginalized actors in the global system. By ignoring African initiatives, and by not providing it with the required support, such efforts are doomed to fail.

It is common in the literature and in speeches by leading officials of the Fund and Bank to admit that Africa is experiencing a crisis of deep and dangerous proportions; that by the mid-1980s it was already a continent in “free fall: no goods on the shelves, no spare parts, no chalk in the classrooms, no drugs in the clinics and so on. Budgets were out of control, debt was piling up, institutions were decaying, social indicators were falling, and, in substantial parts of Africa, famine stalked the land,” (Jaycox 1992: 2). However, this has not stopped lenders and creditors from extracting huge surpluses from Africa. Arrears in interest payments to creditors rose from $1 billion in 1982 to $11 billion in 1990. While maturity period for short-term loans shortened from 6.7 to 4 years in the same period, grace period for loan repayments was reduced by 36 percent. While net transfers of resources to Africa declined precipitously to a low of $1.1 billion in 1990, the net outflow between 1983 and 1990 was $30 billion and debt servicing obligations continued to eat up foreign exchange earnings and in the case of the poorest countries, they had to borrow to meet their basic imports. (Africa Recovery March 1988; UN 1991; Ihonvbere 1994). It is no wonder that Michel Camdesus confessed in 1987 that the IMF was taking more resources out of Africa than it was putting in (Africa Recovery December 1987). For instance Africa today owes about $300 billion dollars. The question Africans should ask is where is the money? What did Africa purchase with this money? The money is the vaults of western banks and western governments know it. If it was easy to freeze the assets of Marcos of the Philippines, of Iraq and Iran, why not seize these clearly stolen monies and use it to pay off these debts, many of which are dubious anyway? African leaders took loans and encouraged by western governments and suppliers, sunk these loans into the purchase of military hardware which only intensified conflicts and human rights abuses in the continent. The monies did not go into food or cash crop production, infrastructural development, or the provision of basic human needs for the people. What did not go into the military, security, and a few elitist urban-based projects went into foreign banks to the full knowledge of the West. Now, it is fashionable to complain of corruption as if it is natural or endemic to Africa alone and as if the West has not and does not continue to benefit from the waste, mismanagement and corruption of African leaders. The bottom line is that in spite of all the complaints about poverty in Africa and the like, Africa’s poverty, underdevelopment, dependence, vulnerability, and backwardness is very good business for the West. In so far as this is the case, the West cannot be expected to push an agenda for recovery, growth and development that will sufficiently empower the region and its peoples to pose challenges to the West in the market place or be independent of western control and exploitation. If there is a lesson for the western powers in their experiences with the Japanese and the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) it is in the fact that alternative markets erode their market hegemony.

Finally, as part of its new package and in celebration of the triumph of US hegemony and the market, structural adjustment has been introduced as the only way out for Africa. As Adebayo Adedeji (1993: 44) has argued, the policy of adjustment was presented as the “only one game in town: adopt the terms of a Structural Adjustment Programme or perish.” Of course, as usual, the components of this policy was formulated in the West and packaged for imposition on desperate, poor, crisis-ridden and weak economies of the developing world, especially Africa. The programs are often negotiated with the same governments and elites that have been described as “rent-seeking” (World Bank 1989), “neopatrimonial” (Sandbrook, 1985, 1988; Van de Walle 1994; Bratton 1994), and “corrupt” (Diamond 1988). It is interesting to see the way adjustment is touted as the long-neglected remedy. One wonders why it took the intelligent West, with all its education, information, and technology so long to come up with this solution!

I admit that structural adjustment is necessary: many African states need to be more efficient, effective, leaner, and more supportive of productive ventures. Governments should identify areas where they can do more good and not put bureaucratic obstacles on the path of creativity and progress. It would however appear that the main problem the West has with African economies is that the controls make it impossible for their transnationals to exploit the African economies without restraint, transfer huge surpluses (far above their over-heads) abroad, and manipulate the economic processes to satisfy the metropole in the first instance. After all, even in the American economy there are controls on currency transfers; on foreign ownership in certain sectors of the economy, and on general economic activity. The capitalist state, as we mentioned earlier has always been active in the processes of accumulation and economic development. Yet, the orthodox prescriptions of devaluation, desubsidization, deregulation, commercialization, privatization and so on, in an underdeveloped, foreign dominated, and vulnerable economy; with a weak and unstable state, are designed to satisfy the dominant economic actors (foreign capital) and open up the economies to transnational penetration and exploitation. In no African country, not even in Ghana has the orthodox prescriptions worked. Foreign debts have increased, national control of economic policies mediated, and national autonomy eroded as IMF and World Bank officials, even Western ambassadors have taken charge only because these countries cannot import needed goods or receive foreign aid without the stamp of approval from the Fund and the Bank (Ihonvbere 1993). After all, as Edward V. K. Jaycox, (1992: 4) Vice-President, Africa Region, of the World Bank has noted, “in virtually every case, African countries have gone into adjustment only when they were absolutely desperate.” This desperation makes the foreign exchange-strapped governments vulnerable and gives them no power or room to negotiate and they are forced to accept whatever policy is dumped on them.

African leaders have become so intimidated by the Fund and the Bank and by western governments that many have surrendered the governance of their nations to these powerful agencies (Cheru 1989). Unfortunately, this is an area in which not much has been said or written for some inexplicable reason. The fear of African leaders is evidenced in the statement of a former President of Burundi at a talk at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin in late 1994. When asked to comment on his experiences with the Fund and Bank in relation to the implementation of structural adjustment in his country, he began be breathing a sigh of relief and declaring that he could now speak candidly and critically since he was no longer president of Burundi. He then went on to declare that adjustment as prescribed by the Bank created more problems than solutions but that it made it easy for these financial agencies to control his country just like other African states! Though the Economic Commission for Africa under Adebayo Adedeji tried to fight the Bank and Fund and orthodox adjustment to a stand still through the presentation of an alternative framework (1989) for adjustment in Africa, cowardly African leaders have been hesitant to embrace and implement the document, and the Bank has virtually ensured its marginalization just like it did to the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) through the “Berg Report” (1981). Today, African politicians and the vast majority of the pro-democracy activists, without a critical study and in the effort to satisfy the western agenda and be on the good side of donors, election monitors and so on, have embraced the IMF and World Bank versions of adjustment and this has been one reason why they have achieved very little on coming to power. As Stephen Ellis (1993: 139) has noted, “this is the most striking observation to be made about political parties, new or old, all over the continent: virtually all of them, explicitly or implicitly, are committed to World Bank policies. They simply have no other choice if they are to aspire to power, since donor governments all take their lead from the World Bank, which is itself closely associated with US policy decision.” Adjustment policies, imposed uncritically, on a sea of poverty, corruption, repression, mismanagement, and a generally unproductive environment stands little chance of making far-reaching changes that will promote democracy. How can the World Bank expect the very same corrupt leaders who piled up a $300 billion debt to execute such a serious program? The Bank overlooks history and historical experience, the ability of non-bourgeois forces to resist such painful programs; the depth of pre-adjustment crisis; the differences among and within African states; the differences in resource endowment and level of development; the nature of contestation for power; and the credibility and legitimacy of African leaders. Post-hoc social programs to protect vulnerable groups like the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) in Ghana, introduced after the damage has been done, hardly helps in creating the required environment that will re-attract foreign investors, and promote consensual politics. It is difficult to believe that the World Bank, with all its consultants and experts had no idea as to the sort of damage its policies could cause in such poverty-stricken nations! After all, the World Bank has practically become the intellectual power house which sets the “agenda for African development,” (Herbst, 1992: 17). As for the United States, there is increasing recognition of the fact that it is “contributing relatively little to new thinking in Africa, being largely content to piggy-back on the World Bank’s thinking,” (Herbst 1992: 17).

The main damage caused by this uncritical acceptance and adoption of orthodox monetarist prescriptions clearly evidenced in the inability of “African politicians … to articulate any original or critical view on economic policy…contributes to a sense that there is little to choose between rival parties, other than the moral characters and competence of the people who lead them. It follows that political parties tend to compete for the same social constituencies as their rivals and find it hard to identify and represent any social or economic interest group which has been previously under-represented, unless, of course, such a group is ethnically defined,” (Ellis 1993: 139). In many of these nations therefore, there is an extreme ethnicization and personalization of politics- the struggle is reduced to removing Abacha, Moi, Kaunda, Mobutu, Eyadema and so on. The pro-democracy groups do not make any new arguments. They have no new constituencies, and rather than create a holistic agenda linked to the historical struggles for empowerment and democratization, they engage in name-calling, political opportunism, grand-standing, defensive radicalism, and the politics of limited objectives. The policies of the West, the Fund and the Bank are accepted hook, line and sinker as the MMD did in Zambia. Though the Bank belatedly recognized the political dimensions of the African crisis in its 1989 report, a point made by Africans a long time ago, its agenda for the new politics is to use it to implement adjustment to facilitate debt-repayment, and the penetration of African markets by western capital. As Adedeji (1993: 51) has noted, “all the SAP policy instruments exacerbate the openness and external dependence of the African economies.”

Conclusions: Beyond the Western Agenda in Africa

The West certainly has a role to play in resolving the numerous problems and predicaments of Africa. But scholarship and discourses must have the courage to explode the myth of Western interest in solving these problems as well as the misplaced belief that current policies are designed to assist Africa out of its predicaments. As well, scholarship must not support the misinformed media in creating the impression that US aid goes to Africa to help “these poor Africans” just because US intervention in Somalia was given such publicity. It is interesting that no one in the media, and very few in the academic world took the pains to argue that the United States, the World Bank, and the IMF were very much responsible for the disaster in Somalia (Ihonvbere 1994b). As Jeffrey Herbst (1992: 15, 16) has categorically noted, the “United States has never been a significant aid contributor to Africa… Indeed, U.S. aid to Africa is only 9 percent of total aid given to the continent by all bilateral donors.” Michael Clough (1992: 14, 15, and 20) has also argued that the “United States has few tangible interests” in Africa; “(e)xports to Africa have never accounted for a substantial proportion of total U.S. exports;” and that “American perceptions of the African continent are shallow and highly skewed.” Yet, the image one gets from reading works on Africa even by reputable scholars is one of huge support for African initiatives, massive inflows of foreign aid, and support for development in the region. At the best, we get the impression that America and the West have good intentions, it is the neo-patrimonial, corrupt, unstable, and inefficient systems and structures in Africa that prevents the West from “Asianizing” Africa. Yet, one can ask: do these conditions not exist in the Middle East, Israel, Eastern Europe and other regions which receive massive foreign assistance? Why did it take so long for the African National Congress (ANC) to be seen as a liberation and not a terrorist movement even after the UN declared apartheid as a “crime against humanity?” Why did it take almost two decades for the government of Angola to be recognized by the United States even when the “Communist” government and its troops were protecting American investments which the US government was sponsoring Savimbi to destroy? Why can countries in Africa not receive the sort of support for their economies and currencies like Russia and recently Mexico? I will like to suggest three areas for attention.

First, there is need to build and strengthen an African constituency in the United States and in other western capitals. This is an inevitable step in generating the recognition and respect which Africa needs and in creating a sort of international watch-dog that will identify, extend, and protect the image and interest of Africa. This international constituency will engage in the re-education of the West to redefine its impression, biases, policies, and responses to the African problem. The numbers of Africans in diaspora are sufficiently large, diverse, skilled, and articulate to push this net-work of pro-Africa constituencies to lead to a monumental international movement which will extend the frontiers of pan-Africanism in the 1990s and beyond (Ihonvbere 1994b). This movement will coordinate investment, foreign aid, tourism, educational programs, and government policies towards Africa with a view to eliminating the current “safari mentality” and post-hoc responses to mostly western generated disasters in the continent. As Mutua (1994: 14) has noted, “American policy-makers cannot, nor should they, export democracy to Africa or retail notions of democracy to the continent. But they can play a role supportive of the nascent democratic movement.” While it is true that African issues might not win votes in African-American constituencies in the United States for example, there is an urgent need for a summit of the various black or African-American organizations and movements cutting across religion and ideology along with pan-African and popular organizations in Africa to map out a solid agenda for building this constituency for Africa abroad. It is the absence of this constituency that has led to the abuse, marginalization, and denigration of Africa and to lack lustre responses to emergencies and political turmoil in the region.

A second issue is that Africans in the continent must begin to take themselves seriously. Governments must begin to respect themselves and their peoples. Irresponsible behavior like in the Sudan, Somalia, Liberia and Togo should be challenged and serious foreign governments and international agencies should have the courage to support in every way the challenges from popular constituencies. One can ask how many Americans or Germans steal money and come to hide it in New Nigeria Bank. Why is it that when African capitalists loot the treasury the first place they go to is the coded bank accounts of Europe and America? The loss of Africa is the gain of the West. It was reported not long ago that Nigerians had $33 billion stolen money in foreign banks, and this was just a tip of the ice-berg. When Rawlings shot three former Ghanaian Presidents and Haile Selaissie of Ethiopia died, their loot all disappeared into the “productive” economies of the West. When Said Bare died recently in Nigeria, his loot in coded secret accounts in Switzerland went to improving the standards of living of the Swiss people while Somalis wallow in misery and disease. As the ECA noted in the African Charter for Popular Participation (1990: 19) “there must be an opening up of the political process to accommodate freedom of opinions, tolerate differences, accept consensus on issues as well as ensure the effective participation of the people and their organizations and associations. This requires action on the part of all, first and foremost of the people themselves.” Governments which resist such opening should be confined to the dust bin of Africa’s political history “by all means necessary.” The courage to set such an agenda for political challenge and renewal must not be set from abroad. Once it is set by the West, it will be reduced in all terms to procedural, pacifistic, and compartmentalized processes which will be easy for the elites to encapsulate and manipulate. Where political confrontation is necessary as was the case against General Babangida in Nigeria and against General Moussa Traore in Mali, the people and their organizations should not shy away from it just because human rights organizations, donors and lenders preach against violence after resolving most of their own contradictions in violent terms in their respective histories. Only an Africa generated and Africa-centered agenda for political change can incorporate far-reaching policies for dismantling and reconstructing the neo-colonial state, and challenging the subservient and corrupt ways of the African elite. There is increasing agreement that it is the “primary responsibility of Africans to free themselves from the bonds of despotism and poverty,” (Mutua 1994: 17). History does not afford us examples where despots and persons who have privatized the state and its resources willingly give up power without some form of struggle. It is the sort of alliances, institutions, programs and modes of struggle that Africa presents to the world that will be supported. If Africa allows foreign interests to set its agenda and treat it as a hopeless and lost case then this current cycle of manipulation will continue. As Salim A. Salim (1994: 4) has concluded, while Africa’s friends around the world “who are supportive of democratic process in Africa should concentrate more on strengthening democratic institutions, on strengthening the culture of democracy, the culture of human rights, the culture of tolerance in the continent…,” “the primary responsibility for the development of Africa, the primary responsibility for resolutions of conflict, the primary responsibility for democratization in Africa must be that of the Africans. It can’t be different.”

Finally third, there is an urgent need to rescue the pro-democracy movements and struggles from the western agenda. Western, especially American support for democracy in Africa is to serve western, particularly American interests because not only is a global democratic agenda conducive to American security interests which “means preserving market access to natural resources and keeping open the sea lanes of international trade,” since “America’s economic health requires not only a safe and secure climate for trade and investment, but an open one as well, in which tariff and non-tariff barriers to international exchange are lowered as much as possible,” but also that a “more democratic world will be safer, saner, more prosperous, receptive, and friendly world for Americans,” (Diamond 1991 5, 6). In view of these interests therefore, Diamond contends that a “long-term strategy of promoting democracy must therefore be at the heart of our global vision,” (Diamond 1991: 7). There is no way in which Africa can hope to benefit from such an agenda by an imperialist economy unless Africa is able to meet the goals of America with the defined and consolidated autonomous goals of Africa. This is because America’s international campaigns for democracy is not value-free nor is it in the primary interest of the affected countries.

The pro-democracy movements in Africa have become moribund, disorganized, confused, ineffective, even corrupt. Many have no clear vision as to what they want. Many of the “new” leaders have become professional net-workers raising money abroad to advance the narrow interests of their organizations and sponsors all of whom believe they should be presidents of their respective countries. In this way they refuse and fail to reach a consensus, to accommodate each other’s differences and strategies, and they become intolerant and ironically, undemocratic. Where they resort to violent protests, it is not often because it will advance the interest of the struggle but because it will satisfy their foreign sponsors that they are active and it will give them an edge over other pro-democracy groups. Many are led by criminals of yesterday, dismissed ministers, political opportunists, professionals who see the struggle for procedural democracy as just another job, “emergency” or “born again” democrats, and people with limited exposure and experience in political organization and action. This is why in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and other locations, it has been easy for the incumbent dictator to out-fox the opposition and retain power in one repackaged form or the other. Adedeji (1993: 44) has noted that the new politics in Africa “has been largely aborted and subverted, the subversion in some cases master-minded by the very leaders who had proclaimed their commitment to the realization of democracy. Indeed, the past…years have witnessed oscillations between tumult and paralysis, and have shown more clearly than ever before the deep-rooted and systematic weaknesses of current leadership in Africa.” Adotey Bing (1991: 67) has argued that “to date, multiparty elections in Africa have produced no fundamental change…” because “given the socio-economic conditions of Africa and the fact that up to 80 percent of Africa’s working people are peasants, multi-partyism is more likely than not, in the first instance, to lead to conservative victories, and a multi-coloured cloak of legitimacy. Thus the multi-party state is unlikely to be more responsive to either the needs or expressed wishes of the majority of Africa’s population than the one party or military states have been.” This is largely because of the excessively liberal and shallow programs of the majority of the pro-democracy movements: they depend on old and discredited politicians; rely on foreign ideas, funders, and experts; struggle to fit their agenda to satisfy the programs of foreign organizations; have no holistic agenda for reconstruction after multi-party elections; focus excessively on personalities; have imbibed the prescriptions of donors, lenders and international finance organizations; and have not been able to penetrate the rural areas and present the masses of the people with an alternative indigenous grassroots agenda for political renewal. Thus in spite of early victories and the tumultuous challenges to the status quo in all African states, “To date, there are no signs that democratization has recast political constituencies in a new mode. They continue to be formed in terms of clientilism, although the forms of clientilist recruitment can change, whether based, for example, on party allegiance, ethnicity or some other factor. In any event, when combined with corruption, clientilist networks contrive to hamper the effective design and implementation of state policy,” (Ellis 1993: 143). This is why pro-democracy movements, on coming to power appear, sound, and operate so much like the discredited regimes. While external pressure is needed to “maintain the momentum” (Obasanjo 1994: 22) of democratization in Africa, it cannot be at the expense of indigenous initiatives, realignments, and mobilization of the people to take charge of the process of creating history.

In spite of its abundant resources (Lagos Plan of Action 1980: 3), Africa remains the least developed region in the world. Yet there is a lot of change going on and far-reaching struggles for reconstituting the political landscape can no longer be reversed. While it is certainly a continent “teeming with reformers, entrepreneurs, peasants, thinkers, workers, and idealists; in a word, those who resist degradation and dehumanization,” we agree with Guy Martin (1993: 7) that in the final analysis, “economic and political change in Africa will succeed only if it is a home-grown, indigenous process, initiated by the African people themselves, taking into account their own historical, social and cultural values and traditions.” With donors, lenders, the World Bank, IMF, western governments and scholars, Africanists, and African scholars, politicians and pro-democracy movements overlooking this reality, this task will be tough but not impossible to achieve in the very near future.

Notes

Adedeji, Adebayo, “The Case for Remaking Africa,” in Douglas Rimmer, ed., Action in Africa, London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1993, pp. 43-57.

Ayittey, George B. N., Africa Betrayed, New York: St. Martins, 1992.

Bing, Adotey, “Salim A. Salim on the OAU and the African Agenda,” Review of African Political Economy (50) (March 1991), pp. 60-69.

Bratton, Michael and Nicolas can de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” World Politics Vol. 46, (4) (July 1994), pp. 453-489.

Chalker, Lynda, “The Proper Role of Government,” in Douglas Rimmer, ed., Action in Africa, London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1993, pp. 23-28.

Cheru, Fantu, The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy, London and Harare: Zed Press and Anvil, 1989.

Chomsky, Noam, “The Struggle for Democracy in a Changed World,” Review of African Political Economy (50) (March 1991), pp. 12-20.

Clough, Michael, Free at Last? U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold War New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992.

Diamond, Larry, An American Foreign Policy for Democracy, Washington, D.C.: Progressive Policy Institute, Policy Report No. 11, July 1991.

Economic Commission for Africa, African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAF-SAP), Addis Ababa: ECA Secretariat, 1989.

——————-, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation, Addis Ababa: ECA Secretariat, 1990.

Ellis, Stephen, “Democracy in Africa: Achievements and Prospects,” in Douglas Rimmer, ed., Action in Africa, London: James Currey and Heinemann, 1993, pp. 133-143.

Fukuyama, Francis, “The End of History,” The National Interest (16) (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.

Herbst, Jeffrey, U.S. Economic Policy Toward Africa, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992.

Huntington, Samuel, P. “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs Vol. 73, (2) (Summer 1993), pp. 21-49.

Ihonvbere, Julius O., “Surviving at the Margins: Africa and the New Global Order,” Current World Leaders Vol. 35, (6) (December 1992), pp. 1053-1072.

————–, “Banking on Poverty and Crisis: The Impact of World Bank and IMF Policies on Sub-Saharan Africa.” Paper presented at the Third Annual Conference of the Campaign for Peace and Democracy on “Is a Democratic World Order Possible?”, New York City, April 17, 1993.

————–, “Between Debt and Disaster: The Politics of Africa’s Debt Crisis,” In Depth: A Journal for Values and Public Policy Vol. 4, (1) (Winter 1994), pp. 108-132.

————–, “The IMF, The World Bank and the Somali Crisis,” paper delivered at the conference on “Towards Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa,” Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, November 19, 1994.

Johnston, Harry, “Luncheon Remarks,” in William Minter, ed., U.S. Foreign Policy: An Africa Agenda, Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Center, 1994, pp. 18-19.

Kaplan, Robert D., “The Coming Anarchy,” Atlantic Monthly (February 1994), pp. 44-76.

Martin, Guy, “Preface: Democratic Transitions in Africa,” Issue Vol. XXI, (2) (1993), pp. 6-7.

Mutua, Maku wa, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Building Democracy Through Popular Participation,” in William Minter, ed., U.S. Foreign Policy: An Africa Agenda, Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Centre, 1994, pp. 13-17.

Obasanjo, Olusegun, “Prospects for Peace,” in ibid.

Organization of African Unity, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000, Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies, 1981.

Salim, Salim A., “Africa in Transition,” in William Minter, ed., U.S. Foreign Policy: An African Agenda, Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Center, 1994, pp. 2-6.

Sandbrook, Richard, “Liberal Democracy in Africa: A Socialist-Revisionist Perspective,” Canadian Journal of African Studies Vol. 22 (1988), pp. 240-267.

—————-, The Politics of Africa’s Economic Recovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

—————-with J. Barker, The Politics of Africa’s Economic Stagnation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

—————–and Mohamed Halfani, eds., Empowering People: Building Community, Civil Associations and Legality in Africa, Toronto: Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, 1993.

Sirleaf, Ellen J., “Some Reflections on Africa and the Global Economy,” in William Minter, ed., U.S. Foreign Policy: An Africa Agenda, Washington, D.C.: Africa Policy Information Center, 1994, pp. 7-12.

United Nations, African Debt: The Case for Debt Relief New York: UN Africa Recovery Unit, Department of Information, 1991.

Walle, Nicolas van de, “Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa, with an Illustration from Cameroon,” in Jennifer Widner, ed., Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1994, pp. 129-157.

World Bank, Accelerated Development in Tropical Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1981.

———–, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth-A Long-Term Perspective Study, Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1989.

Professor Julius O. Ihonvbere

Text of public lecture delivered under the auspices of THE BREEZE MAGAZINE, Airport Hotel, Ikeja, Lagos March 14, 2003

Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention to speak for too long today. I would prefer to be brief and to leave enough time for discussions and questions. Let me also confess that I hurriedly put this lecture together in the last two hours or so. I think it does contain enough to generate some conversation. I have left out details of violence. I chose to focus on the conceptual aspects of the problem though I would use examples as necessary. I thank you for honoring me with your invitation. I commend you for your courage, vision and commitment to the truth in a society that is as decayed as ours.

Thirty seven years ago, a young, charismatic and courageous military officer declared in a coup broadcast:

Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in high and low places who seek bribes and demand ten percent, those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers and VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists…(Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, January 1966 Coup Broadcast.)

Ladies and gentlemen, let me ask a few questions: Are the political profiteers gone from the Nigerian society? Are the bribe takers gone? Do they demand ten percent or more today? Are those that seek to keep Nigeria permanently divided gone? Are the VIPs of waste no longer with us? What about the tribalists? Are they gone? Are they weaker in their politics? What about the nepotists? Have they been reformed? If we can answer “yes” to one of these questions, we can end the lecture right here, go home, pop some champagne and sing halleluiah because our country has been reborn. Let me put it to you all (as if you did not already know) that our country is still in big trouble. These troubles were not created by some invisible elements or by God. They were generated and nurtured by people that live amongst us; people that we all know very well. In fact, in many instances we have encouraged and protected these characters and this attitude has emboldened them to take more risks in perpetuating their dubious agenda. Today, we are all paying very dearly for the indiscipline, irresponsibility, arrogance, limited vision, wickedness and greed of this group. Unfortunately, their pathological fixation of irresponsibility, nepotism, corruption, waste, and other lucrative unproductive but not really helpful ventures have percolated to the lowest ebbs of our society to such an extent that even ordinary people now mimic the decadent elite. This is very unfortunate for a creative and hardworking people.

It is the coalitions, contradictions, distortions and disarticulations arising from these factors and forces that shape the content and context of our politics and society. It is the inability of the state to emerge as a relatively autonomous force; the inability of the governing class to build hegemony and emerge as a ruling class; the contradictions of production and exchange relations; and the continuing marginal location and role of the social formation in the global power balances that have created the foundations for political rascality in Nigeria. Thus, rather than build structures, ideologies, relationships, networks, and enabling environments to build a nation-state (if not a nation) out of the contending diverse interests, identities and nationalities that occupy our political landscape, the opportunistic politics of the power elite has rather, congealed alternative sites of loyalty and power. It has enthroned and reified normless politics, alienated significant communities that continue to survive and operate outside the hegemony of the state, and promoted a culture of cynicism and reliance on extra-legal processes and actions that now guide relations between the people on the one hand and the state and its custodians on the other. It is not an accident therefore that informality and informal relations continue to reign supreme whether is it to get a job, scholarship, admission, contracts, relate to public institutions and officers or whatever, Nigerians consider first an informal approach before or alongside a formal one.

Political Rascality and Violence

In the history of every society, the dynamics of production and exchange relations have significant implications for class and power balances. The mode(s) of accumulation shapes the hegemony and solidity of state and class. The power elite use the structures of power to legitimate the domination and exploitation of non-bourgeois forces and through numerous hegemonic projects try to build an ideological bloc that in turn moulds and determines the nature and direction politics as well as the world view of dominated forces. Control and domination are exercised in civil society rather than at the political level which relies on intimidation, violence, manipulation, and the containment of the popular will. Rather such elite has a sense of nation and a sense of mission. It might quarrel over broad issues but it shares deep ideological commitments that bind it together in the interest of larger national objectives. For instance, democrats and republicans may fight in America but they all remain American capitalists. There is a limit to the degree of political irresponsibility that would not be entertained. There is some predictability in political actions and political institutions can exercise their functions as are laid out in the constitution. There is unanimity of respect for the constitution and a near total finality in the pronouncements of the law courts. As well, when the national interest is threatened, they band together against any external threats. In short, almost all, Americans, irrespective of color or class believe in the American project. A country like South Africa is steadily working towards that. The problem is that the African elite is so irresponsible, highly factionalized, ideologically bankrupt and confused that it often lays the foundations for the subversion of its already tenuous hegemony. This is because its political rascality prevents it from generating, packaging, circulating and sustaining longer term political, economic and social strategies for building growth, development, democracy and hegemony. This is a class that lives for the day with little or no interest in longer term projects. This explains why it is in so much hurry to embezzle public funds without providing services to the people. Of course, this alienates the people, erodes the credibility of the power elite, and precipitates anger, distrust, alienation, and violence. The already tenuous hegemony dissolves into petty squabbles and political indiscipline or rascality become the celebrated form of political engagements.

Political rascality therefore is that brand of politics that lacks ideological content and context, that is short sighted, disorganized, opportunistic, and incapable of building strong, efficient and effective institutions. This brand of politics is generally superficial, alienating, and pedestrian. It is often focused on the capture and deployment of raw power and its mobilizational capacity is often limited. In broad contexts, it is anti-people. This is because issues of gender equality especially women’s rights, the environment, social cultural rights, community rights, minority rights, and popular participation in the making and implementation of decisions are often taken for granted, trivialized or simply ignored. Political rascality is essentially individualistic and it often expresses itself in the inability of politicians to maintain discipline within their own parties. There is an excessive focus on building personality cults, subverting laid down rules, seeking short cuts to power, and using power to marginalize already voiceless and marginal communities and citizens. Of course, political rascality is also a “strategy” for covering up monumental policy failures on the part of the elite. It shows up as a sort of “shakara” politics where critical issues and discourses are reduced to pedestrian levels and trivialized. Thus rather than present serious minded and focused well-thought out strategies or programs for change, the politicians engage in the politics of personality and diversions. Under this mould of politics, there is often a well-packed strategy of blaming the victims rather than the perpetrators. A steady strategy of depoliticization, defensive radicalism and de-ideologization become the basis of political relations and competition.

The depoliticization strategy involves an effort to reduce the strength and focus of politics especially at the local level. The political rascals try to politicize trivial issues while subjecting critical questions to dubious negotiations. In fact, they appropriate the political voice of the people by anointing themselves as leaders. Hence, the vice-president Atiku Abubakar declared only recently that the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) does not and cannot speak for the north. The vice-president was convinced that with the existence of elected legislators and executives, a group of self-anointed and non-elected persons could not claim to be speaking for the peoples of the north. Such groups exist in the West and East and among minorities be it Ohaneze, Afenifere or such groups. Who or when were they elected? They simply called a few people, decided on what they considered important and on the best strategies of achieving their declared goals. Now they arrogantly decide who should run for office, how they should run for office, what should be the priorities of regions and ethnic groups, and when they quarrel amongst themselves they expel each other and try to rationalize their actions based on informal rules already decided in secret. Some even declare arrogantly that party primaries would not be necessary because they were satisfied with the performance of incumbents or that “vacancies” do not exist for certain political positions. Of course, they are accountable only to themselves. Members of the Nigerian elite have done a lot of damage to this country in the name of their peoples even as they act without consultation. This, simply put, is part of political rascality.

The strategy of defensive radicalism is exhibited when they adopt fake and opportunistic radical postures. Scratch the radicalism and militancy and you would find greed, corruption, and total disregard for the short and longer term consequences of their actions. They blow a lot of hot air with no strategy, capacity, or desire to actualize their numerous threats. Often designed to gain attention or win an invitation to the “dining table” their actions reflect more of commitment to illiberal democracy than a peoples’ democracy. You would find a lot of this in some prodemocracy movements, human rights groups, trade unions, ethnic associations, professional groups and in the specific struggles on north-south relations, minority-majority contestations and permutations, and in the resource control or political restructuring debates. Many that openly pretend to articulate positions on these issues go behind the curtain to negotiate lucrative benefits for themselves. Once they get appointed to political positions, they engage in double-speak or simply become silent. In the June 12 movement, there were many who openly supported the struggle but privately urged Abacha and Adulsalam not to concede to the June 12 demands. Similarly, many so-called radicals and militants had no qualms with working for Abacha even when his junta was looting, maiming, killing, and brutalizing the entire society. Some so-called radicals had no regrets in writing to invite Abacha to take over power when a serious ideological reading of that moment would have told them that a character like Abacha could not be a vehicle for the restoration of democracy and stability in Nigeria. Ironically, some of them are today very close to the seat of power in a liberal arrangement that they had worked very hard to subvert. Unfortunately, the ordinary people confuse them with real or serious radicals and use their failings to deride the genuine efforts of committed patriots.

The de-ideologization strategy is simply to atomize concrete ideological questions and pretend that they are best handled in bits. In fact, the struggle to sort out the contradictions in compartmentalized (as against holistic) forms relies heavily on the ethnicization or regionalization of issues. The use of religion and other primordial proclivities is equally rampant. Because the Nigerian elite hardly read, it is largely unaware of developments in other parts of Africa and the larger world so it continues to recycle outdated and long-abandoned ideological and political tools. Reminiscent of the traditional “planning without facts”, the elite engage the contradictions of domination, exploitation, marginalization, and underdevelopment without a philosophy or at best a pedestrian one. If it gets as far as “pan-Africanism” it has done very well though quite often it has no idea what this is all about and has no plans to alter what Nkrumah said decades ago to fit contemporary realities and challenges. In essence, the goal is to float around with no philosophical blocks to build a comprehensive national project that would outlive regimes and individuals.

Because political rascality enables the power elite to immerse itself shamelessly in irrelevance and waste, it can accumulate rather rapidly even if the process undermines the state and mortgages its own future. The longer run consequence however is the reproduction of negative coalitions, suspicions, poverty, disease, foreign domination, and violence. In my view, this has largely been the experience of Nigeria. Let us focus on the Nigerian elite and the state.

Causes of Political Violence

We all know the causes of violence-political, psychological, spiritual, economic and politics, even cultural- in our society. Allow me to list some of the causes then concentrate on just three to save time. The causes include:

• Nature of the State- It lacks stability, legitimacy, predictability, transparency and hegemony. Citizens largely see it as enemy and therefore pay little attention to its strategies for development.

• Character of the ruling/political elite- it is factionalized, fractionalized, mediocre, disorganized, conflictual, dependent, corrupt and very indisciplined. Its \woeful record since independence can be seen in the uncompleted projects, poverty of its citizens, huge debt profile, bad roads, hospitals without doctors and drugs, dilapidated institutions, archaic technology, and irrelevant and irresponsible gyrations in the arena of public policy.

• Inherited distortions in the society- the so-called Christian –Moslem, North-South, poor-rich, illiterate-educated, rural-urban, oil rich-oil poor etc divisions continue to mediate efforts at growth and development, promote violence and distrust.

• Greed and corruption- not much need to be said here. Though Nigeria is NOT the most corrupt country in the world, our elite have shown that they are amongst the worst. Their criminal tendencies especially through the occupation of

• Insensitive leadership- The continuing gulf and distrust between the power elite and the people of Nigeria is clear indication of frustrations over longstanding insensitivity, manipulation, neglect and abuse. This breeds anger and makes the masses vulnerable to the merchants if violence.

• Manipulation of primordial differences- Without a clear national ideology or philosophy of governance, the power elite has frequently, and continues to manipulate region, religion, ethnicity, language and at times class difference. This helps to weaken civil society, distract the people from the failures of the elite, and congeal loyalties around pedestrian and opportunistic political posturings. Today they are congealed into three major ethnic cabals of Afrenifere, Arewa and Ohaneze. We are yet to see the bridges of contact, dialogues, negotiations and commitment to social justice and development and democracy amongst the three groups.

• Weak political institutions- Specifically, the political parties are weak and appear to be finding it difficult to keep their members in check. More on this below.

• Weak security/surveliance structures- Of course there is corruption in the police and security forces. This is not unique to Nigeria. It is a tough job to police a crisis-ridden, poorly managed and violence prone society. Legacies of criminal military dictatorship have not helped matters. Civil war in neighboring nations leading to the proliferation of small arms has not helped either. Sand the moral decay and dislocation, partly the result of the commandist and undemocratic culture of military rule, is further complication issues for the police and security forces. While short term measures would include the purchase of more arms, more recruitment, more amenities and the construction of prisons, the real solution is in fundamental political restructuring, the involvement of civil society in crime watch and control, and the improvement in the conditions of service of the police and security forces. The police is a microcosm of the larger society, the quality of leadership, the nature of politics and the relationship between the state and civil society.

• Closure of opportunities for self expression and self- improvement- when people have no opportunities to express their grievances, they go underground or adopt extra-legal mechanisms. It was a wise decision to register more political parties. The violence today would have resembled a civil war situation. Now those that feel manipulated, outsmarted, intimidated, cheated or harassed in some parties can move elsewhere even if it is clear that they would not win. This is happening everyday in Nigeria. But the poor management of intra-party politics, appointments, nominations, primaries and so on, have bred and precipitated assassinations and other forms of violence.

• Foreign interference/manipulation- the role of external interests cannot be overlooked. Be it in their economic policies or in their military and political interests. Clearly, the monetarist programmes of the IMF and World Bank without adequate safety nets have precipitated violence in Nigeria. We all remember the anti-sap riots. As well, the on-going efforts by the United States to fight global; terrorism in all its manifestations, real and imagined, would breed acts of violence as opportunist cash in on the initiative to advance their own agenda.

• Greed for political power- In Nigeria, power is everything. Power allows you to drive on a one-way in the opposite direction. It brings wealth, friends, and the ability to engage poverty face-to-face! With power, you can do and undo. You can buy the police, buy judges, and buy forged certificates. You can even try to eliminate real and imaginary enemies. With power you can grab another person’s land, house, wife or car. You can eliminate some poor houseboys or house workers. You can push all others off the road so that you can get to the toilet or a restaurant on time. This is the root of the violence in our country: the criminal appropriate and deployment of naked or raw power. This erodes elite and state legitimacy, compromises development, and contaminates the political process.

• Intolerance and lack of democratic values- There are no democratic values guiding the on-going political engagements. Party rules are not respected. The constitution is not respected. Party constitutions appear not to exist. The masses are seen as objects of manipulation rather than objects of participation in the political process. Violence, lies, distractions, diversions, manipulations, and political 419 seems to be characterizing the process. The good and fair politicians have been overshadowed by the crooks, assassins, criminals and dubious personalities. These tendencies, taken together, constitute a recipe for violence.

• Economic decay/dislocation- unemployment, underemployment, inflation, non-payment of wages and pensions, rural-urban drift, decaying or dilapidated infrastructure and job insecurity arising from precarious economic conditions can precipitate violence. Someone who is hungry, disillusioned and desperate would also be a prime candidate for violent acts.

• Marginalization/repression of the youth- Our youth have no place in national life. They are seen as mi8creans, area boys, and problems to the enjoyment of the elite. This is very wrong. Young persons can make or break a nation. A national that ignores its your is preparing a direct entry into chaos and violence. Such ignored, marginalized and alienated you are easy recruits for trouble makers and the entreprenuers of violence.

• Decaying educational structures/cultures- the decay in Nigeria did not start today. Cults and others forms of violence already took over the universities before the Obasanjo administration. But the unprecedented decay in our academic institutions for which we must hold past leaders responsible is today one of the major elements in our unsteady and violent political realities.

• Criminal appropriation of the voice of the voiceless- when people have their values, dreams, hopes, identities and voices appropriated by others who now claim to speak for them without authority, this could precipitate violence and instability. This is happening as all sorts of extra-legal security and vigilante groups are emerging on the political landscape. Also agglomeration of non-elected elites that are claiming to speak for people that have already elected their representatives is causing a lot of tension.

The State in Nigeria as Instrument of Domination

The state inherited at independence was a violent, undemocratic, and privatized structure that was barely constituted to serve as the basis of governance or efficient delivery of services. This state structure was not dismantled at political independence. Rather, it was simply “whitewashed” or “Africanized” and handed over to a carefully nurtured political elite that was extremely hungry for raw power. The state building project in Nigeria has failed to transform power into authority. It has continued to dominate society at the political level relying on violence almost at the first instance of political engagement. In many instances, it has become largely irrelevant to the existential conditions of the people because they engage it only at the point where its agents are extracting resources and visiting violence on them and their communities. All over Africa, people are learning not to trust or rely on the state and have designed ingenuous strategies for avoiding, evading, confronting, and weakening the state. This sort of non-hegemonic state encourages political rascality because its capacity and propensity to rely on violence is very high. This capacity makes it attractive to political opportunists, mediocre politicians and persons committed to struggles of limited objectives. This in itself lay’s the foundations for instability, the abridgment of individual and collective rights, and the suffocation of civil society.

The Nigerian state, a product of history and managed by a largely unproductive elite remains very unstable and non-hegemonic. The challenge of building hegemony remains its foremost predicament. Its credibility has been severely mediated by decades of military rule, insensitivity to the plight of the majority, and its frequent resort to violence against non-bourgeois communities. To be sure, the structures of the state have been reformed or reconstructed over the decades since political independence. These reforms have not been consistent and have hardly involved the people. Speeches introducing new projects and policies are simply read on TV and the people are expected to fall in line or to support project that they know nothing about. Such support have often been temporary or superficial hence state creation, a new anthem and pledge, national honors, new local governments, new states, a new federal capital, new leaders- military and civilian-, new universities and other institutions to name but a few have failed to build the sort of Nigeria we all dream of. However, with the accumulative base of the ruling class largely located in access to the state and its resources rather than in productive activities, it has been difficult to construct an efficient, effective, legitimate, truly sensitive, transparent and democratic state. Its unsteadiness is evidenced in the numerous challenges to its tenuous hegemony; the wanton disregard for is rules and regulations; its inability to extract surpluses; and its frequent resort to intimidation, manipulation and diversions. Even with the return to democratic rule in May 1999 the contradictions of the state have not diminished. Part of the problem lies with the struggle to undo the legacies of military dictatorship. This struggle often comes up, unfortunately, as moves against regions/religions and interests. In reality, individuals and cliques affected often transpose their narrow interests on those of regions and communities in order to build a dubious regional grievance list.

Unfortunately because of the nature of the May 1999 transition, the quality of politicians that found their ways by hook and crook into power has complicated efforts at genuine democratization. Those that got into power have simply shut out those that they see as real or imaginary competitors, opponents or claimants to the throne. Though subtly, power is being used to build huge political war chests, personal fortunes and to buy the structures of violence such as the police even the legislatures. A situation where a governor publicly denounces formal state security services and the police and hands issues of crime control to thugs and extra-legal bodies demonstrates the deepening crisis of the state. The existence of several extra-legal political associations that frequently and openly challenge the power of the state is also evidence of the crisis of legitimacy. It is no wonder that the campaign for the 2003 elections started in 1999: performance is on the pages of newspapers and on the lips of sycophants and praise singers rather than in the concrete transformation of the environment. Why a local government chairman would advertise the so-called achievements of his administration in the Guardian or Newswatch beats me. It is largely because they are not performing and are seeking dubious ways of confusing already confused and cheated citizens. In the grim struggle to keep out others and as well as in the strategizing to unseat incumbents, the norms of governance and democratic competition have been mortgaged or sacrificed by the political elite. The numerous cases of assassinations, attempted assassinations and publicly issued death threats by politicians at all levels all over the country is reflective of the premium placed on power and the unorthodox or extra legal mechanisms of capturing power. The net result is the reproduction of a violent, wasteful, unstable and inefficient state. Certainly not the type of state that can guarantee individual and collective rights or consolidate a fragile democratic enterprise.

The Nigerian Elite as Obstacle to Democracy

At political independence the new elite inherited a state with limited legitimacy and without hegemony. This condition complicated the nature of political engagements. Of course, since only a handful of elites were involved in the contestations for power, the various governments they formed reflected and represented those narrow interests. Thus, right from election day the legitimacy of the government was compromised. In trying to exercise control, the elites have had to rely on force, manipulation, and violence. With time, politics degenerated into warfare. This was a war in which everything was deployed and no prisoners were taken. Pluralism and tolerance were thrown overboard with democracy, and intolerance and bestiality, at best, insensitivity to the plight of the disadvantaged became the order of the day. The foundation for instability, bad governance, corruption, violence, waste and the recycling of underdevelopment became firmly established. We are all familiar with the rest of the story.

The dominant class at political independence was a pathetic parody of what a dominant class really should be. This reality complicated the continent’s chances of engaging the forces of neocolonialism and the contradictions of underdevelopment. Thus, right from the 1960s, the possibility of building new structures of accommodation, pluralism and good governance was mediated, even subverted by the nature of Africa’s political elite. The new elite, including the nationalists, settled into an unequal, exploitative, and subservient relationship with foreign capital at the expense of the workers and peasants. Aside from the fact that it was small in size, it was also a very pretentious, underdeveloped, dependent, corrupt, and highly fragmented class. It lacked confidence in itself. It was reliant on foreign tastes, markets, and its world-view was externally determined. It had only a tenuous relationship to production and its accumulative base depended on its lucrative but unproductive relationship with foreign capital. Its economic strategy was largely determined by its ability to divert public resources away from development and basic needs into private interests and foreign bank vaults. With its tenuous accumulative base, the African bourgeois class turned to the state as its instrument of accumulation. Thus, rather than building a productive base in industry and agriculture, the bourgeois class began to extend the powers of the state to build up its own capital base mostly through dubious projects, over-inflated contracts, and direct stealing of public funds.

This pattern of accumulation required the abridgement of popular rights, the diversion of public resources to serve private ends, the construction of extensive security networks, and increasing intolerance for the opposition. It also required the development of vicious strategies of primitive accumulation and political containment that saw the working classes and peasants as the main victims. With time, the media, students, trade unions, peasant associations, minorities, and professional groups became victims of the emergence of the “big man.”

Those who captured the state, its instruments of force and resources, simply personalized it, wiped out all features of sensitivity, and imaginary and real enemies were found and immediately eliminated or forced into exile. Local “axes of evil” (as George Bush would put it) were found as necessary and were subjected to the most brutal and merciless power of the state. However, each act of brutality and repression bred new cells of opposition to the state, its institutions and agents. Within two decades of political independence therefore, the continent was littered with military coups and counter-coups, civil and inter-state wars, ethnic violence, agitations for autonomy by minorities, alienation of the public from the state and its custodians, and the withdrawal of support for public policies. Good governance was thrown over-board and leaders busied themselves with the construction of dubious ideologies, personality cults and looting their respective treasuries. As political decay, uncertainty, violence, and disillusionment replaced the euphoria of Uhuru, even fractions of the power elite began to construct parallel structures of power and opportunities. This was evidenced in the use of foreign schools for the wards, reliance on foreign hospitals for medical attention, use of foreign banks, airlines and advisers; the use of private security in place of public police, the reliance of private water bore-holes and private electricity generators in place of publicly provided alternatives, and investments abroad rather than in the local economy. The state was hardly the sort of force that was capable of opening up the political space, mobilizing the people, and building a true foundation for democratic politics and constitutional rule. Indeed, for most Africans, the state is very much a wicked, hostile and insensitive force to be avoided, challenged, and where possible defeated. Hence, rather than perceive it as a force to organize society, support individual and collective initiatives for accumulation and survival, most Nigerians now avoid the state as they find comfort, security, and hope in alternative sites of power and opportunities. Even philanthropic organizations like Lions Club and Jaycees as well religious organizations have capitalized on the irrelevance of the state to forge new linkages with civil society. As informal social structures they are now in competition with the state for the loyalty of the people. In fact, in recent times, ethnic associations appear to be commanding as much legitimacy and support as the state.

The truth is that the state is largely perceived as enemy and its custodians seen as crooks and unreliable characters. Loyalty is given to the ethnic or community group in the first instance because the state has failed woefully to inspire confidence, patriotism or commitment. Those that have tried to shift loyalties away from the ethnic group to the nation-state have been forced to “return to base” as their hopes for a democratic, transparent, and supportive state evaporates in the face of criminal corruption, waste, violence, and at best illiberal political conduct. Worse still, its custodians have become obstacles to the attainment of the basic reasons why people agree to live together in plural communities. The “big man” in Africa has always been and remains a danger to society. This is a really dangerous, undemocratic character whose track record shows nothing but corruption, waste, violence, human rights abuses, misplaced priorities, and a pathological commitment to the recycling of mediocrity. The typical “big man” in Africa has no respect or regard for women much less gender equality. He is not interested in environmental protection. He is anti-intellectual and hates non-governmental organizations. He sees the media as a menace and minority rights hardly feature in his confused understanding of pluralism and social justice. He measures his worth or importance by the degree of poverty, disease and squalor around him. Rural people are idiots and illiterates and have no right to discuss national issues. The youth are stupid: after all they pay no taxes and have no grounds to comment on the challenge of national development. The so-called “big man” spends most of his time thinking and plotting how to corner public funds, subvert the course of justice, weaken public institutions to cover his criminal activities, and while constantly tooth-aching and bellyaching about how public facilities fail to work, does nothing about a viable alternative. The “big Man” is not ashamed to be in charge of an unstable, ramshackle, unsteady, inefficient and corrupt state. He insists on being called by all sorts of flamboyant names: “The Great Lion,” “The Big Goat”, “The Huge Lizard,” “The Killer” and “The Teacher”, “The Father of the Nation”, “The Rain Maker” to take a few examples. He carries himself as if without him the world would be destroyed by the almighty. His every word, even jokes are to be treated as law. He blames real and imaginary enemies, especially trade unionists, students, the IMF and World Bank and armed robbers for his failure. Impatient with democracy and due process, he contaminates, compromises and encapsulates the other arms of government. He does not hesitate to eliminate or exile his opponents. He constructs huge houses for his sycophants, mistresses and relatives. While closing local schools because of “irresponsible” and radical students, he keeps his wards at the best schools abroad. While reducing budgets to local health facilities he regularly seeks medical check-ups and treatment abroad. He attends the Mosque and Churches regularly and with fanfare but has a resident babalawo in his mansion. He has many cars and airplanes yet cannot operate a national airline. His morality stinks as he sleeps with the daughters of his ministers, priests, friends and contractors. He fathers children all over the place and has countless mistresses. He treats national resources as his personal resources and insists on being thanked for constructing highways and paying salaries to workers. He detests unions and strikes and constantly amends the constitution to check opposition. He is very convinced that he is the nation’s best warrior, bureaucrat, thinker, businessman, accountant, and sportsman. Even when he can hardly read a legibly written speech, he considers himself the best orator in the world. He humiliates his ministers in public and does not expect them to complain or resign.

The above is by no means an exaggerated rendition of the sort of characters that squandered Nigeria’s opportunities for growth, development and democracy and subverted post-independence constitutions. Today, many (if not most) Nigerian politicians and so-called leaders still operate in this unsavory mold. With a non-hegemonic and very illegitimate state in place, this sort of dominant class could not enhance or protect civil society or promote constitutional governance. They remain bound to violence as the only strategy for power consolidation and deployment.

Political Parties and Political Stability?

Unfortunately for countries like Nigeria where political rascality is highly pronounced, party politics often reflects the nature of the state, its institutions, agents and custodians. Of course, rascal politicians would establish rascal parties. To be sure, we should make allowances for the so-called learning process. Though none of the current politicians ever claimed not to be experts in all aspects of politics, power and authority. Nonetheless, it would be expected that by now, the three parries that contested for the 1999 elections would have their houses in order and give Nigerians a new taste in party politics. Of course, opportunism has encouraged decamping and all sorts of factionalization and violence. Most of the leaders still have no regard for the people and appear not to understand the purpose of party politics. A political party is just as good as its leadership, structure, resources, programs, and the environment in which it operates. In Nigeria, none of the three parties is seriously performing the functions of parties. I have my doubts if the newly registered parties would do better given the quality and character of the respective leadership. They appear to be toys in the hands of party leaders who do not pretend that their main goal is to build a truly democratic organization. Indeed, even when some good leaders have tried, they were easily swallowed up by the greed and hunger for power and money around them.

New parties have been registered and many have produced emergency presidential candidates. It is as it the presidency is the key to all the problems in their respective communities. But they fail to perform the functions of parties. The parties do not identify, train and present the best candidates for office. They have mostly assumed members. They do not provide public education. None has a research center or institute for serious and sustained research and policy development. At least we are yet to see their products. They are all fragmented and constantly bickering over leadership, money or contracts. One of the three leading parties asked its presidential candidates to pay a fee of N10 million each. This is unfortunate for a fledgling democracy and amounts to preserving that position only for the rich. Of course, this does not include fees for the “leaders”, the mobilizers, campaigns for the primaries etc. Campaign costs in Nigeria are probably the most expensive in Africa. Then there are gatekeepers who “own” the parties: the so-called godfathers- often reactionary and undemocratic, they show very limited interest in the meaning and essence of democracy. The “leaders” privatize opportunities for building new networks and building new voices and leaders as they hold meetings late at night, make dubious deals, anoint their own boys for positions without regard to credibility and capacity. They see politics as one thing: the capture of raw power. The parties assume that the only reason why they exist is to win elections by hook and crook. Few in the political parties can effectively articulate party ideology and relate this to the challenges of growth, democracy and development. For the parties, elections are a die and die affair. The parties are not democratic, as ordinary people have no voices. It would be an insult to politics and political science to call these contraptions political parties. How many Nigerians have their manifestoes? How many have access to party records and programs? With these sort of political contraptions, the future of Nigerian democracy can at best be tenuous. While the registration of new parties would generate new energy in party politics and compel the existing parties to take themselves more seriously of find themselves out of power and out of office, the overall character of the Nigerian elite still casts doubts on the degree of commitment to true democratic values.

Conclusion: Rescuing Nigeria from Political violence

The fact that the government of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo has not been overthrown in a military coup d’etat to date in spite of the rascality of large sections of the political class is clear evidence that democracy is working. It is an indicator that Nigerians have come to believe that there is no alternative to democratic governance. This does not necessarily imply that all Nigerians are pleased with the state of the nation. It only means that when opportunities arise to compare the violent, wicked, oppressive and evil military dictatorships of the past with the current democratic dispensation, with all its uncertainties and imperfections, the present arrangement remains superior and preferable. To move the nation forward therefore, governments at all levels, professional groups, civil society organizations, and patriotic Nigerians must collectively insist on and embark on the following:

Promote good governance: To be taken seriously in today’s world, there is a degree of leadership as reflected in the quality of governance that is important. Imagine if Nigeria had no oil? True, we have a large population. But what use is a huge population of literate, disillusioned, hungry, unemployed, and alienated citizens? Qualities of accountability, social justice, transparency, sensitivity, and patriotism must guide the character of governance and leadership.

Mobilize civil society: Civil society is the foundation of stability, creativity, the market, and progress. Progress can never be made unless there is a clear effort to open up political spaces and allow civil society to thrive. A government and leadership that are not sensitive to this are doomed to fail. Foreign interests frequently gauge how much popular or grassroots support a government has. Most Nigerian leaders are yet to understand or appreciate the meaning of civil society much less how to mobilize its energy for the task of national development.

Promote rapid economic development and industrialization: With oil wealth, Nigeria abandoned agriculture and by implication the rural areas and the majority of Nigerians. Today, our rural areas look like 14^th century hamlets lacking all basic amenities. The rural and urban areas are delinked. Our so-called factories and industries rely largely on imported inputs. Our consumption patterns are dependent on the productive activities of foreign investors and producers. Government should not get into the business of production except in sensitive and very capital intensive areas. It must however have a clear policy that favors its citizens first. It must create an enabling environment. It must design policies to assist those that demonstrate the capacity to go into serious business. With an underdeveloped economy, a nation would be deluding itself to think that it has global influence, much less power. South Africa’s sudden prominence in African and world affairs is directly linked to its industrial and general economic capacity. Nigeria must take industrialization more seriously. Building so-called industrial estates without industries is an escapist approach to serious industrialization. Enough of talking about industrialization. It is time to act and show results. Allow me to suggest that a national think thank be established to work out a holistic strategy for industrialization based on local content in the first instance.

Address the national question: The failure of previous regimes to address the national question continues to tear the country apart. This has precipitated untold pains, violence, massacres, alienation, and hatred even among communities that once coexisted. From the Nigeria Delta through the Middle Belt to the north significant communities and interest groups are acting out their understanding and perceptions of how Nigeria ought to be structured and organized. The emergence of IPC, OPC, APC, IYC, MASSOB, MOSOP, MWI and so on, only reflects frustrations with the present. It is much easier to address these problems through a national dialogue or conference before they get out of hand. We have lost millions of naira and thousands of innocent souls to religious intolerance already. To the extent that we keep thinking that these groups would exhaust themselves, we provide ammunition for the enemy. Again, investors, donors, lenders, and foreign governments are watching this closely. The poor handling of the Ogoni issue cost us our voice, relevance, and credibility in the international arena including sanctions from the west and the UN and suspension from the commonwealth. The crisis is not over and the earlier it is addressed the better. An unstable and violence-ridden nation cannot moralize or preach to the world. Our undemocratic political situation under Babangida and Abacha mediated our credibility when we announced that our intervention in Liberia was to restore democracy! Nigerians must be allowed to sit and discuss how they want to live together, to negotiate the national question, reach some minimal consensus, and collectively commit to democracy, social justice, tolerance, and coexistence.

Revamp, restructure, retrain, and re-equip the police, armed forces, and security services.: No doubt the Nigeria military has received a bashing to its credibility in recent years no thanks to the inglorious juntas of Babangida and Abacha. The military still has a role to play in national development and in protecting the integrity of the nation. However, it needs to be restructured both in its training, responsibilities, and relationship to a democratic reality. The retirement of “political military officers” is a good starting point. There is a need to take a serious look at the issues of training, deployment, promotions, location of hardware, conditions of service especially for the so-called “other ranks” and political education. If Nigeria is going to continue its longstanding involvement in peacekeeping, a disciplined, well-trained, well-paid, and well-equipped military is indispensable. If the military is left in its old structure, ideology and mode, it could challenge our democratic experiment and take us back to square one. With the current anti-coup posture of the OAU and tendencies in the global community, Nigeria would face ridicule and isolation to the detriment of the quest for development, stability, and global influence.

Tackle corruption: We all know that the government’s anti-corruption initiatives have had very limited effect. Recently the former chairman of Ibaja Local Government was jailed by a Lokoja High Court for awarding a N4.9 million contract without budgetary approval or cash backing (Thisday October 1, 2002). He was prosecuted by the Anti-Corruption Commission. If this should be the case most of our governors and ministers should be in jail for awarding contracts that they have remained unable to pay: no cash backing! By not probing leaders that were known to be corrupt, the government has created the impression that there are sacred cows. But more importantly, there have to be ways to empower civil society organizations, communities, and official structures to get involved in the task of fighting corruption. Corruption is not good for business or the image of the country. Many Nigerians abroad have been denied several opportunities because of the image of corruption, lack of discipline, and official inability to check the excesses of businesspersons. Corruption eradicates discipline and merit. It increases the cost of business. It endangers national security and leads to waste.

Address the problem of the youth, women and minorities: The youth and women constitute well over 70 percent of the Nigerian population. Nigeria has no youth policy in the country and we hardly take the question of women seriously. Though there is a ministry that is supposed to address this, there is no comprehensive agenda. Our women remain marginal, dominated, disrespected, and exploited. They are still seen as objects for sexploitation rather than partners in the task of national development. Most of those in power today are insensitive to gender issues and they see the youth as constituting a nuisance. This is a grave mistake. Until the government is able to effectively address the issue of the youth and women, it might as well be indirectly funding a powerful opposition army that would rubbish its overall programs. No nation in the contemporary world overlooks the possible contribution of women and young people. The negative consequences of their reaction to alienation and marginalization could totally upset a country’s stability.

Rehabilitate decayed institutions especially academic and research centers: to put it mildly, our academic institutions are largely a joke today. Aside from the brain drain that has affected the institutions official neglect has also promoted decay at all levels. No wonder, most graduates from Nigerian universities are hardly better today than high school graduates of the 1970s. It is not surprising that many are no longer admitted directly (if at all) to graduate programs abroad. Libraries are empty or ten years behind in literature. Laboratories are empty. Buildings are dilapidated. Teachers are unpaid and angry. Students have taken to cultism and violence. In fact, it is a shame. Some universities started and are still operating bogus and useless “Satellite Campuses” or so-called “Executive Programs” and “outreach campuses” in all nooks and corners of our major cities just to raise money. Universities that are unable to retain staff, pay salaries, recruit qualified faculty or maintain their main campuses were running external campuses. The government must take this issue seriously. It is embarrassing the Nigerians are now sending their kids to Ghana, South Africa, Botswana and Uganda for higher education. At the elementary level, the middle and upper classes have abandoned the public schools for the expensive private schools all over the country, in Benin and Togo. A country that neglects education will not survive in the long run. Not much needs to be said about this. We either rebuild, strengthen, re-equip, and restructure our schools or prepare for disaster. I recommend an immediate N1 billion special grant to all existing universities specially for libraries, laboratories, and infrastructure. This money should be managed by a committee of Council. Senate. Faculty and senior staff unions, and the students’ unions.

Give the country a popular constitution that would promote good governance, national unity, the rule of law and political stability. The 1999 constitution is, at best, a fraudulent document. It cannot serve as the basis of governance and it has been condemned across the country. The fact that the National Assembly and the presidency have set up mechanisms to review the constitution is evidence of the problems with the constitution. The process of constitution review must however be seen as an opportunity to promote mass political education, mobilization, national dialogue or debate, and for addressing the national question especially issues of women, human rights, citizenship, religion, refederalization, language and the rile of law. These are some of the contradictions that precipitate violence.

Encourage Creativity and Reward Merit: We must establish a system that encourages the creativity, originality and curiosity among Nigerians. It must be a system that rewards merit and would bring new blood and new ideas into government. With due respect, we cannot keep recycling old men and women with old ideas, persons who have not read a book in five or more years and who hardly know where or how to turn on a computer in this turbo-technology and market driven era. We have a choice: continue with these conservative and pro-status quo ideas and persons in power or revamp our nation so we can move forward to harness national energies and creativities for the overall good of all. Personally, I cannot believe that persons who were in power when I was an undergraduate over 20 years ago still in power today! When are we going to move forward and allow new voices, new ideas, and new leaders to help bring our country into the new era?

Politicians must call themselves to order: The Nigerian power elite is once again putting Nigeria on the path to destruction and authoritarianism. These same elite and their progenitors precipitated a civil war, several coups and counter coups as well as the current economic predicaments of the country including a huge foreign debt profile. Their unguarded, insensitive, provocative and undemocratic conducts and pronouncements in heating up the political landscape and promoting cynicism, suspicions and violence. They are taking Nigerians for a ride once again. They must call themselves to order immediately.

Parties must be accountable: Political parties must hold themselves accountable for the actions of their leaders and members. INEC, the police and judiciary must be prepared to take drastic action against the parties and their leaders for any act of violence. The parties must all begin to design mechanisms for party discipline and be prepared to punish those politicians that revel in indiscipline, corruption, arrogance, and violence.

Political Decampees must be carefully watched and managed: Where political parties accept decampees at least 6 months to any election, such persons must miss one election exercise before putting themselves up for election. If it takes over three years to realize that a party is not suitable or it takes rejection at a party primary to realize this, movement to another party is only opportunistic and not based on serious ideological considerations. By restricting entry into the political race, decampees do not upset existing party programs and try to force out existing candidates through intimidation, bribery, thuggery, manipulation, lies, and other extra-legal mechanisms. It would check irresponsible and opportunistic decamping from party to party, corruption, and violence.

The people must liberate themselves: Nigerians are going to have one more opportunity to liberate themselves from disease, hunger, waste, criminal leadership, unpaid salaries, inflation, and marginalization in 2003. They must use their votes very wisely. A word is more than enough for a fool. It is ordinary people that are often recruited for violence, thuggery, rigging, intimidation and so on. Hunger and unemployment are not excuses for stupidity and indiscipline. They must use the 2003 elections as opportunities to correct existing political mistakes and must see through lies, political arrogance, and the oratorical fecundities of politicians. They must consider the individual, the track record, party agenda, specific programs related to particular communities, and where possible go into open or public contracts with the very best candidate.

Progressives must bid for power: I am a very strong believer in the fact that progressive persons and activists must make a bid for power. This is not the time to sit by and complain or criticize endlessly. It is time to deploy the accumulated experience and networks into the service of the people. It is ideologically wrong to leave the terrain to rascal politicians and then complain that they are not performing. Those who have no desire to run must support those that have the courage to run. It is ideologically fraudulent to give up a war even before fighting a battle, to discourage those that a making a bid for power and to conclude, even before they win elections that they would fail. If you do not have power you can change nothing.

Convene a National Conference: I do not see an alternative to a national conference in this country. If we had a national conference since May 1999, we might have avoided many of the pitfalls, hot points and fault lines that currently characterize our nation’s politics and society today. Things have become really bad. We do not trust each other. Criminals are being celebrated. No amount is too large to steal and no community is too civil to be wiped out or terrorized. Power has become an instrument to loot, kill and destroy. Values have been subverted. Ideologies have become worthless. Leaders have become frightened, tired and weak. Institutions have come delegitimated. How many of you here trust the police? Love the customs? Have anything to do with the fire services? Our people are hoping against hope. Tears are no longer the preserve of the hungry. Frustrated young men have become armed robbers. Greedy and misguided young women have become prostitutes. There is hardly a distinction between a professional prostitute and spinster today. Our campuses have been captured by cultists, armed robbers, thugs and persons with no interest in academic excellence. No university building is too strategic to be torched as we just saw at Delta State University. Armed robbers, indicted public servants, crooks, pimps, and 419 king pins are being made chiefs and celebrated as heroes. In short, the fault lines in our society are getting wider by the day as massacres, intimidation, violence, corruption, compromised and contaminated leadership, and poverty continue to eat steadily at the nation’s fabric. The solution in my mind is a two year national conference at the Ward, Local Government, State and national levels. Truly comprehensive, involving all segments of the Nigerian society and culminating in the production of a new national agenda. A conference would not break up the country and would not in any way challenge the power of those in office. Of course it would set new rules for accountability and transparency, social justice, environmental protection, women’s rights, religious harmony, ethnic equality, freedoms, socio-economic rights, and the mechanisms for capturing and deploying power. I would concede that a sincere, serious, representative, well-funded, and autonomous constitution review process can achieve similar objectives as was the case in South Africa. The choice is there for the power elite. If it fails to seize the moment and bring about critical reforms and anchor the future of our democracy in the people and their communities, it would have itself to blame pretty soon. Nigerians must make support or non-support for a national conference or a truly consultative, inclusive and people-driven constitution reform a political and campaign issue. Those candidates that refuse to support the agenda should be voted out of office without remorse. It is only through such reforms, involving the people and their communities that we can redress the structural deformities in the system, get a truly democratic constitution, promote social justice and build as foundation for social security and democracy.